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Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRA.'J\JSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
DECLARATION OF VINT LEE 
HUGHES, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
ON BEHALF OF H-D TRANSPORT, 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, VINT LEE HUGHES, under penalty of perjury, declare as follows: 
DECLARATION OF VINT LEE HUGHES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF H-D TRANSPORT, IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
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1. I am the individually named Plaintiff referenced above and have brought this 
lawsuit in that capacity and as a 50% partner of H-D Transport, an Idaho partnership. 
2. I understand that Michael Pogue and his law firm Lawson & Laski, PLLC are 
claiming that they were never my attorneys and were never and are not now the attorneys for 
H-D Transport. 
3. I also understand that Michael Pogue and his law firm are claiming that, at the 
trial of the lawsuit filed against me by H-D Transport and Andrew Diges, I testified that Michael 
Pogue and his law firm Lawson & Laski, PLLC were only Andrew Diges' attorneys. I have read 
the testimony that Michael Pogue and his law firm quote. Michael Pogue and his law firm are 
mischaracterizing my testimony. 
4. I never testified or argued that Michael Pogue and his law firm were only Andrew 
Dig es' attorneys. The testimony quoted by Michael Pogue and his law firm is my statement 
about learning on November 21, 2011, that Michael Pogue and his law firm was only 
representing Andrew Diges' interest. I did not say and did not intend for my testimony to mean 
that I never believed Michael Pogue and his law firm to be my attorneys. 
5. From the time that Andrew Diges hired Michael Pogue and his law firm on 
October 21, 2011 until December 3, 2011, I believed that Michael Pogue and his law firm 
represented me, Andrew, and our partnership, H-D Transport. 
6. I believed this because Andrew and I discussed Andrew hiring a lawyer to draft a 
partnership agreement for me, Andrew, and our partnership. I learned from Andrew that he hired 
Michael Pogue and his law firm to do this for us. 
7. After learning that Michael Pogue and his law firm were our attorneys, I spoke 
with Michael Pogue and our partnership bookkeeper about the partnership's finances for the 
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purposes of putting together the partnership agreement That was on at least one occasion, on 
November , 2011, if not on other occasions as well. Following the November 21 call, I 
received an email from our bookkeeper to Michael and me talking about our discussions about 
creating a partnership agreement. A true and copy of that email is attached to the Declaration of 
my attorney, Scott Learned, as Exhibit 4. 
8. Michael Pogue and his law firm never told me that they were not my attorneys. 
By November 21, I had become suspicious about whose interests Michael Pogue and his law 
firm were representing, but I still believed that they were the attorneys for me, Andrew, and our 
partnership. 
9. I believed that Michael Pogue and his law firm represented all of us until 
December 3, 2011, when I received a letter dated November 28, 2011. In that letter Michael 
Pogue and his law firm state that they represent Andrew, only, and that I had two options for 
getting out of the partnership. This was the first time that I came to learn that my attorney-client 
relationship with Michael Pogue and his law firm was over. 
10. December 3, 2011, was also the first time that I came to understand that Michael 
Pogue and his law firm were claiming to no longer be the attorneys for H-D Transport. But by 
December 5, 20 I l, I learned that Michael Pogue and his law firm sued me on December 2, 2011, 
as the lawyers for H-D Transport. It did not appear to me that Michael Pogue and his law firm 
ended the attorney relationship with H-D Transport for very long, if at all. 
11. After Michael Pogue and his law firm sued me as counsel for H-D Transport, and 
still to this day, I understand Michael Pogue and his law firm to be attorneys for H-D Transport. 
Based on the lawsuit that they filed against me, I understand that they are the attorneys who 
decided that H-D Transport was going to be shut down. Also, all during the lawsuit, they 
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controlled all of H-D Transport's information. Any time I wanted some information about 
Transport I had to go to Michael Pogue and his law firm. Often times they would not me 
what I asked. They also never gave me proof of where H-D Transport's money went. I and my 
attorneys asked for that information, and Michael Pogue and his law firm would never say where 
the money was. They also would not provide any documents showing where the money was. 
12. My previous attorney asked to have the money protected at a January 17, 2012, 
hearing. Michael Pogue and his law firm said that there was no need for concern about the 
money. I understood from Michael Pogue and his law firm's comments that Michael Pogue and 
his law firm were taking care of and keeping safe H-D Transport's money. 
13. To my knowledge, Michael Pogue and his law firm are still H-D Transport's 
attorneys who are shutting down H-D Transport. I know from my prior attorney, Ben Worst, his 
filing to withdraw as my counsel, and the hearing that I attended on that filing, that the Court has 
to give permission for an attorney to get out of a case. When the Court signed the Order I 
understood that Mr. Worst was no longer my attorney and that he terminated his relationship 
with me and H-D Transport. I understood I was on my own and expressed to the Court my 
anxiety about it. I am not aware of Michael Pogue and his law firm asking the Court for 
permission to be let off of the case against me at any time. Every hearing I went to, Michael 
Pogue and his law firm were announced as the attorneys for H-D Transport. Also, all documents 
I got in the lawsuit list Michael Pogue and his law firm as the attorneys for H-D Transport. 
14. I know from being involved in the trial in H-D Transport's lawsuit that Michael 
Pogue and his law firm brought against me that H-D Transport got a judgment from the lawsuit. 
I have asked my attorneys, Jones & Swartz PLLC, to ask Michael Pogue and his law firm to 
collect on the judgment so that partnership creditors can get paid. To my knowledge, Michael 
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Pogue and his law firm have not collected on H-D Transport's judgment. I learned from my 
attorneys who lea.med from an email from Michael Pogue and his law fum' s attorneys that 
Michael Pogue and his law firm will not be executing on the judgment. 
15. H-D Transport needs the money from the judgment. It has cralitors (my parents) 
that have not yet been paid. I also believe that the partnership may owe taxes and to my 
knowledge taxes have not been prepared or paid. 
16. Michael Pogue and his law firm also have done nothing to close down H-D 
Transport. Creditors still have to be paid, the judgment has to be collected, and trucks have to be 
sold. I have been trying and continue to try to sell one of the partnership trucks, but have been 
unsuccessful. I have no idea where the other truck in Michael Pogue and his law fum's other 
client's possession is or whether it has been sold. 
I declare wider penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing 
is true and correct 
. 1):... 
DATED this J{J day of October, 2014. 
By.~-Vint Lee Hugh 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of October 2014, a true and correct copy 
foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
John J. Janis 
Kira Dale Pfisterer 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Counsel for Defendants 
The Honorable John K. Butler 
District Judge 
Jerome County Courts 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax: 342-2927 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: johnjanis@aol.com 
kdp@hepworthlaw.com 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax: (208) 644-2609 
[X] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: 
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JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702] 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988 
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 615-5327 
Facsimile: (215) 650-5327 
Email: scottleamed@msn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby respond to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed September 19, 2014. As discussed below, the Court should deny 
Defendants' Motion for multiple reasons, including that Plaintiffs have established genuine 
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issues of material fact regarding the existence of an attorney-client relationship and breach of the 
duties resulting from that relationship; that the litigation privilege does not apply between an 
attorney and his client; and that Plaintiffs' claim for unreasonable restraint of trade is not, as 
argued by the Defendants, limited to a conspiracy or alleged conduct without intent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant lawyer Michael D. Pogue and the Defendant law firm Lawson & Laski, PLLC 
("Defendants") were counsel for H-D Transport and their argument otherwise is belied by the 
evidence. Defendants appeared before this Court as counsel for H-D Transport in a partnership 
dissolution action. Defendants signed filings under Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure that they submitted to this Court stating that they represent H-D Transport. 
Defendants' attempt to argue that they did not represent H-D Transport must be summarily 
rejected. Defendants were, and remain, H-D Transport's attorneys in the partnership dissolution 
action. 
Defendants' argument that they did not represent Mr. Hughes and, as such, they cannot 
be sued for malpractice also must be rejected. Contrary to the Defendants' argument that 
Defendants' lack of a relationship with Mr. Hughes has already been determined, that issue has 
never been previously submitted to, or decided by, any court. Neither collateral estoppel nor 
judicial estoppel applies. Whether Mr. Hughes reasonably believed that he had an attorney-
client relationship with the Defendants is a determination that must be left for the jury in this 
case - the first and only case that addresses the relationship between Defendants and 
Mr. Hughes. Among the evidence that the jury will have to weigh will be the undisputable facts 
that Mr. Hughes was told by his partner, Andrew Diges, that the Defendants were hired to draft a 
partnership agreement for Messrs. Hughes and Diges; that Defendants, Mr. Hughes, and the 
partnership's bookkeeper engaged in a call and email exchange for the purposes of preparing for 
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Defendants' drafting of the partnership agreement and that Defendants never told Mr. Hughes 
that they did not represent him during this time; and that partnership money was paid to 
Defendants for the purposes of drafting the partnership agreement for Messrs. Hughes and Diges. 
Defendants' argument that Mr. Hughes' lawsuit is barred by the litigation privilege must 
also be rejected. Mr. Hughes' claim against Defendants has nothing to do with Defendants' 
conduct while representing clients adverse to Mr. Hughes in litigation, nor does it have to do 
with defamation - the only type of claim to which the privilege applies. Mr. Hughes' claim is 
aimed at Defendants' conduct before litigation ensued. Specifically, Defendants went from 
jointly representing Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport in the drafting of a partnership 
agreement to representing Mr. Diges only - turning on Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport, forcing 
Mr. Hughes out of the partnership, and forming a company for Mr. Diges to put the partnership 
out of business. 
The litigation privilege also does not bar H-D Transport's claim. The litigation privilege 
does not protect an attorney from a lawsuit brought by a client. That is H-D Transport's claim, 
that Defendants breached their duties to H-D Transport while representing H-D Transport before 
and during litigation. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in its entirety. fvfr. Hughes 
and H-D Transport's Complaint against the Defendants is viable and must be allowed to proceed 
to a jury trial. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden of 
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establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. Van v. 
Portneuf Med. Idaho 552, 556 (2009). 
The Court is to construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. 
Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 
64 P.3d 317,320 (2003). 
III. STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Of the facts advanced by Defendants as being undisputed, Plaintiffs dispute the 
following: 
Defendants cite to paragraph 10 Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint as stating that Mr. Diges 
hired Defendants to represent Mr. Dig es. 1 Defendants' recitation of paragraph 10 of the 
Complaint is not accurate. Verified Complaint speaks for itself, but paragraph 10 
states that Defendants were hired on behalf of Mr. Diges, Mr. Hughes, and H-D Transport to 
draft a partnership agreement for Mr. Diges and Mr. Hughes.2 
Defendants' claim that they did not represent H-D Transport3 is disputed by numerous of 
Defendants' filings with this Court in a dissolution action captioned H-D Transport and Andrew 
Diges v. Vint Lee Hughes, Case No. CV-2011-955, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.4 Those documents state, expressly, that Defendants are 
counsel for H-D Transport: "Plaintiffs H-D TRANSPORT and ANDREW DIGES by and 
1 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. 
2 Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, ,i IO. 
3 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. 
4 Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 allows this Court to take judicial notice of the court file in the same or 
separate case. (I.R.E. 20l(c).) 
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through their attorneys, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue PLLC."5 
Defendants also appeared at numerous hearings on behalf ofH-D Transport: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
COURTROOM OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BLAINE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
BLAINE COUNTY, HAILEY. IDAHO 
APRIL 3. 2012, Tuesday, 1:30 P.M. 
7 THE BAILIFF: Please rise. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated .. All 
9 right. It's now 1 :30 April 3, 2012, The first 
10 matter we're going to take up is H-0 Transport, et 
11 al. versus Vint Hughes, case number CV-2011-55. 
12 All right The record will reflect 
13 Mr. Pogue is present on behalf of the plaintiffs and 
14 counterdefendants, H-P Transport and Andrew Digges; 
15 and Mr Worst is present on behalf of the defendant, 
16 counterclaimant, Mr Hughes. Mr. Hughes is also 
17 present in court 
(Ex. 1 to Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel"), Apr. 3, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 1:1-17.)6 
Notably, Defendants have never withdrawn as counsel for H-D Transport and remain its 
counsel of record in the dissolution action.7 In contrast, Benjamin Worst filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel for H-D Transport as a Counterclaimant and Mr. Hughes as a Defendant 
and Counterclaimant, on March 23, 2012. That motion was heard and granted on April 3, 2012.8 
Plaintiffs also dispute Defendants' statement that Mr. Hughes previously testified that 
5 Dec. 2, 2011 Application for Temporary Restraining Order, H-D Transport and Andrew Diges v. Vint 
Lee Hughes lawsuit, CV-2011-955, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Blaine ("H-D Transport v. Hughes"). See also, Dec. 2, 2011 Verified Complaint, H-D 
Transport v. Hughes; Jan. 4, 2012 Motion for Appointment of Special Master re: Partnership Dissolution 
Accounting Issues and Motion to Shorten Time thereon, H-D Transport v. Hughes; and every other filing 
signed by Defendants on behalf of H-D Transport in H-D Transport v. Hughes. 
6 See also, Exs. 8 and 9 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript and July 3, 2012 
Hearing Transcript, respectively, and every other hearing attended by Defendants on behalf of H-D 
Transport in H-D Transport v. Hughes. 
7 See generally, the docket for the H-D Transport v. Hughes lawsuit, showing no motion to withdraw as 
counsel for H-D Transport filed by Defendants. 
8 Ex. 1 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jul. 3, 2012 Hearing Transcript. 
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Defendants did not represent Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport, as well as Defendants' statement 
Hughes mistakenly believed Defendants represented him for about a month.9 
Mr. Hughes reasonably believed that Defendants were counsel for himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D 
Transport from October 21, 2011 to December 3, 2011, when Mr. Hughes received the 
November 28, 2011 letter sent in an attempt to force Mr. Hughes out of the H-D Transport 
partnership. 10 That is the first time that Defendants declared that they were counsel for, only, 
Mr. Diges. Of course, only four days later Defendants filed the dissolution lawsuit referenced 
above, identifying themselves as counsel for H-D Transport. 
Mr. Hughes has, at all times, reasonably believed that Defendants represented H-D 
Transport. 11 Defendants sued Mr. Hughes as counsel for H-D Transport. 12 Defendants, as 
counsel for H-D Transport, controlled all of H-D Transport's information throughout 
discovery. 13 Defendants, as counsel for H-D Transport, represented to Mr. Hughes, his attorney 
Ben Worst, and the Court that they were protecting Transport's assets. 14 Defendants are 
still counsel for H-D Transport. 15 H-D Transport has a judgment against Mr. Diges, but 
Transport cannot enforce it because Defendants will not move for enforcement against their 
other client, Mr. Diges, and they will not withdraw as counsel for H-D Transport. 16 
Plaintiffs also dispute Defenda.'l.ts' statement that Mr. Hughes argued in t.lie underlying 
case that Mr. Diges hired the Defendants for his sole benefit. 17 In the underlying lawsuit, 
9 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
10 Declaration of Vint Lee Hughes in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Hughes Dec."), ,r,r 5-10. 
ll Hughes Dec., ,r,r 5-12. 
12 Hughes Dec., ,i 11. 
13 Hughes Dec., ,i 11. 
14 Hughes Dec., ,r 12. 
15 Hughes Dec., ,r 13. 
16 Hughes Dec., 'if 14. 
17 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. 
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Hughes argued and testified that he believed that Mr. Diges hired Defendants to draft a 
partnership agreement for Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport. Mr. Hughes also argued 
that Mr. Diges breached his duty to Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport by representing that 
Defendants' engagement was for the purpose of drafting a partnership agreement for 
Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport, when, unbeknownst to Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges later 
had Defendants start advising on taking Mr. Hughes out of the picture and dissolving H-D 
Transport. Mr. Hughes' testimony from the underlying case bears that out. 
Mr. Hughes did not testify that he believed there was a lack of an attorney-client 
relationship between Defendants and himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport. Mr. Hughes 
testified that he believed there was such a relationship, that he understood Defendants had a role 
in the partnership, and that he was blindsided on November 21, 2011, that Defendants were not 
representing the interests of Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport: 
A. [T]he 21st of November is when it was actually disclosed to 
me by another individual who we were working \\rith that you 
truly were not representing H-D Transport the partnership and 
was individually representing Mr. Diges. 
*** 
This here is the follo\\ring day when my wife and I obviously 
were completely blind sided by the deception of your role in 
the partnership. 18 
*** 
And then he [Andrew Diges] also didn't return a phone call 
after I'd found out that you were actually not representing 
Hughes/Diges but representing Mr. Diges' interests. 19 
While Mr. Hughes questioned whether Defendants were representing each client's 
respective interests equally as of November 21, 2011, Mr. Hughes held his belief about the 
18 Ex. G to Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel in Support of Summary Judgment ("Aff. of Defs' Counsel"), 
Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, p. 213:3-6 and 9-11. 
19 Ex. G to Aff. of Defs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
p. 228:16-19. 
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existence of an attorney-client relationship with Defendants and himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D 
Transport from October 21, 2011 until December 2011.20 December 2011, is when 
Mr. Hughes received the November 28, 2011 letter wherein Defendants disclosed for the first 
time that they were counsel for, only, Mr. Diges.21 
Plaintiffs also dispute Defendants' attempted use of Judge Brody's finding with regard to 
Mr. Diges' retention of the Defendants.22 While Judge Brody's conclusion states what it states, 
it does not have a preclusive effect in this case. The issue of whether an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport and the Defendants was not before 
Judge Brody. Judge Brody's ruling on the Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law states as much: 
Secoud, th.is Court must detcrrnme wheiber it should issue any clarification 
regarding this Court's st.at.ement about M:r. Diges' attorney client relationship with Mr. 
Pogue.~ Defendant seeks to clarify paragraph 18 of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion.s of Law. The Defendant presents no valid reason or legal standard requiring 
this Court to clarify its findings. Therefore, in the exercise of discretion, this Court sees 
no reason to clarify paragraph 18. The concern is apparently over future issues that may 
arise. Those issues will have to wait for the future, when they might be fully litipted. 
(Ex. 2 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Nov. 17, 2014 Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4.) 
20 Hughes Dec., 115-10. 
21 Hughes Dec., 119-10. 
22 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Existence Of An Attorney-Client Relationship Between Plaintiffs And 
Defendants Is For The Jury To Decide 
Under Idaho law, "[w]hether an attorney-client relationship exists is a question of fact." 
Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9 (2012). An attorney-client relationship is created where the 
"attorney agrees to provide assistance, or engages in conduct that could reasonably be construed 
as so agreeing." Id. 
An attorney-client relationship can be formed "based upon the attorney's failure to clarify 
whom the attorney is representing where, under the circumstances, one of the parties could 
reasonably believe that the attorney is representing that person's interests." Berry, 153 Idaho 
at 9. "[W]here an attorney has represented a closely held business entity and then provides legal 
services for a transaction involving that entity and its owners where their interests are adverse, 
the attorney must clearly inform all involved who is the attorney's client and inform the others to 
seek independent legal advice." Id at 9-10 (citing Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577-78 
(2004)). 
"The scope of the representation depends upon what the attorney has agreed to do." 
Berry, 153 Idaho at 9. "If the attorney agrees to undertake a specific matter, the relationship 
terminates when that matter has been resolved." Id. "If the attorney agrees to handle any 
matters the client may have, the relationship continues until the attorney or client terminates the 
relationship." Id. 
In this case, Mr. Hughes reasonably believed that Defendants were counsel for himself, 
Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport collectively. He reasonably held that belief as to himself and H-D 
Transport until December 3, 2011.23 That is when he received a letter form Defendants stating 
23 Hughes Dec., ,i,i 5-10. 
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were counsel for Mr. Diges only. Mr. Hughes, on behalf Transport, then believed 
Defendants' attorney-client relationship with H-D Transport formed, again, on December 2, 
2011, when Defendants filed a lawsuit on behalf ofH-D Transport against Mr. Hughes.24 
As testified to by both Mr. Hughes25 and Mr. Diges, Defendants' engagement on 
October 21, 2011, followed Mr. Diges and Mr. Hughes discussing hiring an attorney to have a 
partnership agreement drafted. Their hope was that a formal agreement would end some of the 
problems the partners were experiencing: 
Q. Mr. Diges, isn't it true that you hired an attorney to draft a 
partnership agreement for you and Mr. Hughes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you do that approximately? 
A. We did that around 10-21 we were looking at this. 
Q. Did you write a check to pay for those services? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you write a check from the partnership account to pay for 
those services? 
A. Yes.26 
*** 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Hughes that you were gomg to have a 
partnership agreement drafted? 
A. I think we talked about it. 
Q. But both of you were interested in memorializing a formal 
agreement; would that be fair? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Would a formal agreement have ended some of the problems 
that you guys were having as a partnership? 
A. It might have. 
Q. Would that agreement define more specifically some of the 
understanding between you and Mr. Hughes about the 
partnership? 
A. It could have. 27 
24 Hughes Dec., 1fi 5-14. 
25 Hughes Dec., ,,r 5-10. 
26 Ex. 3 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
t 124:8-18. 
7 Ex. 3 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
p. 126:3-15. 
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On November 21, 2011, Mr. Hughes, Defendants, and Diane Barker, H-D Transport's 
bookkeeper, had a telephone call to assist Defendants with understanding H-D Transport's 
finances in preparation for drafting the partnership agreement.28 Ms. Barker sent an email 
following the call. Ms. Barker's email confirms that the collaborative call was at least 
represented as being for the purpose of assisting the partners with reducing their partnership 
agreement to writing so that they and the partnership could continue in operation: 
From: Diane Barker [mallto:d1anebarkendaho@gmail.com] 
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2011 3:04 PM 
To: Michael Poc:iue 
Cc: huqhes.iewelry@aol.com 
Subject: Accounting 
Dear Michael, 
Attached you will find: 
1. Excel Spreadsheet showing the gross financial contributions from the Hughes Family (including 
the Jewelry Gallery) into HD Transport. 
2. A Profit and Loss including all financial information that was given to me. 
3. A Balance Sheet including all financial information that was given to me. 
4. A Detailed Transaction list of the above reports. 
Please keep in mind the following: 
1. The Liabilities and Owner's Equity sections are slightly unconventional as I was trying to make rt 
all as transparent as possible. For instance, the personal expenditures of each partner are 
reflected there. So groceries, meals, clothing, and travel expenses that Vint purchased and 
consumed are accounted for in his name and likewise for Andrew. These items can be 
recatagorized after Andrew and Vint make a partnership decision on how to handle personal 
expenditures. 
2. The Draw section for Andrew has multiple entries wherein I allocated his draws to Cost of Goods 
Sold - Contract Driver at 30% of the Gross Receipts. Again, this is something that can be recast 
after the partners memorialize their agreement. 
3. The Draw section for Vint may be recast (per a partnership agreement) to reflect some or all of 
his cash inflows as loans rather than advances. Likewise his draws might then be loan 
repayments. And finally, some or all of his draws might be recast as management fees. 
I hope this provides a clear picture to all parties so that they may work on a partnership agreement that 
ensures the continued success of the operation. 
(Ex. 4 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Nov. 21, 2011 email from D. Barker to V. Hughes and M. 
Pogue.) 
28 Hughes Dec., 1 7. 
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Mr. Diges testified that Mr. Hughes had no reason to believe that Defendants were doing 
anything but working on the partnership until, at the earliest, the delivery of the November 28, 
2011 letter demanding that Mr. Hughes exit the partnership: 
Q. You testified that on October 21st you went to Mr. Pogue to 
have a partnership agreement drafted. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified that you had discussed that with Mr. Hughes 
prior to going to see Mr. Pogue. 
A. To do the partnership agreement, yeah, it was mentioned. 
Q. Now, did you tell Mr. Hughes you wanted to dissolve the 
partnership prior to sending him the letter on November 28th? 
A. No, we didn't.29 
Mr. Hughes did not testify that he believed there was a lack of an attorney-client 
relationship between Defendants and himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport. Mr. Hughes 
testified that he believed there was such a relationship, that he understood Defendants had a role 
in the partnership, and that he was blindsided on November 21, 2011, that Defendants were not 
representing the interests of Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport: 
A. [T]he 21st of November is when it was actually disclosed to 
me by another individual who we were working with that you 
truly were not representing H-D Transport the partnership and 
was individually representing Mr. Diges. 
*** 
This here is the following day when my wife and I obviously 
were completelrc blind sided by the deception of your roie in 
the partnership. 0 
*** 
And then he [Andrew Diges] also didn't return a phone call 
after I'd found out that you were actually not representing 
Hughes/Diges but representing Mr. Diges' interests.3 
29 Ex. 3 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
EP· 136:20- 137:5. 
0 Ex. G to Aff. of Defs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
fi· 213:3-6 and 9-11. 
1 Ex. G to Aff. of Defs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
p. 228:16-19. 
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While Mr. Hughes questioned whether Defendants were representing each client's 
respective interests equally as of November 21, 2011, Mr. Hughes held his belief about the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship with Defendants and himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D 
Transport collectively from October 21, 2011 until December 3, 2011. December 3, 2011, is 
when Mr. Hughes received the November 28, 2011 letter wherein Defendants disclosed for the 
first time that they were counsel for, only, Mr. Diges.32 
Of course, on or about December 5, 2011, when Mr. Hughes received notice that the 
Defendants had filed a dissolution lawsuit on behalf of H-D Transport against Mr. Hughes on 
December 2, 2011, Mr. Hughes, again, believed that Defendants were counsel for H-D 
Transport.33 Mr. Hughes, as a partner in H-D Transport, has believed that Defendants have been 
counsel for H-D Transport in dissolution from at least December 2, 2011, to the present day. 
Whether Mr. Hughes' belief that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself 
and Defendants, and H-D Transport and Defendants, is a question the jury must determine. 
Defendants cannot be granted summary judgment on their claim of an absence of an attorney-
client relationship on the facts currently before the Court. 
B. Neither Collateral Estoppel Nor Judicial Estoppel Applies In This Case 
1. Collateral estoppel does not bar an issue not previously litigated. 
Defendants' argument that Defendants' attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hughes and 
H-D Transport was determined by Judge Brody and that the issue is precluded in this action must 
be rejected. As Defendants note, collateral estoppel requires a showing of five factors: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier 
case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to 
the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
32 Hughes Dec., 1~ 5-10. 
33 Hughes Dec., 11 5-13. 
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precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was 
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the litigation. 
Rodriguez v. Dep 't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92 (2001 ). While Mr. Hughes was a party to the 
dissolution action and is a party to this action, whether he believed that an attorney-client 
relationship existed between himself and Defendants was not an issue in the dissolution action. 
As such, Mr. Hughes did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the existence of an 
attorney-client reiationship between himself and Defendants in the dissolution action. Judge 
Brody confirmed this in his ruling on the Motion to Amend his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
ofLaw: 
Second, this Court must determine whether it should issue any clarification 
regarding this Cowt•s ~t about Mr. Diges' attorney client rclatiooship with Mr. 
Pogue. The Defendant seeks to clarify paragraph 18 of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Defendant presents no valid reason or legal standard requiring 
this Court to clarify its findinas. Tnerefore, in the exercise of discretion, this Court sees 
no reason to clarify paragraph 18. 'The concern is apparently over future issues that may 
arise. Those issues will have to wait for the future, when they might be fully liti&ated. 
(Ex. 2 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Nov. 17, 2014 Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4.) 
2. Judicial estoppel does not apply because Plaintiffs did not take a position in the 
underlying lawsuit that is inconsistent with the position asserted in this lawsuit. 
Defendants' argument for judicial estoppel is as baseless as it is ironic. First, Plaintiffs 
never took a position in the underlying lawsuit that H-D Transport was not a party or that H-D 
Transport was not represented by DefendaI1ts. H-D Transport was, and still is, a named party in 
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dissolution action. In fact, a judgment was issued in its name.34 
It is ironic that Defendants would rely on judicial estoppel - a doctrine "'intended to 
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system"35 - to argue that Defendants 
were not H-D Transport's counsel in the dissolution action. Since filing that action on behalf of 
H-D Transport and through the present day, Defendants are counsel of record for H-D Transport 
and represented as much to the Court: "Plaintiffs H-D TRANSPORT and ANDREW DIGES by 
and through their attorneys, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue PLLC."36 
Defendants also appeared on behalf of H-D Transport at the very hearing where the 
Defendants claim they were secretly allowed to withdraw as counsel for H-D Transport and H-D 
Transport was mysteriously dismissed from the case, and afterward: 
1 COURTROOM OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
2 BLAINE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
3 BLAINE COUNTY, HAILEY, IOAHO 
4 APRIL 3. 2012, Tuesday, 1:30 P.M. 
5 
6 
7 THE BAILIFF: Please rise 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated All 
9 right It's now 1:30 April 3, 2012. The first 
10 matter we're going to take up is H-D Transport, et 
11 al. versus Vint Hughes, case number CV-2011-55. 
12 All right The record will reflect 
13 Mr. Pogue is present on behalf of the plaintiffs and 
14 counterdefendants, H-P Transport and Andrew Digges; 
16 and Mr Worst is present on behalf of the defendant, 
16 counterclaimant, Mr Hughes. Mr. Hughes is also 
17 oresent in court 
34 Ex. 5 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Mar. 7, 2014 Judgment for H-D Transport against Mr. Diges. 
35 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11, citing McCallister v. 
Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894 (2013). 
36 Dec. 2, 2011 Application for Temporary Restraining Order. See also, Dec. 2,201 l Verified Complaint; 
Jan. 4, 2012 Motion for Appointment of Special Master re: Partnership Dissolution Accounting Issues 
and Motion to Shorten Time thereon; and every other filing signed by Defendants on behalf of H-D 
Transport. 
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1 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Apr. 3, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 1:1-1 
the Defendants did not represent H-D Transport, they certainly never corrected the 
Court about who they represented. And, Defendants have never withdrawn as counsel for 
Transport and remain its counsel of record in the dissolution action.38 Rule 1 l{b)(2) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires leave of Court before an attorney is released as counsel of 
record. (I.R.C.P. ll(b)(2).) Additionally, under Idaho law, where, as here, the dissolution of 
H-D Transport is not yet complete, Defendants still represent H-D Transport. "The scope of the 
representation depends upon what the attorney has agreed to do." Berry v. McFarland, 153 
Idaho 5, 9 (2012). "If the attorney agrees to undertake a specific matter, the relationship 
terminates when that matter has been resolved." Id "If the attorney agrees to handle any 
matters the client may have, the relationship continues until the attorney or client terminates the 
relationship." Id. It cannot be denied that Defendants agreed to act as counsel 
pay and has an outstanding judgment (an asset) that needs to be enforced to pay creditors.39 
Even if this Court intended its comment about H-D Transport being a nominal party as 
releasing Defendants as counsel for H-D Transport and dismissing H-D Transport from the 
lawsuit, Defenda.11ts' claims that Mr. Worst was Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport's counsel when 
he agreed with the Court's assessment that H-D Transport was only a nominal party, is not 
binding on Mr. Hughes or H-D Transport. Mr. Worst was not counsel for Mr. Hughes or H-D 
Transport when the discussion referenced by the Defendants took place. The Court signed the 
37 See also, Exs. 8 and 9 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript and Jul. 3, 2012 
Hearing Transcript, respectively. 
38 See generally, the docket for the H-D Transport v. Hughes lawsuit, showing no motion to withdraw as 
counsel for H-D Transport filed by Defendants. 
39 Hughes Dec., 'ft 14-16. 
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order releasing Mr. Worst as counsel for H-D Transport and Mr. Hughes before the discussion 
took place.40 Whatever Mr. Worst stated after that order was entered, it was not as counsel for 
H-D Transport or Mr. Hughes and cannot be binding on them.41 An attorney cannot bind a party 
that they do not represent. The attorney must first represent a client-party before they can act on 
that client-party's behalf. And, even with representative authority, the attorney cannot surrender 
or give up a client-party's substantial right without actual authority. 
The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency. 
. . . An attorney has "the general implied or apparent authority to 
enter into or make such agreements or stipulations, with respect to 
procedural or remedial matters, as appear, in the progress of the 
cause, to be necessary or expedient for the advancement of his 
client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose for which the 
attorney is employed." Yet it is well settled that "The implied 
authority of an attorney ordinarily does not extend to the doing of 
acts which will result in the surrender or giving up any substantial 
right of the client." 
Muncey v. Children's Home Finding & Aid Society, 84 Idaho 147, 151-52 (1962). 
Second, Defendants' attempt to argue that Mr. Hughes took the position that Mr. Diges 
hired Defendants as Mr. Diges' attorney in the underlying dissolution action is a convenient, but 
inaccurate, representation of what transpired in the underlying action. Mr. Hughes did not argue 
or testify that he believed there was a lack of an attorney-client relationship between Defendants 
and himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport. Mr. Hughes testified that he believed there was 
such a relationship, that he understood Defendants had a role in the partnership, and that he was 
blindsided on November 21, 2011, that Defendants were not representing the interests of 
Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport: 
40 See Ex. l to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Apr. 3, 2012 Hearing Transcript on Worst's Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel (Order signed at p. 21 :S-13; discussion about a nominal party at pp. 21:25 -22:19). 
41 Hughes Dec., 41! 13. 
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[T]he 21st of November is when it was actually disclosed to 
me by another individual who we were working with that you 
truly were not representing Transport the partnership and 
was individually representing Mr. Diges. 
*** 
This here is the following day when my wife and I obviously 
were completely blind sided by the deception of your role in 
the partnership. 42 
*** 
And then he [Andrew Diges] also didn't return a phone call 
after I'd found out that you were actually not representing 
Hughes/Diges but representing Mr. Diges' interests.4 
Defendants' attempt to invoke judicial equitable doctrines to preclude arguments in this 
case that were never before advanced by Plaintiffs should be rejected. Equity cannot act to aid 
Defendants in arguments that are clearly not supported by the record before this Court. 
C. The Litigation Privilege Does Not Protect Defendants From A Malpractice Action 
Brought Against Them By Their Own Clients 
Defendants' claim that the litigation privilege is an absolute bar to this litigation must be 
rejected. The seminal case in Idaho on the litigation privilege is Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
826 (2010). As discussed in Taylor, the litigation privilege "does not provide attorneys 
blanket immunity against all claims raised against them, merely because they are acting as an 
attorney in litigation." Taylor, 149 Idaho at 839. The privilege applies, if at all, where 
"attorneys are being sued by the opponents of their client in a current or former lawsuit, and that 
suit arises out of the attorneys' legitimate representation of that client pursuant to that litigation." 
Id 
The Idaho Supreme Court has gone on to clarify that Taylor was not intended to apply to 
all claims against attorneys, but has only been applied in Idaho to guard against defamation 
42 Ex. G to Aff. of Defs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
E· 213:3-6 and 9-1 L 
3 Ex. G to Aff. of Defs' Counsel, Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in H-D Transport v. Hughes, 
p. 228:16-19. 
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claims. "[TJhe litigation privilege has only been applied to defamation claims based on 
particular statements made during the course of litigation." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. 
Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 84 n.10 (2012). 
The litigation privilege does not apply in this case. First, the present litigation does not 
contain a claim for defamation. Second, the breaches of fiduciary duty and malpractice claims 
being brought in this lawsuit are being brought by Defendants' clients, not opponents of 
Defendants' clients. Mr. Hughes' claims arise out of his attorney-client relationship with 
Defendants and Defendants' breach of duties arising from the same before litigation ensued -
when Mr. Hughes reasonably believed that Defendants were his attorneys. H-D Transport's 
claims arise out of its attorney-client relationship with Defendants and Defendants' breach of 
duties arising from the same before litigation ensued, throughout litigation, and continuing to the 
present day. 
Neither the nature nor the scope of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the litigation privilege. 
As such, Defendants' attempt to invoke the privilege should be rejected. 
D. Actionable Harm Did And Continues To Occur 
Defendants' claim that no actionable harm occurred that could support a claim in this 
case is not correct. Mr. Hughes' claim for actionable harm arose before litigation ensued, when 
he reasonably believed that Defendants were counsel for himself, Mr. Diges, and H-D Transport 
in the drafting of the partnership agreement. Defendants admit that during this period of time, 
and before it was made clear to Mr. Hughes that Defendants were not his attorneys on 
December 3, 2011, Defendants assisted Mr. Diges in taking H-D Transport's money and creating 
an entity for Mr. Diges on an expedited basis that would take over H-D Transport's assets and 
business: 
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Q. Was taking money that was due to the partnership and giving it 
to your LLC the right thing? 
MR. POGUE: He had to do it. 
THE WITNESS: I had to. 
BYMR. SWARTZ: 
Q. Did Mr. Pogue tell you to do it? 
MR. POGUE: Don't answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: I did it. 
MR. POGUE: If he asks you anything about what you said to me 
or I said to you, just ignore the question. We're getting really 
close to terminating this deposition. 
MR. SWARTZ: Mr. Pogue, I'm happy to swear you in and you 
can tell us why Mr. Diges had to transfer money that he didn't own 
to himself. Do you want to answer that question? 
MR. POGUE: Yes. Because there was no account that he could 
put it in because the account that the partnership had was frozen. 
MR. SWARTZ: It was in receivership according to your client, 
Mr. Pogue. 
THE WITNESS: He just told me no, the only person that could 
write a check on the account was Vint. 
BY MR. SWARTZ: 
Q. Who could deposit checks into that account? 
MR. POGUE: Anybody could. 
THE WITNESS: Anybodv could.44 
*** 
Q. Mr. Diges, I've just laid in front of you what is the Certificate 
of Organization for a limited liability company, and it looks 
like it's yours, Highly Dependable, LLC. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you seen this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask your attorney, Mr. Pogue, to file it on your behalf? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Pogue to expedite its filing? 
A. No. I just asked, Could you file an LLC for me? 
Q. Do you see in the lower right-hand comer where there is a $20 
expedite fee? 
A. No. 
Q. Lower right-hand comer. 
A. Yes. I can see it. Doesn't mean anything to me. 
MR. POGUE: I can speak to that. It was filed on an expedited 
basis because on November 29th the bank accounts wore [sic] 
44 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltf's Counsel, Feb. l, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges ("Diges Depo."), pp. 140:2-
141:4. 
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frozen and Mr. Hughes traveled to North Dakota to attempt to 
seize assets. 45 
Diges testified that the LLC that Defendants formed for him on an expedited basis was 
the purpose of continuing on with the business that H-D Transport already had in place: 
Q. Can you point to some point in time where you decided, We're 
done with trying to make this partnership work, and we're go 
doing to do --
A November, yeah. Right there. November 30th, when we did 
our stuff. Up until that point I'd been trying to get everything 
done. It's like, I can't do this. 
Q. \Vhat was the purpose of Highly Dependable, LLC? 
A To protect myself, because I'm going to - I need to protect --
we need to protect ourselves so that I can take care of my 
family and take care of my obligations. 
Q. How was Highly Dependable, LLC, going to protect you? 
A How was it going to protect me? I'm - I've already got the 
business. I've already got - I hauled -- we have a 
transportation business. I'm keeping going. We're going to 
keep going and get everything figured out. And too, I just 
knew it was coming. I wanted to have something in place in 
case -- I didn't know what was going to happen. If everything 
would have closed down, I would have kept going one way or 
another, you know. I needed to keep going. Seeing what did 
happen, you know, that's why we started it up. Because there 
was no way to run the other way. 46 
Mr. Diges also confirmed that this part of his work with Defendants was not revealed to 
Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Did you tell Vint at all during this November timeframe that 
you were working with Mr. Pogue to come up with an option 
to create a new entity for you to take over all of the 
partnership's work? 
A N 47 . o. 
Mr. Diges also testified that Defendants' work in forming the competing company was after 
Defendants conducted their research on the rights and responsibilities that partners owe to one 
45 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 113:6- I 14:4. 
46 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 75:23 - 76:23. 
47 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Diges Depo., p. 19:1-5. 
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another: 
Mr. Diges, if you'll go back to the invoice from Lawson and 
Laski, I want to pick up where we were on November 28, 
2011. That's the same day as this demand letter, Exhibit 1, that 
went out to Mr. Hughes. It looks like you made the decision 
that you were going to file a lawsuit on that day. 
MR. POGUE: On what day? 
THE WITNESS: On this day. 
BYMR. SWARTZ: 
Q. You didn't have to? 
A. Research regarding partnership rights and responsibilities, and 
begin drafting. Yeah. Again, I tried to, you know, I'm not 
going - I'm trying to have my stuff ready a little bit ahead of 
time. If we -- if he would have talked to me and we could have 
got stuff taken care of, would have ripped it up. I had him look 
at it because I want to be prepared. I'm not going to be 
running behind. I'm not going to run behind on stuff. I'm 
trying to be prepared for where I'm going, what I'm doing. 
Like that truck. If I would have taken the white truck that we 
got, if I took it in the condition that we bought it in up to North 
Dakota, it wouldn't have lasted a week, and it would have been 
broken.48 
Mr. Hughes' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice arise out 
participation in the aforementioned conduct that resulted in H-D Transport, and Mr. 
50% interest therein, being damaged. Not only did Defendants help Mr. Diges take 
Transport's money, but they helped Mr. Diges eliminate H-D Transport as a viable entity. 
Defendants' claims that Mr. Hughes' harm has been remedied by the judgment against 
Mr. Diges and that, if this action is allowed to proceed, there will be a dual recovery are 
inaccurate. The judgment against Mr. Diges has not been paid and Defendants, as counsel for 
H-D Transport in the action that resulted in the judgment. will not execute on the judgment. 
That is the basis of further loss to the Plaintiffs, as is the loss of the opportunity to carry on in 
business. Mr. Hughes also has a claim for emotional distress caused by Defendants' breach of 
48 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltf' s Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 121 :21 - 122: 19. 
MEMORANDUM fN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 22 
249 
duties owed to him. The judgment against Mr. Diges, ever recovered, does not include 
recovery for such losses because such claims were not part of the action that gave rise to the 
judgment against Mr. Diges. 
H-D Transport's damages continue as Defendants have yet to complete the dissolution of 
the entity. H-D Transport has also suffered damages because Defendants never took any action 
on H-D Transport's behalf to protect H-D Transport's assets in preparation for liquidation and 
proper dissolution of H-D Transport. Defendants, in fact, acted contrary to proper dissolution 
and argued against preservation of assets. 
On December 15, 2011, Defendants suggested to Mr. Hughes' counsel, Benjamin Worst, 
that Mr. Worst make a proposal for the preservation of funds: 
If your client has concerns about the operation of the business pending any resolution I 
would encourage him to make a proposal regarding the preservation and use of funds in a 
separate account etc. 
I make this proposal subject to my client's consent, but I encourage you and your client 
to give it serious consideration. [ look forward to hearing from you and the prompt resolution of 
this matter. 
(Ex. 7 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Dec. 15, 2011 Pogue correspondence to Worst.) 
One month later, at the January 17, 2012 hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Mr. Worst 
asked that the funds be placed into Defendants' trust, for fear that the funds were being spent and 
could not be paid back. Defendants argued against placing the funds in trust; Defendants stated 
that Mr. Worst's concerns were without merit. Defendants stated that there was no missing or 
diverted cash: 
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6 MR WORST: Your Honor, what's to happen to 
6 the accounts receivable that Mr Digges' has 
7 diverted to his own separate bank account? 
8 THE COURT: VVell, that's all sub- - You 
9 know, my assumption is going to be that there's 
10 going to be a full accounting as to what happened to 
11 those monies And, certainly, if it tums out that 
12 Mr Digges has received more than he's entitled to, 
13 then there would be a judgment in your client's 
14 favor as against Mr Digges at that time. 
15 MR WORST: rm concerned that he may spend it 
16 in the time-being and not have the ability to repay 
17 it Is there any possibility we could have the 
18 court order that that be put into Mr. - either on 
19 deposit with the court or into Mr Pogue's trust 
20 account? 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Pogue? 
22 MR POGUE: Your Honor, I'm concerned about 
23 some of these statements that have been made 
24 regarding missing cash and the "elephant in the 
25 room,• quote. unquote. 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 16:5-25.) 
1 Mr Digges has gone to great lengths, 
2 including filing this action originally, requesting 
3 the appointment of a special master, or requesting 
4 and having an accounting of the corporation up 
5 through December 31st, prepared and submitted to the 
6 court. 
7 There is no missing cash . There is no 
a diverted cash. Any cash that has come in has been 
9 used to pay for tires, for trucks, for maintenance, 
10 and I think the full accounting of the partnership 
11 assets will allay any of these questions. And I 
12 think that the court has ordered the parties to 
13 submit this information under oath, and I think that 
14 this is something the special master is free to 
15 resolve. 
16 THE COURT: Well, what I'm going to say at 
17 this point in time is that when I say my, you know, 
18 the free -- the enjoining the party from disposing 
19 of or using any partnership assets would also 
20 include any partnership accounts receivable that 
21 still exist 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 17:5-21.) 
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This is the same hearing where Defendants argued for continued use of partnership assets 
- in direct contradiction to the plain language of the Uniform Partnership Act and contrary to the 
interests ofits client, H-D Transport: 
1 THE COURT; And does not the Uniform 
a Partnership Law preclude the use of any partnership 
9 property or assets for any purpose other than that 
10 necessary for purposes of winding up? 
11 MR. POGUE. Your Honor, I had an opportunity 
12 to review the Uniform Partnership Act both, you 
13 know. as the proceedings unwound and before this 
14 hearing, and I don't believe the Partnership Act is 
15 direct on that point. I think that some use of the 
16 partnership assets may continue during the winding 
17 up or dissolution process. 
18 THE COURT: It may only be used for purposes 
19 of winding up. 
20 MR. POGUE: Well. 1 think that the continued 
21 operation of the business or service of accounts 
22 may be -- is contemplated within the winding up 
23 process I don't think that there's anything 
24 direct. either in the code itself or the comment, 
26 that dictates that partnership assets must be 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 4:7-25.) 
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1 frozen 
2 I think that this issue is complicated by 
3 the fact that we have effectively three partnership 
4 assets. We have the two trucks, which have been 
s referred as the gray truck and a white truck; and I 
6 think the parties have represented or can agree that 
7 those two trucks have been parked and are not in 
8 use 
9 THE COURT: Well, and there's also a tanker. 
1 O MR POGUE: Exactly, there is a tanker or a 
11 trailer. and that trailer was purchased from an 
12 entity Circuit Trucking, LL.C, which. according -
13 or as reflected in the affidavit of Andrew Digges in 
14 Exhibit B, they had taken the position that they 
15 have retained the ownership of that item, and I do 
16 not believe that H-0 Transport has any equitable 
17 ownership of the trailer 
18 So, I think. with respect to halting 
19 the operation of the trailer. in particular, there 
20 is not sufficient legal or equitable grounds, 
21 especially in consideration of the fact that 
22 Mr Digges is using that essentially as his only 
23 source of income and has worked out an arrangement 
24 with Circuit Trucking, LLC to try to get some 
26 income to meet his monthly obligations. 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 5:1-25.) 
1 THE COURT: Yes, but I think under the 
2 Partnership Act, basically, the assets of the entity 
3 should be sold tt' the parties don1t agree, 
4 otherwise, as to what the proper disposition of 
5 those assets are, 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 6:1-5.) 
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18 MR WORST: Your Honor, I wholeheartedly 
19 disagree with what Mr, Pogue says I believe the 
20 Uniform Partnership Act is crystal clear. Idaho Code 
21 53-3-802, partnership continues after dissolution. 
22 Subject to Subsection (b) of this section, a 
23 partnership continues after dissolution only for the 
24 purpose of winding up its business. 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. ofPltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 6:18-24.) 
10 THE COURT: Well, I do agree, I mean I think 
11 the Partnership Act is fairly clear that. basically, 
12 the partnership assets and property are not to be 
13 used other than to wind up the partnership affairs. 
14 I recognize that there are only three 
15 assets of this partnership. Certainly, if those 
16 assets have to be sold, if the assets are 
17 continually used, there is a risk of depreciation of 
18 the value of the asset. 
19 I certainly recognize, Mr. Digges desire 
20 10 continue to receive an income. but I think he has 
21 10 do that without the use of partnership assets 
22 and property 
(Ex. 8 to Dec. of Pltfs' Counsel, Jan. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript, p. 8:10-22.) 
Even after this hearing, Defendants undertook no efforts to preserve H-D Transport assets 
in preparation for dissolution procedures clearly caHed for by the partnership code. 
Defendants' claim that their actions and inactions caused no actionable harm is not 
supported by the records before this Court. As such, Plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed 
with their claims for damages. 
E. The Unreasonable Restraint Of Trade Claims Are Valid And Must Be 
Permitted To Proceed 
Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs' unreasonable restraint of trade claims fail because 
Defendants cannot conspire with a client must fail. Defendants' argument ignores the plain 
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language of the unreasonable restraint trade statute and misconstrues Plaintiffs' burden of 
proving those claims. 
Idaho Code section 48-104 provides that "a contract, combination, or conspiracy between 
two (2) or more persons in unreasonable restraint of Idaho commerce is unlawful." I.C. § 48-104 
( emphasis added). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants unreasonably restrained through a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy. (Complaint,,, 40, 56.) Defendants have chosen to focus 
on one of the three types of conduct prohibited under section 48-104: conspiracy. Plaintiffs' 
allegations go beyond a conspiracy. 
Defendants' argument that they do not owe H-D Transport any fiduciary duties, and 
therefore could not have assisted Mr. Diges with competing against H-D Transport, ignores 
Defendants' attorney-client relationship with H-D Transport. Such an argument also assumes 
that there must be a fiduciary relationship in the Idaho Competition Act, which there not 
Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs cannot show any intent to put out of 
business is belied by the evidence. Most significantly, Defendants filed a lawsuit ... ,.,.,.;.;,.,"""" to 
H-D Transport out of business. Second, it cannot be ignored that Defendants intentionally set up 
a business that Mr. Diges intended to use to take over H-D Transport's business. And, they did it 
on an expedited basis without Mr. Diges asking for them to do so and, by their own statements, 
intentionally set up a mechanism for Mr. Diges' solely-owned LLC to take H-D Transport cash 
assets. 
Mr. Diges was taking all the partnership money, using partnership assets, and took the 
partnership hauling contract for himself after he was advised by his lawyer about how a 
partnership is wound-up in an orderly fashion.
49 Mr. Diges' decision to take the partnership's 
49 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltfs Counsel, Diges Depo, p. 73:16-18; see also, pp. 42:8-43:4. 
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money and assets also happened after he learned from his lawyer that he owed rights and 
obligations to the partnership and Mr. Hughes.50 When asked whether he cared about what his 
actions were doing to Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges testified that he made his moves very carefully and 
that Mr. Hughes dealt his own cards.51 Mr. Diges testified that his moves were prompted by 
what he believed was Mr. Hughes trying to '"screw" him.52 Mr. Diges also testified that he knew 
that pulling the money, contract, and assets out of the partnership meant that Mr. Hughes would 
be put out of business. 53 
Mr. Diges did not act alone. Defendants advised him on his rights and responsibilities to 
Plaintiffs, and yet helped Mr. Diges engage in intentional conduct that can only be said to be 
conduct that was intentionally designed to put H-D Transport out of business while allowing 
Mr. Diges to take over. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2014. 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
JOYM. VEGA 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
50 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltf's Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 121:21 - 122:9. 
51 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltf's Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 148:19- 149:6. 
52 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltfs Counsel, Diges Depo., pp. 134:17-135:9. 
53 Ex. 6 to Dec. of Pltf s Counsel, Diges Depo., p. 175:3-6. 
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Kira Dale Pfisterer 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Counsel for Defendants 
The Honorable John K. Butler 
District Judge 
Jerome County Courts 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax: 342-2927 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -
30 
257 
_.JI 
<:C 
·~ 
-~-
,::....._. 
-
e''°'~ 
':.._.,,, 
-::C 
,,:) 
Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702] 
P.O. Box 7808 
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Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988 
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 615-5327 
Facsimile: (215) 650-5327 
Email: scottlearned@msn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF L.JL;,:LH 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO 
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Plaintiffs, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully request that the Court 
take judicial notice of certain records from the court file in H-D Transport and Andrew Diges v. 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE l 
258 
Hughes, Case No. 2011-955, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Blaine, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d). Those records are as follows: 
1. December 2, 2011, Verified Complaint; 
2. December 2, 2011, Application for Temporary Restraining Order; 
3. January 4, 2012, Motion for Appointment of Special Master re: Partnership 
Dissolution Accounting Issues and Motion to Shorten Time Thereon; 
4. January 10, 2012, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for 
Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Vint Hughes' Application for Preliminary 
Injunction; 
5. March 13, 2013, Plaintiff's Supplemental Pre-Trial Conference Statement Re: 
Special Master's Report; and 
6. March 15, 2013, Plaintiff's Supplemental Witness Disclosure. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2014. 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
By J.rf R~~i,JJ 
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
JOYM. VEGA 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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District Judge 
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FILED 
OCT 2 7 201~ 
. John J. Janis [ISB 3599] 
Kira Dale Pfisterer [ISB No. 6571] 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
JoLy,m Draf)e, Clerk DiStric1 I 
Court B/3/ne Coun . trlanr;,_., 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Telephone: (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
* * * * * 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and LAWSON & 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2013-683 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Hepworth, Janis & 
Kluksdal, and hereby file this Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment fails to demonstrate a 
material dispute of fact that would preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. To be clear, 
Defendants vehemently deny that: (I) they were hired to represent the Plaintiffs or (2) had any prior 
knowledge or took any action whatsoever to assist their client, Andrew Diges, in using partnership 
assets for his own benefit. See Affidavit of Michael Pogue ("Pogue Aff."), ,r,r 3-9. However, the 
Court need not address those issues to resolve Defendants' summary judgment motion. Instead, the 
Court may focus solely on Plaintiffs' sworn testimony, including the following allegations: 
• Defendants were retained on October 21, 2011 for the purpose of drafting a 
partnership agreement for H-D Transport. See Verified Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, -,i 10. 
• Plaintiff Hughes was "blind sided" on November 21, 2011 when he "found out" that 
Defendants were not representing him or the partnership but were working solely for 
Mr. Diges. Affidavit of Kira Dale Pfisterer ("Pfisterer Afr"), Ex. G, 213:3-6, 9-11. 
On December 3, 2011, Plaintiff Hughes received a November 28, 2011 letter from 
Defendants advising him that they represented Mr. Diges only. Declaration of Vint 
Lee Hughes, lndi.'idually and on Behalf of f/-D Transport, in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Hughes Dec."), -,i 9. 
• By December 5, 20 l t, Plaintiffs knew that Defendants had filed a lawsuit against Mr. 
Hughes on December 2, 2011. Id. at -,i l 0. 
• "Beginning on December 1, 2011, Mr. Diges took H-D Transport's assets, including 
cash, equipment, and a hauling contract, and began using all of the same to operate 
his LLC." Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,~ 25. 
• "Throughout the entirety of the [Underlying Lawsuit], Defendants ... objected to or 
deflected every attempt by Mr. Hughes to have Mr. Digcs return H-D Transport's 
cash assets and have them placed into an account where they could be held in trust 
for uses consistent with dissolving H-D Transport, including paying partnership 
creditors." Id. at -,i 30. 
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The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this testimony is that the Defendants were not 
representing either of the Plaintiffs at the time of the alleged misconduct. Accordingly, no duties 
were owed to the Plaintiffs and summary judgment is warranted as a matter oflaw. 
In opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs rely upon the 
declaration from PlaintiffVint Lee Hughes to support their claims that an attorney client relationship 
existed between Defendants and Plaintiff Hughes until December 3, 2011 and between Defendants 
and Plaintiff H-D Transport to this very day. This declaration cannot create a genuine dispute of 
material fact on these issues for two primary reasons. 
First, to fom1 an attorney-client relationship, there must be mutual assent or conduct on the 
part of the attorney that could reasonably be construed as assent. While the Defendants do not 
believe it was ever reasonable for Plaintiff Hughes to believe that they represented his interests, by 
his own testimony, he knew they were not representing him or the partnership as ofas of November 
2 J, 1. Thus, the alleged harm stemming from the alleged negligence; i.e., the 
Transport's assets, took place after the attorney-client relationship ended. 
Second, Mr. Hughes's current statement that he believes that Defendants continue to 
represent Plaintiff H-D Transport cannot create a genuine dispute of fact, because no reasonable 
person could come to this conclusion under the circumstances. Further, this testimony is inconsistent 
with: (I) Hughes previous testimony; (2) his conduct in the Underlying Lawsuit; (3) his 
representations in the Underlying Lawsuit; and ( 4) his written discovery responses in this lawsuit. 
Because the Defendants did not represent the Plaintiffs at the time the alleged misconduct 
occurred, Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and professional malpractice fail as a matter 
of law. Further, the remaining claims are barred by the litigation privilege and also fail to state a 
claim unreasonable restraint of trade. 
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The gravamen of this lawsuit is that Plaintiffs claim the Defendants did not protect them 
from Mr. Diges' conduct during the pendency of the Underlying Lawsuit. However, no reasonable 
person could conclude that the Defendants owed Plaintiffs any special duties at that time. 
Defendants' duty was to their client, Mr. Diges, and they acted solely at his direction and consistent 
with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiff Hughes had his own attorneys to represent 
and protect his interests. 
The fact H-D Transport was named as a party does not change this analysis. Both Mr. Diges 
and Mr. Hughes brought claims on behalf of the partnership. The partnership was, as Plaintiff 
Hughes represented in the Underlying Lawsuit, a nominal party. In fact, to date, the 
partnership has not actually hired an attorney. 1 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Transport 
To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate a material dispute of 
fact. While all inferences made from the facts must be drawn in the Plaintifrs favor, such inferences 
must be reasonable. Similarly. summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable juror could 
support a finding for the non-moving party. 
Summary judgment is warranted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56©). Generally, the Court should 
"liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. and all reasonable inferences 
1 Hiring attorneys for the purpose of dissolving the partnership is not conduct carried on '·in the 
ordinary course of business." See J.C. s 53-3-30 l (2). Accordingly, the consent of both parties is 
required before an attorney can be hired to represent the partnership. To date, the parties have not 
agreed to hire an attorney to act on behalf of the partnership. 
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that can be drawn from the record wi11 be drawn in favor of the nonrnoving party." Boise Tower 
Associates, v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,779,215 P.3d 494,499 (2009). Summary judgment 
is not appropriate if "reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented." Id. 
B. No Attorney Client Relationship Existed as a Matter of Law and the Hughes' 
Declaration Fails to Create a Dispute of Fact on This Issue. 
No reasonable juror could conclude that an attorney-client relationship existed between the 
parties at the time of the alleged misconduct. Defendants have attempted to create a dispute of fact 
on this issue through the Hughes Declaration, but their efforts are unavailing for three primary 
reasons. 
First, no reasonable juror could find either: (1) Defendants's conduct manifested an assent 
to act as the attorneys for Mr. Diges, Mr. Hughes, and the H-D Transport partnership at anytime or 
(2) it was reasonable under the circumstances for Mr. Hughes to maintain any belief that the 
Defendants represented Mr. Diges, Mr. Hughes, and the H-D Transport partnership after November 
21, 2011. Second, the Hughes Declaration is inconsistent with (I) his previous testimony; (2) his 
conduct in the Underlying Lawsuit; (3) his representations in the Underlying Lawsuit; and (4) his 
written discovery responses in this lawsuit. Third, as set forth more fully in Defendants' opening 
brief, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel act as a legal bar to Plaintiffs' claims. 
Judge Brody's decision and Plaintiffs' prior statements through counsel, unequivocally establish that: 
(I) Defendants were never retained on behalf of either of the Plaintiffs; (2) Plaintiffs knew that 
Defendants did not represent them as ofNovember 21, 2011; and (3) PlaintiffH-D Transport was 
a party in the underlying proceeding in name only. 
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1. Defendants Did Not Agree to Represent Plaintiffs and No Reasonable Person Would 
Construe the Defendants' Conduct as Assenting to Such a Relationship. 
Typically. to create an attorney-client relationship, both the attorney and the client must agree 
to the relationship. Alternatively, the potential client must ask for help, and the attorney must engage 
in conduct that could be reasonably construed as agreeing to the representation: 
As a general rule, no attorney-client relationship exists absent assent 
by both the putative client and attorney. 'An attorney-client 
relationship can be established when the attorney is sought for 
assistance in matters pertinent to his [or her] profession.' Stuart v. 
State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990). If the 
attorney agrees to provide assistance, or engages in conduct that 
could reasonably be construed as so agreeing, then there is an 
attorney-client relationship. 
Berrv v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9,278 P.3d 407,411 (2012) (emphasis added). 
If an attorney-client relationship exists, the scope of that relationship depends on what 
attorney has been asked and agreed to do: 
Id. 
The scope of the representation depends upon what the attorney has 
agreed to do. If the client consults with the attorney, the relationship 
terminates upon the completion of the consultation unless the attorney 
agrees to continue the relationship or to undertake a specific matter 
for the client. If the attorney agrees to undertake a specific matter, the 
relationship terminates when that matter has been resolved. If the 
attorney agrees to handle any matters the client may have, the 
relationship continues until the attorney or client terminates the 
relationship. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not contend that Defendants agreed to represent their 
interests. In fact, there is no record to suggest either that the Plaintiffs asked or that the Defendants 
agreed to represent their interests. Pogue Ajf., ,r,r 3-4. Accordingly, the only basis for any claim that 
an attorney-client relationship existed must be based on the Defendants' conduct and such conduct 
must manifest an assent to the relationship. In this regard. Plaintiffs rely on the following: 
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"Mr. Hughes was told by his partner, Andrew Diges, that the Defendants were hired 
to draft a partnership agreement for Messrs. Hughes and Diges;" 
• "Defendants, Mr. Hughes, and the partnership's bookkeeper engaged in a call" 
followed by an email from the bookkeeper that Mr. Hughes believed was for the 
purpose of preparing a partnership agreement; 
• "Defendants never told Mr. Hughes that they did not represent him;" and 
• "[P]artnership money was paid to Defendants" for what Mr. Hughes believed was for 
the purpose of preparing partnership agreement." 
Opposition Brief, pp. 2-3, 10-11 (emphasis added). 
Thus, according to Plaintiffs' own allegations, they believed that Defendants were hired on 
their behalf on October 21, 2011 for the sole purpose of drafting a partnership agreement. They came 
to this conclusion, not based on anv statements made bv Defendants, but based on alleged 
statements made by Andrew Diges and the bookkeeper. 
Furthermore, while Defendants may be bound by their conduct that reflects assent to an 
attorney-client relationship, they cannot be bound by the statements of a third party, especially 
where. as here, there is no allegation that the attorneys knew about such representations. Pogue Afl, 
-,i 6. The only conduct attributed to the Defendants is a single phone call with the bookkeeper and 
Mr. Hughes on the line. This conduct is insufficient to reflect assent to a representation that Plaintiffs 
never requested. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot establish an attorney-client relationship between 
the parties. 
Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument only that an attorney-client relationship was 
formed between the parties on October 21,201 l, that relationship necessarily ended on November 
21, 201 l when Plaintiffs allege that they "found out" that Defendants were not representing their 
interests. Alternatively, the relationship ended as of December 3, 2011 when Plaintiffs received a 
letter from Defendant Pogue stating, "As you know, I represent Andrew Diges." Pfisterer A.ff, Ex. 
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B. It is entirely unrcasonabJc for the Plaintiffs to believe that an attorney-client relationship existed 
after this point in time. 
Either way, according to the sworn statements in the Verified Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, the harm occasioned by the alleged misconduct did not begin until December 1, 2011. 
This was over one week after the Defendants found out that Defendants were not representing their 
interests; three days after Defendants sent the letter stating that they only represented Mr. Diges' 
interests; one day before the Underlying Lawsuit was filed; two days before Plaintiffs received the 
letternotifying them that Defendants did not represent their interests; and three days before Plaintiffs 
learned about the lawsuit. 
Furthermore, according to the Plaintiff the sole purpose of the attorney-client relationship 
they believe existed between the parties was to prepare a partnership agreement. By December 2, 
2011, Mr. Diges had filed his complaint for dissolution of the partnership and on December 3, 2011, 
Mr. Hughes received the November 28, 201 I letter. At that point, it was undeniably clear to all 
involved that Defendants were not representing the Plaintiffs' interests for any purpose whatsoever, 
including drafting a partnership agreement. Meaning, there was no reasonable basis upon which to 
assume an attorney-client relationship at the time of the alleged harm. 
2. The Hughes' Declaration Cannot Support a Finding that an Attorney-Client 
Relationship Exists or Existed .. 
In his declaration, Plaintiff Hughes testifies that: ( 1) he did not know that Defendants did not 
represent him until December 3, 2011 and (2) he believes that Defendants represent the H-D 
Transport partnership to this very day. This testimony is inconsistent with the following: (1) his 
previous testimony at trial; (2) his conduct in the Underlying Lawsuit; (3) his representations in the 
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Underlying Lawsuit; and (4) his written discovery responses in this lawsuit These inconsistencies 
implicate both judicial estoppel and the sham affidavit doctrine. 
Defendants addressed the issue of judicial estoppel in their opening brief. See Memoranudm 
in Support of Motion for Summcuy Judgment, pp. 11-13. Judicial estoppel is intended to safeguard 
the legal system and disallows claimants from taking on position to their advantage in one 
proceeding, and then taking another position in the next. 
Similarly, the sham affidavit doctrine prevents a party from playing fast and loose with the 
facts and the system by filing an affidavit to defeat summary judgment that is inconsistent with 
previous testimony offered at deposition or trial. "[A]n affidavit which directly contradicts prior 
testimony may be disregarded on a summary judgment motion." See In re Estate ofKeeven, 126 
Idaho 290,298, 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994). Under the sham affidavit doctrine, a court 
may refuse to consider an affidavit submitted "to prevent an adverse summary judgment by creating 
factual issues in the affidavit which contradict their prior sworn deposition testimony." 
Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Company, Inc., 124 Idaho 607,610,862 P.2d299, 302 (1993)); Kenne~v 
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 ( 1991) ("The general rules in the Ninth Circuit is that a 
party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony.") 
The Idaho Supreme Court has not yet had opportunity to apply the sham affidavit doctrine, but it has 
not rejected it either. Major v. Security Equipment Corp., 155 Idaho 199, 205, 307 P.3d 1225, 1231 
(2013) ("This Court has never adopted the sham affidavit doctrine .... However, the Court of 
Appeals has previously stated that an affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be 
disregarded as a sham affidavit on a summary judgment motion.") 
There are two primary inconsistencies between Mr. Hughes' previous testimony and his most 
recent affidavit. first inconsistency has to do with whether believed the Defendants 
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represented him after November 21, 2011. The second inconsistency is whether he believed that the 
Defendants represented the partnership during the pendency of the Underlying Lawsuit. 
First, Mr. Hughes testified at trial that he was "blind sided" on November 21, 2011 when he 
"found out" that Defendants were not representing him or the partnership but were solely 
representing Mr. Diges: 
[TJhe 21"t of November is when it was actually disclosed to me by 
another individual who we were working with that you truly were not 
representing H-D Transport the partnership and was individually 
representing Mr. Diges. 
This here is the foUowing day when my wife and I obviously were 
completely blind sided by the deception of your role in the partnership. 
And he [Andrew DigesJ also didn't return a phone call after I found 
out that you were actually not representing Hughes/ Diges but 
representing Mr. Diges' interests. 
Pfisterer Aff, Ex. G, 213:3-6, 9-11. In his declaration submitted in opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Hughes· affirms his prior testimony: 
The testimony quoted by Michael Pogue and his law firm is my 
statement about learning on November 21, 2011, that Michael 
Pogue and his law firm was only representing Andrew Digcs' 
interest. 
Hughes Dec., if4 (emphasis). 
Despite his clear testimony that he knew as of November 21, 2011 that Defendants were not 
representing him, Mr. Hughes states, "From the time that Andrew Diges hired Michael Pogue and 
his law finn on October 21, 2011 until December 3, 2011, I believed that Michael Pogue and his law 
firm represented me, Andrew, and our partnership, H-D Transport." Id. at ,r 5. 
It is impossible to reconcile Mr. Hughes' trial testimony with his current position in this 
lawsuit. Nonetheless, in an effort to do just that, Mr. Hughes has recharacterize his trial testimony. 
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As he describes it now, "[b]y November 21, I became suspicious about whose interests Michael 
Pogue and his law firm were representing, but J stiB be1ieved that they were the attorneys for me, 
Andrew, and our partnership." Hughes Dec., ,i 8. 
The inference Mr. Hughes is attempting to draw from his previous testimony is not 
reasonable. He has testified that on November 21, 2011, it was ''disclosed to him; he "found out" 
and he "learned" that Defendants did not represent him or the partnership. These words are clear and 
unequivocal. They are also inconsistent with a mere "suspicion" about the truth of the matter: 
Defendants never agreed to represent him or the partnership. 
Second, in his declaration, Mr. Hughes states that his subjective belief that Defendants were 
representing H-D Transport was somehow rekindled on December 5, 2011 when he received notice 
of the lawsuit that Mr. Diges filed on behalfofhimselfand H-D Transport. Hughes Dec., ,IlO. Mr. 
Hughes testified that he believes Defendants represent H-D Transport to this verv dav. Hughes 
Dec., i! 13. 
This statement is wholly unreasonable under the circumstances and should be disregarded 
for the following reasons: 
• It cannot be reconciled with Plaintiffs testimony that he "found out" on November 
21 or December 3, 2011, at the latest, that Detendants did not represent him or the 
partnership. 
• It is inconsistent with the fact that Mr. Hughes hired counsel to represent him and the 
partnership in the Underlying Lawsuit, just as Mr. Diges did. Moreover, Mr. 
Hughes' s counsel filed pleadings on behalf of the H-D Transport partnership, just as 
Defendants did on behalf of Mr. Diges. Pfisterer Alf, Ex. F. 
• It is inconsistent with Plaintiffs' attorneys statements at the April 2, 2012 hearing on 
Mr. Worst's motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Pfisterer Ajf., Ex. J 
(04/02/2012 Hearing Transcript). As previously noted, Mr. Hughes, through counsel, 
admitted that H-D Transport was a party in name only. 
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It is inconsistent with the written discovery responses provided in this lawsuit. In 
answer to Interrogatory No. 5, "Plaintiffs state that they first realized that Defendants 
were no longer representing the interest of H-D Transport at the January 17, 2012 
hearing on the preliminary injunction ... . "Id.at Ex. C, p. 7. 
In resolving this motion, the Court does not have to adopt any and all statements or 
inferences in Plaintiffs' favor. There is a reasonableness requirement in the summary judgment 
context. Only inferences that are reasonable may be made in favor of the non-moving party, and the 
Court need not reserve an issue for the fact-finder if no reasonable juror could find for the 
nonmoving party. Under the circumstances presented here, Defendants previous trial testimony 
established unequi vocaUy that he knew the Defendants did not represent him by November 21 , 2011. 
Accordingly, Defendants owed him no duties at the time the alleged misconduct took place. 
3. Collateral Estoppel and Judicial Estoppel Serve as a Legal Bar to Plaintiffs' Claims. 
The issues of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel are addressed in Defendants' opening 
brief. The collateral estoppe1 issue is simple: the district court in the Underlying Lawsuit made a 
finding directly on point: "On conflicting evidence, this Court finds that Diges hired counsel to 
represent him, not the partnership. Diges hired counsel to end his relationship with Hughes to 
maximize his personal interest." Pfisterer Aff, Ex. A, 118. This finding has preclusive effect on the 
Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit. 
Judicial estoppel is a tool to be used to ensure that parties do not make inconsistent 
statements depending on the issue in front of the tribunal. In this case, it acts as a bar to prohibit 
Plaintiffs from arguing that H-D Transport was anything more than a nominal party in the 
Underlying Lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs' arguments concerning the application of judicial estoppel are colorful but without 
substance. To refer to Defendants' arguments as "baseless" and "ironic" makes no sense when the 
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can review the transcript and see what was said, by whom, and for what purpose. The Court 
can see that in the Underlying Lawsuit both partners brought claims on behalf of themselves and 
the partnership. Pfisterer Af(, Ex. F. H-D Transport was a party in the Underlying Lawsuit in 
name only, because it was a partnership dissolution action. Both parties brought claims on behalf of 
themselves and on behalf of the partnership for alleged misdeeds the other partner was taking in their 
efforts to wrestle control over the business. 
Plaintiff Hughes. through counsel, clearly conceded this issue atthe April 2, 2012 hearing. Id. at 
J. Accordingly, Plaintiff Hughes was not as he argues today, relying upon the Defendants to 
represent the partnership. Furthermore, to the extent Mr. Hughes maintains a subjective belief that 
Defendants continue to represent H-0 Transport, this position is unreasonable. Defendants have not 
given him any indication that they have assented to such a representation and any belief to the 
contrary defies logic, as well as Defendants' repeated representations to the contrary. See 
ofJohn J. Janis ("Janis Aff ), A, 
In sum, there is no attorney-client relationship between the parties, and no such relationship 
ever existed- either by mutual assent or via conduct that might be reasonably construed as evidence 
of assent. Both parties were represented by counsel im the Underlying Lawsuit, and these attorneys 
brought claims on behalf of their clients and on behalf of the partnership. Neither party can 
reasonably argue now that he was relying on the other party's counsel to protect his interests. 
C. The Litigation Privilege 
The litigation privilege applies as a bar to any claims of damage asserted after December 2, 
2011 when the Jawsuit was filed. Plaintiffs argue that the litigation privilege does not apply, 
because: (I) it is limited to defamation claims; (2) the parties were not opposing parties but actually 
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had an attorney-client relationship; and (3) Plaintiffs do not seek damages for conduct 
after December 2. 2011. AH three arguments fail. 
occurred 
First, the litigation privilege is not limited to defamation claims as Plaintiffs argue. To 
resolve this issue, all the Court must do is review the Taylor v. McNichols decision, which makes 
abundantly clear that the litigation privilege in Idaho extends well beyond the defamation context. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010). 
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite to dicta contained in a footnote to the decision, 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 84 n. ] 0 (2012).2 That footnote, in tum, refers 
to the Taylor v. McNichols case, which clearly and unequivocally holds that the litigation privilege 
is not limited to defamation claims but applies to all conduct and representations that occur in the 
course oflitigation. 
First. the Tavlor decision states: 
Idaho's Appellate Courts have never considered the propriety of 
expanding this privilege to encompass conduct, as well as statements, 
which occur during the course oflitigation, nor whether the privilege 
should extend to causes of action beyond defamation and libel. We 
take this opportunitv to do so now. 
Id. at 837, 243 P.3d 653 (emphasis added). 
2 In relevant part, the footnote states: 
[A ]s the Respondents correctly point out, the litigation privilege has 
only been applied to defamation claims based on particular statements 
made during the course of litigation. See Taylor v. McNichois, 149 
Idaho 826, 836-37, 243 P.3d 642, 652-653 (2010); Weitz v. Green, 
148 Idaho 851,862,230 P.3d 743, 754 (2010). Further, it only applies 
to an attorney "acting within the scope of his employment, and not 
solely for his personal interests." Taylor, 149 Idaho at 83 7, 243 P.3d 
at 653. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 84,278 P.3d 943,954 (2012). 
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Second, the Taylor decision examines the litigation privilege "across various jurisdictions." 
This includes examination of cases from New Jersey, Texas, and West Virgina. The reasoning 
considered from the New Jersey case is as follows: 
[I]n addition to the traditional protections against suits for 
defamation, the litigation privilege also protected against claims for 
malicious interference with business operations, reasoning that '[i]f 
the policy, which in defamation actions affords an absolute privilege 
or immunity to statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings is really to mean anything then we must not permit its 
circumvention by affording an almost equally unrestricted action 
under a different label. 
Id. (quoting Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 NJ. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 
The reasoning from the Texas case includes the following: 
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence, Texas case law 
has discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit 
is based on the fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a 
judicial proceeding. An attorney has a duty to zealously represent his 
clients within the bounds of the law. In fulfilling this duty, an 
anomey has the right to interpose defenses and pursue rights that he 
deems necessary and proper, without being subject to liability or 
damages. If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party for 
statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his 
client, he would be forced constantly to balance his own potential 
exposure against his client's best interest. Such a conflict hampers 
the resolution of disputes through the court system and the 
attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous representation, courts 
have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from civil 
liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection 
with representing a client in litigation. 
This qualified immunity generally applies even if conduct is 
wrongful in the context of the underlying lawsuit. For example, a 
third party has no independent right of recovery against an attorney 
for filing motions in a lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, 
although such conduct is sanctionable or contemptible as enforced 
by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. Courts have refused 
to acknowledge an independent cause of action in such instances 
''because making motions is conduct an attorney engages in as part 
of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." 
(1955)). 
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[Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex.App.Ct.1994)] ... Thus, an 
attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is not 
independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the 
lawyer's duties in representing his or her client. The immunity 
focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether the conduct was 
meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit. 
Id. at 838,243 P.3d at 654 (quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. 
App. 2005). The West Virginia Supreme Court described the policies underlying the expansion of 
the litigation privilege as fo11ows: 
(1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disc1osure of 
evidence; (2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the 
litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from 
the threat of subsequent litigation; ( 4) reinforcing the finality of 
judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) 
promoting zealous advocacy; ( 7) discouraging abusive litigation 
practices; and (8) encouraging settlement. 
Id. (quoting Clark v. Druckman, 218 W.Va. 427,624 S.E.2d 864,871 (2005). 
After considering this case law, the Idaho Supreme Court reached the following conclusion: 
"In line with the foregoing, we find that the litigation privilege shall be found to protect attorneys 
against civil actions which arise as a result of their conduct or communications in the 
representation of a client, related to a judicial proceeding." Id. 
This case remains good law and has never been overturned. The litigation privilege in 
Idaho, as announced by the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, is not limited to 
defamation cases. 
Second, as discussed in greater detail above, the Plaintiffs are not, and never have been, 
Defendants' clients, notwithstanding Plaintiff Hughes' subjective belief to the contrary. Thus, the 
litigation privilege acts as a bar to any c1aim for damages arising from conduct that occurred after 
December 2, 2011. 
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Third, Plaintiffs may argue that they do not bring claims for damages that occurred after 
December 3, 2011, but their allegations suggest the contrary. The Complaint states that the conduct 
causing Piaintiffs harm began on December 1, 2011, just one day before the lawsuit was filed and 
that such conduct occurred throughout the litigation. See Verified Complaint and Demandfor Jury 
Trial, iMJ 25, 30. Furthermore, in their opposition brief, Defendants address conduct that took place 
throughout the litigation, inc]uding a hearing on January 17, 20] 2. See Opposition Brief, pp. 23-24. 
Fundamentally, it is unreasonable to argue that Plaintiff Hughes believed that the 
Defendants were representing his interests during the pendency of the Underlying Lawsuit. The 
partners, Diges and Hughes, were in litigation, both arguing that the other took action that hurt the 
partnership, both bringing claims on behalf of themselves and the partnership. To now bring a 
lawsuit against the other partner's attorneys on the basis that they took action that harmed the 
partnership is too much. To allow these claims to continue encourages litigation that cross the lines 
from the professional to the personal- with personal attacks and threatened lawsuits based on a 
simple disagreement over the law. This type of conduct should not be countenanced by the Court. 
There is a reason for the litigation privilege, and it is to avoid exactly what has happened here. See, 
e.g. Pogue A.ff., Ex. B. 
D. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade Claims 
Plaintiffs' unreasonable restraint of trade claims fail, because a principal and agent cannot 
conspire together to restrain trade. Plaintiffs try to save their claim by arguing that they do not rely 
upon the conspiracy language in the statute, but can also rely upon the statutory prohibition against 
a contract or combination to unreasonably restraint trade. 
Defendants' arguments make a distinction without a difference. Furthermore, they ignore 
the primary problem with this claim: Defendants are attorneys for Mr. Diges. They act on his behalf 
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and at his direction. Because they do not act for their own benefit or for an independent purpose, 
they cannot contract, combine, or conspire to restrain trade. There is but one party who is engaged 
in the conduct at issue, and the statute requires two. 
Defendants filed a lawsuit and set up a business for their client. That their client used this 
business in ways that Plaintiffs claim hurt them is not the Defendants' responsibility. They did not 
join their client in the operation of this business or otherwise act in any other manner other than in 
a representative capacity. Accordingly, they cannot be considered a second person for the purpose 
of a conspiracy, contract, or combination in restraint of trade and the claim fails as a matter oflaw. 
E. Other Disputes of Fact that are Not Material to a Summary Judgment Decision But 
Cannot Go Unaddressed. 
There are many statements of "fact" in the record that are untrue. These disputes are not 
material to the Court's analysis. However, Defendants feel compelled to address two of these 
disputes for fear that leaving them unaddressed would give the Court the wrong impression. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants "admit" that between October 21 and December 3, 
2011, they assisted Mr. Diges in taking H-D Transport's money and creating a competing business 
for Mr. Diges to use to take over H-D Transport's assets and business. Opposition Brief, p. 19. This 
is simply untrue. Defendants helped Mr. Diges incorporate a separate LLC, and the deposition 
testimony Plaintiffs cite says just that. Defendants did not know that Mr. Diges would use this LLC 
as a means of acquiring funds at the expense of Mr. Hughes. Pogue Af(., ,i 6. 
Second, Defendants have not interfered with Plaintiffs attempts to execute on the judgment 
against Mr. Diges. See Janis Aff., Exs. A-B. As these email exchanges reflect, Defendants have 
tried to work with Plaintiffs' counsel to come up with solutions to assist with the dissolution 
proceedings and Plaintiffs' efforts to collect on a judgment against Mr. Diges entered on behalf of 
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the partnership. These efforts are made difficult by the fact that the partnership does oot have 
independent counsel. However, no one could reasonably conclude that Defendants have interfered 
with Plaintiffs' efforts. 
In fact, Mr. Hughes has not made any attempt to collect on the judgment in the Underlying 
Lawsuit either on his or the partnership's behalf despite being told that any legitimate attempts to 
do so would not be obstructed. One could reasonably infer that Mr. Hughes has delayed in 
collecting on the judgment in an attempt to boot-strap his claims in this lawsuit against Mr. Diges' 
attorneys. More practically speaking, Mr. Hughes may view Mr. Diges• attorneys as a better source 
of recovery than Diges himself. See Pogue Alf., Ex. B. However, the law does not condone such 
a result. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a material dispute of fact that would preclude 
summary judgment. Defendants do not1 and have not, represented the Plaintiffs and no reasonable 
person could conclude that they represented the Plaintiffs at the time of the alleged misconduct. 
Rather, the claims alleged are barred by the litigation privilege, as well as collateral and equitable 
estoppel. There is no reason to submit this case to a trier of fact; it can, and should, be resolved 
now as a matter of law. 
Dated this 2~ day of October, 2014. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
!'·- 0. - -BY~-~=-:. =-__;=-_, ~'-711C-~~~~ 
Kira Dale Pfiz-
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for !he 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 27th day of October. 2014, she caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned Lawyer, PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
( ] U.S. Mail 
[ v[Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 489-8988 
[ ] Email 
( ] C.S. Mail 
[ ~and Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (215) 650-5327 
[ ] Email 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
* * * * * 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and LAWSON & 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2013-683 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. 
) POGUE IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
* * * * * 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
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1 . I am one of the Defendants in the above-entitled action and base this Affidavit 
on my own persona1 knowledge and belief. 
2. On October 21, 2011, I was retained by Andrew Diges to assist him with 
issues regarding his partnership with Vint Hughes. I was retained solely on Mr. Diges' behalf and 
considered him my sole client. 
3. I never told Vint Lee Hughes that I represented him. 
4. I never told Vint Lee Hughes that Irepresented the H-D Transport partnership. 
5. I did not know that Vint Lee Hughes believed that I had been retained on his 
behalf or on behalf of the H-D Transport partnership or how he might have come to that conclusion. 
6. I did not know that I had been retained with money from the H-D Transport 
partnership. 
7. I did not intend to funnel work away from the HD Transport or secretly create 
a new business to compete with H-D Transport. l simply assisted my client in creating a new 
business at his direction. 
8. I did not believe it was improper for Mr. Diges to get Coun permission to 
continue with H-D Transport's business pending final dissolution of the partnership. This approach 
is reflected in the application for Temporary Restraining Order ("T .R.O. ") attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and filed contemporaneously with the Complaint on December 2, 2011. 
9. I did not advise my client to take any money from H-D Transport or Mr. 
Hughes, and I was not aware that he had used any funds for his own purposes until immediately 
before the trial in the Underlying Lawsuit. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of a letter I received 
from Eric B. Swartz dated October 18, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. POGUE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 2 
282 
Dated this 2?1h day of October, 2014. n 
r 
MICHAEL D. \OG 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 27th day of October, 2014. 
lJ l~u1JL [Ju C ~ VIC/ 
NOT ARY ~~UC FOR)DAt:10 
Residing at , :-f U_,~ { f J 
Commission Expire~Q · {) q. ! [t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofidaho, with offices at 53 7 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2Th day of October. 2014, she caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned Lawyer, PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
.[/'[Facsimile (208) 489-8988 
[ ] Email 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ J Overnight Mail 
£ ] Facsimile (215) 650-5327 
[ ] Email 
/5,(.,,a Dale Pfisterer 
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MICHAEL D. POGUE, ISB # 6518 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
Lawson & Laski, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel. (208) 725-0055 
Fax: (208) 725-0076 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; 
ANDREW DIGES, 
Case No.: CV-11 - 1 S5 
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER Plaintiff. 
V. 
VINT LEE HUGHES 
Defendant 
Plaintiffs H-D TRANSPORT and ANDREW DIGES, by and through their attorneys, 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue PLLC, hereby apply to the Court for a Temporary Restraining 
Order and for an Order To Show Cause why a preliminary i~junction should not issue during the 
pendency of this matter pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 65. This Application is 
supported by the Verified Complaint on fi)e. 
A Temporary Restraining Order may be granted under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(b) which provides: 
[a] temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the 
adverse party or the party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts 
shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse pruty or the party's attorney 
can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certified to the court in 
writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the reasons 
supporting the party's c1aim that notice should not be required. 
EXHIBIT-Li. 
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As established the Verified Complaint on file and the information herein the Plaintiffs 
will suffer great and irreparable injury if the Temporary Restraining Order does not issue 
Through this Application, Plaintiffs seeks the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order 
requiring the Defendant VINT LEE HUGHES to cease any further hindrance, obstruction, 
interference or other action to prevent the operation of H-D Transport, or its equipment of 
vehicles, including the grey 1999 T2000 Kenworth truck and the white 1999 T2000 Kenworth 
truck pending the final, mutually agreed, disposition of assets and debts and winding up of the 
business and prayed for in the Verified Complaint. 
Plaintiffs further request an Order prohibiting Defendant VINT LEE HUGHES from 
harassing or interfering with the work of H-D Transport's employees or agents, including the 
driver Jay Longest. 
Defendant VINT LEE HUGHES is currently in North Dakota and is seeking to take into 
his own custody the company trucks and equipment. Upon information and belief he has taken 
the white 1999 T2000 Kenworth tmck and has sent it back to Idaho thereby preventing it from 
earning the partnership any revenue. He is attempting to revoke the licenses and/or privileges for 
the grey 1999 T2000 Kenworth to operate and conduct business With these two trucks out of 
commission H-D Transport cannot earn any money and Andrew Diges will be deprived of any 
income to support his family Defendant VINT LEE HUGHES has threatened and harassed H-D 
Transport employees, including Jay Longest, and attempted to elicit the cooperation of local law 
enforcement authorities to seize company equipment Local law enforcement has declined the 
request to assist Vint Hughes in his wrongful attempt to seize company assets and halt its 
operation. 
I hereby certify that I attempted to give Defendant's counsel, Ben Worst, notice of this 
Application by telephoning him today and leaving him a message.. I have sent him copies of this 
application and the Verified Complaint on file" 
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DA TED: December 2, 2011 LAWSON LASKTC!tARK & POGUE, PLLC 
,.asO·~/ 
..... -A' I I/ ·°i' _.,, 
: ~'7:,/ .• l /., ,'(./ ! 
l ., .. .t// (/~ 
. \-,/. /./ Michael D. rogu'p 4-' 
Attorneys for Plai~l!l.ffs 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R Swartz 
eric@jonesandswartzlaw "com 
October 18, 2013 
JILA E-MAIL (without exluoits) 
and U.S. MAIL 
James R. Laski 
Michael D. Pogue 
LAWSON & LASK! PLLC 
1,~~o 
! L4WSON Lti.SKI CLARK &. POGUE I 
·--·, .... ,,,, ___ .. 
LAWSON, LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 33 IO 
Ketchum, ID 83 340 
OFFER OF COMPROMISE 
jrl@lawsonlaski.com 
mdp@lawsonlaski.com 
PROTECTED BY RULE 408 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Gentlemen: 
Vint Hughes has hired my firm to represent him and H-D Transport, an Idaho Partnership in which 
he is a 50% owner ("Partnership"), to pursue their claims against you, Lawson & LasJcj PLLC, and 
Lawson, Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, arising out of your and your firm's: assistance of Andrew 
Diges in his theft of H-D Transport's money; breach of fiduciary duty owed to Mr. Hughes and 
H-D Transport; negligent representation of H-D Transport; and unreasonable restraint of trade. 
The purpose of this letter is to put you, Lawson, Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and 
as the assumed business name of Lawson & Laski PLLC, and Lawson & Laski PLLC, on notice of 
Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport's claims and our representation of Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport 
incident to such matters. I am also writing to make a demand for payment by you, Lawson, Laski, 
Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and as the assumed business name of Lawson & Laski 
PLLC, to Mr. Hughes in the amount of $570,510.00 and to H-D Transport in the amount of 
$428,893.20. These amounts are intended to compensate Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport for the 
following damages caused by you and your finn: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND GIVING RISE TO CLAIMS 
On or about October 21, 2011, Mr. Diges hired you and your firm on behalf of himself, H-D 
Transport and Mr. Hughes, using H-D Transport money. As Mr. Diges testified at trial in the 
------Diges,-H-D-Transport-v.-Hughes·matter; you·and your frrm were hired to draft a partnersh.ip···"·-----"--
agreement for Mr. Diges and Mr .. Hughes: 
EXHIBrr_b_ 
1673 W Shoreline Dr 
Suile 200 
-Boise, ID 83 702 
PO Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Phone: 120!!) 489-8989 
F.ix: (20B) 489-8986 
junasandsw.ir12lnw com 
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Q. Mr. Diges, isn't it true that you hired an attorney to draft a partnership 
agreement for you and Mr. Hughes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you do that approximately? 
A. We did that around 10-21 we were looking at this. 
Q. Did you write a check to pay for those services? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you write a check from the partnership account to pay for those 
services? 
A. Yes. 1 
*** 
Q. Is that the check you wrote to have a partnership agreement drafted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now if you'll turn that page you'll notice halfway down there's another check 
written .. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So von actually wrote two checks to Mr. Pogue~s office. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Each for $750? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the same day. And it was -
A. I don't think we had enough money in the account that they needed. We were 
waiting for payday to show up, so he cashed one and held the other 
Q.. So it was your understanding that that money was to draft a partnership 
agreement; is that correct? 
A. Yes.2 
Q. Did vou tell Mr. Hughes that you were going to have a partnership 
agreement drafted? 
A. I think we talked about it 
Q. But both of you were interested in memorializing a formal agreement; would 
that be fair? 
A. Yeah. 
Q.. Would a formal agreement have ended some of the problems that you guys 
______________
 were.having as.a partnership?----·- ... ··-----· --· - --·--·----·---------------- .. __ -- .. -
A. It might have. 
1 Ex. A hereto, Diges, H-D Transport v .. Hughes, Trial Transcript, p. 124:8-J 8. 
2 Ex. A hereto, Diges, H-D Transport v. Hughes, Trial Transcript, p 125:7-24. 
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Q. Would that agreement define more specifically some of the understanding 
between you and Mr. Hughes about the partnership? 
A. It could have.3 
Mr. Hughes also testified that he believed you and your finn were creating the partnership 
agreement for Mr. Hughes, Mr. Diges, and the Partnership: 
Q. And no proposed partnership agreement or contract was ever presented to you, 
was it? 
A No, because he refused to create one from October 21st to November 22nd. 
Q. And you never created one either. 
A. I was expecting him to, and he told me be was and that be bad hired you 
and gave you, now that I found out yesterday, two checks for $750 each!!! 
behalf of the partnership, sir.4 
Mr. Hughes believed that you and your finn were the attorneys for himself, the Partnership, and 
Mr. Diges. He held that belief from the time that Mr. Diges advised him of your retention through 
the calls that you had with Mr. Hughes on November 21, 2011, about Partnership business: 
11 /211.2011 MOP 11176-001 / Diges, Andrew 
H·D Transport 
Telephone calls wilh cfient, Vint and D Barker. 
review sipreadsheet. 
T 1 5000 230.0000 
(Ex. B hereto, Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC Transactions Listing.) 
345.0000 
Mr. Hughes had no reason to believe that you did not represent him, Mr. Diges, and H-D 
Transport. He knew you were being hired to help him and Mr. Diges formalize a partnership 
agreement; he knew that the Partnership was paying for your services; and he knew that you were 
calling him to discuss Partnership business. "There are also circumstances in which the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship can exist based upon the attorney's failure to clarify whom the 
attorney is representing where, m1der the circumstances, one of the parties could reasonably 
believe that the attorney is representing that person's interests." Berry v McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 
9,278 P.3d 407,411 (2012)-
-···--·· On·December · 1 ~- 201 l~ · .Mr:-Hugheneceiv!dTletterfrom-you dated Novemoer·2s; 2011:-wnerein ____ _ 
you state that you are writing on behalf of Mr. Diges. Your November 28th letter also states that 
you are proposing a dissolution of H-D Transport on Mr. Diges' behalf, and that Mr. Hughes had 
3 Ex. A hereto, Diges, H~D Transport v Hughes, Trial Transcript, p. 126:3-J 5 .. 
4 Ex. A hereto, Diges, H-D Transport v. Hughes, Trial Transcript, p. 215:6-14. 
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until December 2, 2011, to select one of two options of splitting up the company. (Ex. C hereto.) 
Neither proposed option was consistent with partners' rights or proper dissolution under Idaho's 
Unifonn Partnership Act. 
I understand from Mr. Diges' testimony in the Diges, H-D Transport v. Hughes matter that by 
November 28, 2011, you were advising him on how to properly dissolve the Partnership: 
Q. What was the purpose of this [November 28, 201 l] letter? 
A. To, you know, our first,just a first step to, you know, dissolving the business. 
Q. Was Mr. Pogue advising you on how to dissolve a partnership? 
A. Yes.5 
By November 28th, you and your finn were also advising Mr. Diges about his partnership rights 
and responsibilities, and you and your firm started drafting a complaint on behalf of H-D 
Transport and Mr. Diges against Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Mr. Diges, if you'll go back to the invoice from Lawson and Laski, I -want to 
pick up where we were on November 28, 2011. That's the same day as this 
demand letter, Exhibit 1, that went out to Mr. Hughes. It looks like you made 
the decision that you were going to file a lawsuit on that day. 
*** 
A. Research regarding partnership rights and responsibilities, and begin drafting. 
Yeah. Again, I tried to, you know, I'm not going- Pm trying to have my stuff 
ready a little bit ahead of time. If we -- if he would have talked to me and we 
could have got stuff taken care of~ would have ripped it up. I had him look at 
it because I want to be prepared. 6 
*** 
Q. I'm going lo show you the file stamp on the Complaint and represent to you it 
says December I, 201 I. Do you see that there? 
A Yes. 
Q. Does that refresh your recollection? 
A. There. It's right there in plain black and white. 
Q. Did you authorize Mr. Pogue to file that complaint? 
--------·-··- . --·A,·---Y es,J did.-···-·····--··--· ··-··. ·-·····- -··- .. . ______ ·-···-·· -·····-·- ..... ---·······-··--···--· ...... . .... ·--·--·····--· _ .. Q. On that day? 
A Yeah. 
5 Ex. D hereto, February I, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, p. 47:3-7. 
6 Ex. D hereto, February !, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, pp. 121:22- 122:12. 
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Q. That's one day before the [December 2, 201 I] deadline you set for Mr. Hughes 
[in the November 28, 2011 letter].; 
You were apparently still working on the partnership agreement while Mr. Diges was also having 
you advise him on how to dissolve H-D Transport, and while Mr. Diges was having you set up a 
new company for him, personally, that would compete directly with H-D Transport 
Q, 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A 
When did you decide to abandon the drafting of a partnership agreement? 
After we started to get all the Face book messages. That was the big one. 
.And according to your wife's testimony and yours those were roughly around 
the middle of October when you started receiving those? 
End of October. rne middle to the end of October there. 
So your testimony is that those Facebook messages are what made you 
abandon drafting a partnership agreement with Mr. Pogue? 
Not entirely. 
When did you decide to start your own entity and abandon the partnership 
agreement? 
We just put it in place in case. We didn't know what was going to 
happen. So we drafted that on the 30°' of the month, but if we didn't have 
to u.se it, we wouldn't use it. But either way I was going to start my own 
business. 
Q. So you were continuing to work on the pa..'inership agreement up until 
November 30th? 
A. Well, we were trying to, yeah. 
Q. Okay. So it was your understanding that had a formal partnership agreement 
been drafted that you would have continued as a partnership up until 
November 30th of 2011? 
A. You know, it was a long time ago, but with all the stuff that was going on and 
the lack of him taking care of stuff we decided we didn't need this kind of 
stress in our life. We just didn't -- we didn't want to go on anymore. 
Q. But up until that point you were interested in formaJizing your partnership with 
Mr. Hughes? 
A We were trying. 1 
. _____ Mr.Diges .testified in his deposition.thaLyou .and. your. firm-formed-Highly Dependable LLC-for----- -----
him, and that you and your finn chose to do so on an expedited basis, in order to get it filed on 
November 29, 2011: 
7 Ex. D hereto, February i, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, p .. l 27: 11-24, 
1 Ex A hereto, Diges, H-D Transport v Hughes, Trial Transcript, PP- 126: 16- 127:25. 
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Q. Mr. Diges, I've just laid in front of you what is the Certificate of Organization 
for a limited liability company, and it looks like it's yours, Highly Dependable, 
LLC. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you seen this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask your attorney, Mr. Pogue, to file it on your behaJf? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Pogue to expedite its filing? 
A. No. I just asked, Could you file an LLC for me? 
Q. Do you see in the lower right-hand comer where there is a $20 expedite fee? 
A. No. 
Q. Lower right-hand comer. 
A. Yes. I can see it Doesn't mean anything to me. 
MR. POGUE: I can speak to that It was filed on an expedited basis because on 
November 29th the bank accounts wore frozen and Mr. Hughes traveled to North 
Dakota to attempt to seize assets. 9 
Mr. Diges also testified that you and your furn advised him, and you confirmed, that you and your 
firm believed, and led Mr. Diges to believe, that he had to take the money that belonged to H-D 
Transport: 
Q. Was taking money that was due to the partnership and giving it to your LLC 
the right thing? 
MR. POGUE: He had to do it. 
THE WITNESS: i had to. 
BY MR. SW ARTZ: 
Q. Did Mr. Pogue tell you to do it? 
MR. POGUE: Don't answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: I did it 
MR. POGUE: If he asks you anything about what you said to me or I said to you, 
just ignore the question. We're getting really close to tenninating this deposition. 
MR. SW ARTZ: Mr. Pogue, I'm happy to swear you in and you can tell us why 
Mr. Diges had to transfer money that he didn't own to himself. Do you want to 
.. --·--·--·---·---answerthatquestion? ------- -------· -··--.. ··-·----.. -·--·--- ----·-·------..... _____________ _ 
MR. POGUE: Yes. Because there was no account that he could put it in 
because the account that the partnership had was frozen. 
MR. SWARTZ: It was in receivership according to your client, Mr. Pogue. 
9 Ex. D hereto, February 1, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, pp. l 13:6- l !4:4. 
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THE WITNESS: He just told me no, the only person that could write a check on 
the account was Vint 
BYMR SWARTZ: 
O. Who could deposit checks into that account? 
MR. POGUE: Anybody could. 
THE \\'ITNESS: Anybody could. ID 
You and your firm counseled and assisted Mr. Diges in taking at least $142,964.40 in H-D 
Transport cash assets: 
Partnership Cash Deoosited into Diees' LLC 
$9,776.00 December 2, 2011 
$27,530.00 December 15, 2011 
$33,342.00 January 4, 2012 
$17,498.00 February 2, 2012 
$15,236.00 February 16, 2012 
$19,396.00 February 29, 2012 
$20,186.40 March 23, 2012 
$142,964.40 
You and your furn counseled and assisted Mr. Diges in taking these cash assets knowing that the 
cash belonged to the Partnership that you were helping through dissolution. You and your finn 
did so knowing that Mr. Diges had no intention of preserving the cash assets on behalf of H -D 
Transport. You and your firm knew that Mr. Diges intended to use the cash assets for his new 
LLC and his personal gain. You and your firm also received at least $10,932 of the Partnership's 
cash assets for payment of legal fees. You and your firm took this cash I<-..nowing that Mr. Diges 
did not have a right to deliver such fWlds to you and your firm because the cash belonged to H-D 
Transport, and not Mr. Diges: 
$1,500 Paid to Lawson, Laski, Dec. 21, With Partnership Cash Deposited 
Clark, and Pogue, PLLC on 20]1 into Diges' LLC Bank Account 
$9,432 Paid to Lawson, Laski, Feb.25, With Partnership Cash Deposited 
Clark, and Po1ZUe, PLLC on 2012 into I)i~es~_ LLC_~ank Ac:cq!¥Jt -·-·· 
$10,932 
10 Ex. D hereto, February l, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, pp. 140:2 - 141 :4 
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As counsel for H-D Transport assisting it with an orderly dissolution, it was your and your finn's 
obligation to protect H-D Transport' s assets for the purposes of satisfying Partnership creditors 
and the partners: "In winding up a partnership's business, the assets of the partnership, including 
the contributions of the partners required by this section, shall be applied to discharge its 
obligations to creditors, including, to the extent permitted by Jaw, partners who are creditors." 
{LC § 53-3-807.) You were also obligated to have H-D Transport stop all business, except 
business that was necessary to wind-up.. (LC. § 53-3-803(1) ("a partnership continues after 
dissolution only for the purpose of winding up its business .. ")) Instead of carrying out these 
obligations, you allowed Mr. Diges' personal interest, as well as the interest of you and your firm, 
to injure H-D Transport. 
Throughout the Jawsuit you and your firm knew Mr. Diges was talcing and using money that 
belonged to H-D Transport You and your firm also assisted him with concealing the fact that he 
did nothing to preserve the money and, instead, spent it all - a fact that was first disclosed on the 
last day of trial. 
In your December 15, 2011 letter to Benjamin Worst, you state: 
If your client has concerns about the operation of tbe business pending any resolution I 
would encourage him to make a proposal regarding the preservation and use of funds in a 
separate account etc 
I make this proposal subject to my client's consent, but I encourage you and your client 
to give it serious consideration. I look forward to hearing from you and the prompt resolution of 
this matter. 
(Ex. E hereto.) 
One month later, at the January 17, 2012 hea.-ing on Preliminary Injunction, Mr. Worst asked that 
the funds be placed into trust for fear that the funds were being spent and could not be paid back. 
You argued against placing the funds in trust; you stated that Mr. Worst's concerns were without 
merit You stated that there was no missing or diverted cash. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Judge Ordered that all use of assets, including the cash, stop. (Ex. F hereto, Court Audio 
Recordings.) 
_________ On April 3, 2012, at a_hearing for Mr. Worst's withdrawal, Mr .. Hughes again_voiced.concern ______ _ 
about the location and use of the cash assets. You remained silent on the issue. (Ex .. F hereto, 
Court Audio Recordings.) 
On May 15, 2012, Mr .. Hughes brought a Motion to CompeL Among the items he requested was 
the return of the Partnership cash. At that hea..'ing, you stated that all of the money had been 
frozen. (Ex. F hereto, Court Audio Recordings.) 
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On July 3, 2012, in response to Mr. Hughes advising the Court of Mr. Diges• continued use of 
Partnership assets, you told the Court that ML Diges used Parmership money to lease a truck for 
his LLC. You also stated that you objected to the return of the money to the Partnership. You 
also stated that you were in agreement that Mr. Diges owed at least $46,000 to the Partnership and 
further stated that Mr Hughes' parents, as creditors, needed to be repaid. (Ex. F hereto, Court 
Audio Recordings.) You and your finn undertook no effort to make this happen. Worse, you and 
your fhm aJlowed Mr. Diges to ho1d-up the Partnership's payment to Mr. Hughes' parents by 
conditioning that payment upon the parties reaching a globaJ resolution of the entire lawsuit: 
I want to make clear that there is no threat to delay payment to the parents, 
However, I have pointed out that a settlement will result in the parents being paid 
much more quickJy than if litigation and appeals run their course. 
If the parents are paid right now I suspect that Vint will lose some impetus to settle 
short of trial, and his demands may be more difficult to meet Moreover, Andrew 
wants to reach a global settlement so aJ1 of the issues are resolved at one time. 
If we can settle the parents get paid now, and Vint gets the trucks (and not a low~ 
baJl auction price that will be realized after the Court orders the sale). 
*** 
Michael Pogue 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
PO Box 3310 
675 Sun Valley Rd., Ste. A 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
TeL (208) 725-0055 
Fax. (208) 725-0076 
(Ex. G hereto, Mar. 7, 2013 Email from M Pogue.) 
On March 15, 2013, on Ivfr. Diges and H-D Transport's Motion for Continuance, counsel for 
Mr. Hughes requested Mr. Diges' return of the undisputed $41,000 to the Partnership to pay 
creditors. You, again, o~jected and stated that instead of Mr. Diges returning cash, that the money 
to pay creditors should come from the sale of the trucks. (Ex. F hereto, Court Audio Recordings.) 
Throughout discovery in the Diges, H-D Transport v. Hughes matter, Mr. Diges was repeatedly 
asked to identify where the cash assets of the Partnership were located. You and your fum 
allowed Mr. Diges to skirt around the issue by always arguing that the money was being 
accounted for and that the identity of its location did not need to be disclosed, 
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You also allowed, and assisted, Mr. Diges with committing perjury during his February 1, 2013 
deposition when be testified that he was keeping the money safe, which you knew was not true: 
Q. And you steal money? 
MR POGUE: What? 
THE \VTTNESS: We've disclosed everything that we've done. 
BY MR. SW ARTZ: 
Q. Have you returned the money to the partnership? 
A. Has any of the partnership equipment been liquidated? Has the trailer been 
returned? 
Q. Mr. Diges. can you answer that question? 
MR POGUE: It's been answered, so I'm instructing the witness not to answer it 
again. 
*** 
THE WITNESS: No. It's not resolved. 
BY MR SWARTZ: 
Q. Are you holding onto the money that you took from the partnership, or have 
you spent it? 
A. I'm holding onto it 
Q It's currently available? 
A I don't have to disclose that. 
MR. POGUE: I don't see the relevancy. 11 
You and your firm never disclosed that Mr. Diges had spent all of the money until the last day of 
trial when you and Mr. Diges proudly advised the Court that the money was all gone: 
Q. Mr. Diges, at the very least is it fair to say that your LLC owes the partnership 
$41,495? 
A. 
Q. 
A 
Q. 
A, 
Say the question again .. 
Is it fair to say that at the very least your LLC owes the partnership $41,495? 
Yes, which half of it's mine for the profits. 
Do you have $41,495 set aside to repay the partnership? 
No. 
Q. ls that money gone? 
-·--------A. .Yes. - ··---- -·--···-·· ---··---·---············----·--·· ·----- ... 
Q. Did you spend that money? 
A. Yes. 12 
11 ex. 0 hereto, February J, 2013 Deposition of Andrew Diges, pp. 149:14- 150:14. 
12 Ex A hereto, Diges, H-D Transport v Hughes, r rial Transcript, p. 163: 13-25. 
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On re-direct, you reveal your and Mr. Diges' plan with regard to how he was going to pay the 
money back that he illegally took and used: 
Q. If this matter had in fact been resolved in early 2012 do you believe that there 
would have been funds in the account available to pay? 
A. Yes. 
Q.. And the money's spent, right? 
A. The money was spent on survival. 
Q. And you knew it was -- the partnership had claimed part of those funds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you spend it? 
A. Just day-to-day survival. After February - March, hauling gravel doesn't 
really pay that well and it was a rainy spring, didn't really work a lot. There 
was a lot of down time. 
Q. Did you think you were going to make the money back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you think you were going to make the money back and more? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But the market changed? 
A. The market changed. 13 
H-D TRANSPORT'S CLAIMS AGAINST You AND YOUR FIRM 
Professional Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Dutr 
You and your firm should not have been representing both Mr. Diges and H-D Transport without 
first getting Mr. Hughes' signed written consent: 
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the 
provisions of Rule L7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is 
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the 
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the 
shareholders. 
---.. ·-·--·------··· -·-···--··-... - .. -··· ·---······ ·-------·---·-··-· ······--·-·· ····-··-.. ··-- .. --......... -···-··-··"·-·· --·······-···---· (I.R.P C. l .JJ(g).) 
13 Ex.. A hereto, Diges, H-D Tranrport v. Hughes, Trial Tran script, pp. l 88:5 - 189: l. 
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A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; 
O.R.P.C. 1.7.) 
You and your firm never sought Mr. Hughes' consent to represent both Mr. Diges and H-D 
Transport in light of a very clear conflict - Mr- Diges was engaging in behavior that was adverse 
to H-D Transporl Mr. Diges was taking H-D Transport cash assets when you. as H-D Transport's 
counsel leading its orderly dissolution, were supposed to be directing the collection and 
preservation of Partnership assets. "ln winding up a partnership's business, the assets of the 
partnership, including the contributions of the partners required by this section, shall be applied to 
discharge its obligations to creditors, including. to the extent permitted by law, partners who are 
creditors." (LC.§ 53-3-807.) You were also obligated to have H-D Transport stop all business, 
except business that was necessary to wind-up. (LC.§ S3-3-803(1) ("a partnership continues after 
dissolution only for the purpose of winding up its business.").) Instead of carrying out these 
obligations. you and your firm allowed Mr. Diges' personal interest, as well as your and your 
finn's interest, to injure H-D Transport. 
As counsel for H-D Transport, you and yom firm were obligated to stop Mr. Diges from injuring 
the Partnership, and instead you assisted him with injuring the Partnership: 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person 
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act 
in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a Jegal obligation to 
the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, 
then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the 
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the 
best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher 
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the 
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by 
applicable Jaw. 
(I.R.P.C. L U(b).) 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist 
or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
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(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(l.R.P.C. 8.4(a)-(d).) 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that 
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or 
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning 
or application oftbe law. 
CT.R.P.C. l.2(d) .. ) 
fn the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act. 
(l.R.P.C 4.1).) 
As a result of you and your law firm's conduct, H-D Transport has been damaged in at least 
amount equal to the $142,964.40 in Partnership cash assets that was taken by Mr. Diges. 
Mr. Diges took this money because you and your firm either advised him to, or you and your firm 
failed to stop him from doing so. Either way, you and your firm breached the duties that you and 
your firm owed to H-D Transport as a client 
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade 
You and your firm also damaged H-D Transport by assisting Mr. Diges with creating a company 
that was not only designed to compete with H-D Transport, but was also designed to take H-D 
Transport's equipment, hauling contract, and cash assets, guaranteeing that H-D Transport would 
be put out of business. You and your firm's conduct violates the Idaho Competition Act's 
prohibition against unreasonable restraint of trade. "A contract, combination, or conspiracy 
between two (2) or more persons in unreasonable restraint ofldaho commerce is unlawful." (I.C. 
§ 48-I04).) 
You and your firm's agreement to set up Mr. Diges' competing LLC, knowing it was Mr. Diges' 
plan to take H-D Transport's cash, hauling contract, and equipment and to put H-D Transport out 
of business in doing so, is, irrefutably, an unreasonable restraint of commerce.. And. H-D 
Transport's loss of its business and its cash assets is, irrefutably, damage that flows from you and 
your law firm's illegal conduct 
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Under the Idaho Competition Act, H-D Transport is entitled to three-times its actual damages, plus 
attorney fees and costs: 
(1) Any person injured directly or threatened with direct injury by reason of 
anything prohibited by this chapter, may bring an action for injunctive relief, 
damages, and, as determined by the court, reasonable costs and attorney's fees ..... 
(2) If the district court finds that the violation at issue constituted a per se violation 
of section 48-104, Idaho Code, or an intentional violation of section 48-105, Idaho 
Code, it shall increase the recovery to an amount not in excess of three (3} times the 
damages sustained. 
(I.C. § 48-113).) Three times the $142,964.40 in Partnership cash assets that was taken by 
Mr. Diges with your and your firm's assistance is $428,893.20. 
MR. HUGHES' CLAIMS AGAINST You AND YOUR FIRM 
Breach of Fiduciarv Duty/Professional Negligence 
ML Hughes had no reason to believe that you and you:r firm did not represent him, Mr. Diges, and 
H-D Transport. He knew you and your firm were being hired to help him and Mr. Diges 
formalize a partnership agreement; he knew that the Partnership was paying for your services; and 
he knew that you were calling him to discuss Partnership business. "[These] are also 
circumstances in which the existence of an attorney-client relationship can exist based upon the 
attorney's failure to clarify whom the attorney is representing where, under 1he circumstances, one 
of the parties could reasonably believe that the attorney is representing that person's interests." 
Berryv McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9,278 PJd407, 41 l (2012). 
Mr. Hughes had no idea that you were assisting H-D Transport and Mr. Diges with a plan that was 
adverse to Mr. Hughes' interests until December l, 2011, when he received your November 28, 
2011 letter. You and your firm then proceeded to represent H-D Transport and Mr. Diges in 
settlement demand and litigation designed to force Mr. Hughes to agree to a dissolution of H~D 
Transport that was contrary to Idaho Partnership law. 
-· .. ·-----You and .your firm forced Mr. Hughes to incur. over. $155,000 in-attorney fees and costs incidentto- - ---· 
the Diges, H-D Transport v. Hughes lawsuit. Mr Hughes was forced to retain counsel to defend 
against a lawsuit that you started whereby you and your clients, Mr. Diges and H-D Transport, 
tried to argue that Mr. Hughes was entitled to something less than his statutory interest in H-D 
Transport. Mr. Hughes also incurred these costs trying to recover Partnership cash assets that you 
and your firm knew were being hidden and wrongfully used. As the Diges, H-D Transport v. 
Hughes matter has not yet concluded, Mr. Hughes stands to have to incur additional attorney fees 
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and costs - a good portion of which will likely be incurred learning that Mr. Diges will not be able 
to pay the Partnership or Mr. Hughes the money be owes. 
You and your firm repeatedly engaged in conduct throughout the lawsuit designed to hide the truth 
about Mr. Diges' use of Partnership assets. You and your firm repeatedly engaged in conduct 
throughout the lawsuit that were adverse to Mr. Hughes' interest in the Partnership. You and your 
firm repeatedly objected to return of Partnership cash assets. Where, as here, Mr. Hughes was 
your and your finn's client, you and your firm owed a duty to Mr. Hughes not to represent 
Mr. Diges and H-D Transport in pursuit of these interests that were, clearly, adverse to 
Mr. Hughes' interests. 
In addition to the actual losses caused by your and your firm's negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty, Mr. Hughes has, and continues to, suffer significant emotional distress as a result of what 
you and your firm did. Mr. Hughes has been devastated by your and your firm's conduct 
Mr. Hughes is, at this time, demanding $100,000 in emotional damages. 
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade 
In addition to the aforementioned claims, Mr. Hughes, like H-D Transport, also has a claim under 
Idaho's Competition Act You and your firm advised, or assisted, Mr. Diges with completely 
cutting Mr. Hughes out of the frack-water business. You and your firm advised, or assisted, 
Mr. Diges with forcing a dissolution of the Partnership on Mr. Hughes. Mr. Diges could have 
dissociated and Mr. Hughes could have continued to operate H-D Transport. Dissolution was not 
necessary, but you and your firm forced it on Mr. Hughes while representing Mr. Diges and H-D 
Transport 
Even if Mr. Hughes could he said to have voluntarily agreed to dissolution, your and your firm's 
conduct throughout the dissolution process has prevented Mr. Hughes from starting his own 
business. Mr. Hughes, like Mr .. Diges, could have started his own business, but, like Mr. Diges, 
Mr. Hughes required cash to do so Your and your f1II11's conduct resulted in Mr. Diges' sole 
access to Partnership cash in which l\.1L Hughes had a 50% interest. 
Mr. Hughes' total damages from the loss of his opportunity to continue operating H-D Transport, 
or to start his own business, is, at this time, untold. H-D Transport was making significant 
·-·- --·--··· amounts of-cash.- Mr. Hughes lost the.opportunity to continue doing so as-H-D -Transport or as his· -· -- ·· -·-
own separate company because of your and your firm's conduct At a minimum, Mr. Hughes' 
damages are, at least, equivalent to $105,170, which is the revenue that was made by Mr. Diges' 
LLC after it took H-D Transport's cash, equipment. and hauling contract Three times that 
amount, as allowed by Idaho's Competition Act is, $3 15 ,510. 
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My clients will agree to a full release of any and all claims that they have against you, Lawson, 
Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and as the assumed business name of Lawson & 
Laski PLLC, in exchange for.their receipt of your and your firm's payment to Mr. Hughes in the 
amount of $570,510.00 and to H-D Transport in the amount of $428,893.20. This offer will 
remain open for fifteen days from the date of this letter. I look forward to bearing from you and 
your firm on how you and your firm wish to proceed. Thank you. 
EBS:el 
Enclosures 
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John J. Janis [ISB No. 3599] 
FILED P.·M:·:.-, _. __ , 
OCT 2 8 2014 
Kira Dale Pfisterer [ISB No. 6571] 
HEPWORTH, JAN1S & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
JoLynn Dra@e, Clerk D,strict 
Court Bl11ine Coun Idaho 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Telephone: (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
***** 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; ) 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; ) 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional ) 
limited liability company; and LAWSON & ) 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, ) 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
----------------
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
* * * * * 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFE~A . .:'\'TS' 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGEME~T 
JOHN J. JANIS, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - l 
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1. a.TTI one of the attorneys retained to represent the Defendants in the above-
entitled action and base this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "'A" is a true and correct copy of a letter I sent to 
counsel Mark Coonts on June 2, 2014. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and conect copy of an email exchange 
I had with counsel for the Plaintiff, Mark Coonts and Erik Schwartz bet\veen May and July, 2014. 
In that email string, I refer to the fact that my clients, the Defendants in the above-captioned lawsuit, 
would not object to any efforts to collect on a judgment entered against Mr. Diges in the Underlying 
Lawsuit. I also address the issue of whether the Defendants represented the partnership for any 
purpose ever and made our position clear that the Defendants in this case did not represent the 
partnership presently for any purpose and never represented the partnership for any substantive 
purpose at any point prior to this lawsuit either, including during the Underlying Lawsuit. 
Dated this 2710 day of October, 2014. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 271h day of October, 2014. 
AMY BUCHHOLZ 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
Residin a Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires: C/- .,., - {°! 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 53 7 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2'71" day of October, 2014, she caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned La\\,yer, PLLC 
942 W. Myitle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[ J JJ.S. Mail [ vf Hand Delivery 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 489-8988 
[ J Email 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ v{1Iand Delivery 
[ } Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (215) 650-5327 
[ ] Email 
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TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT· 3 
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J. Charles Hepworth 
JohnJ.Janis HEPWORTH, JANIS & K.LUKSDAL, CHTD. 
537 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
(208) 343-7510 
Fax:(208)342-2927 
John W. Kluksdal 
Kira Dale Pfisterer 
John C. Hepworth (1927-2011) 
LAW OFFICES 
- ES'TA.BUSHED 1952 -
TOLL FREE: (877) 343-7510 
June 2, 2014 
J/.l4 FACSIMILE & ELECTRONIC MAIL 
Mark P. Coon ts 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1675 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Re: Hughes v. Diges 
Dear Mr. Coonts: 
Hughes v. Lawson & Laski, PLLC, et al. 
HJ&K File No. 05-2-028.9 
This is in response to your email to Mike Pogue of May 23, 2014. In that email, you 
again address the subject matter ofMr. Pogue allegedly representing the partnership for the material 
purpose of executing on the Judgment entered against Mr. Pogue's actual client, Andrew Diges. I 
previously wrote you about this, in that you are contacting a party your law furn has sued who you 
know to be represented by counsel, about the matters at issue in the lawsuit you brought against him 
and his firm. That was in an email that I assume you received, but I am sending this letter via 
facsimile and as an email attachment to be certain it is received. 
In your email of May 23, 2014, you suggest that Mr. Pogue should "withdraw as 
counsel of record for the partnership." Tiris suggestion ignores the detailed com..-rnunication 1 had 
with you outlining all the reasons Mr. Pogue has never represented the "partnership" for any material 
purpose, a point recognized by the Court in the underlying case in both its Findings of Fact and 
bearings prior to the trial. I thought I made this clear in my email to you, but if it needs repeating, 
Mr. Pogue and his law firm has not and does not represent Mr. Hughes' and Mr. Diges' combined 
interest in the partnership for any material purpose. There is no purpose by him filing any kind of 
notice to withdraw as counsel for the partnership, since for all material reasons he is not counsel for 
the partnership, and never has been. 
We understand that your ciient, Mr. Hughes, is the one that ultimately has the 
indebtedness from Mr. Diges. It is up to you to decide how to begin execution proceedings to seek 
payment of that debt. 
Also, you may need to be aware that Mr. Diges owes Mr. Pogue and his law firm a 
substantial amount of attorneys' fees incurred for Mr. Pogue' s efforts in dealing with the underlying 
lawsuit since its inception. In fact, the overwhelming amount of attorneys' fees incurred in dealing 
with that case, totaling approximately $45,000.00, remain unpaid. If there would hypothetically be 
EXHIBIT_!_ 
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any merit to the suggestion Mr. Pogue represented the partnership, then that attorneys' fee bill would 
also hypothetically be a partnership debt. 
In any event, the bottom line response to your email of May 23, 2014, is we believe 
the Court has already ruled that Mr. Pogue and his law firm do not represent the interests of the 
partnership so there would be no purpose served to filing a notice of withdrawal. Mr. Hughes may 
of course take whatever measures he deems necessary ifhe elects to execute on the judgment, and 
we are not aware of any impediments that either currently or previously stood in the way of this. 
Very truly yours, 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
JJJ/ajb 
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Re: 2418.3; Hughes;judgment and execution 
From: johnjanis <johnjanis@aol.com> 
To: eric <eric@jonesandswartz.law.com>; mark <rnark@jonesandswartzJaw.com> 
Cc: kdp <kdp@hepworthiaw.com> 
Bee: mdp <mdp@lawsonlaski.com> 
Subject: Re: 2418.3; Hughes; judgment and execution 
Date: Wed, Jul 2, 2014 2:14 pm 
Eric: 
09 9 a.m. 10-28-2014 
Page 1 of 4 
I prefer not to engage in combative emails with counsel so! apologize if my email was 
phrased in some manner that appeared as such. 
I understand your point/belief that the malpractice action would not be adverse to Mr. Diges' 
legal interest. But, this is a 2 person partnership we are talking about here and when a 
partnership like that decides to hire a lawyer or law firm to file a lawsuit on its behalf it would 
usually be something that both partners agreed to do. My point is that was not the case 
here and Mr. Diges has made tt clear he did not consent to hiring your firm for this purpose 
and if anything it would have been filed over his objection. He definitely does not want to 
have any personal responsibility for any legal fees or costs incurred for the purpose of the 
malpractice case nor does he want any of his share of the partnership interests to be 
responsible for any such indebtedness either. 
The rest of your email goes again to your argument that Mr. Pogue represented the 
partnership for material purposes during the underlying case and that he supposedly should 
continue to do so for purposes of executing on the Judgment against his actual client Mr. 
Diges. We have gone back and forth on this subject and think I've made our position clear 
on this subject multiple times that we have a very fundamentai disagreement about 
this. This has included providing our reasoning and/or what we believe to be the specific 
good cause basis for our position in this regard. In short, we do not believe Mr. Pogue 
represented the partnership for any material purpose in the underlying case and still doesn't, 
and we believe that was well understood by everyone involved. Your letter argues your 
position on this issue and ignores ours. I don't see any benefit to us just re-arguing these 
points back and forth. i don't like any kind of nasty-gram type back and forths to begin with, 
as they are almost always non-productive, and in any event it's clear neither of us is going 
to convince the other. So, I'd suggest we just agree to disagree on this and we will proceed 
to get a definitive ruling on this issue as well as the other bones of contention. 
While I've made it clear that Mr. Pogue will not be executing on the Judgment against his 
real and actual client Mr. Diges, who he continues to represent, we have tried to work out a 
fair solution to address your client's desire to institute collection proceedings. To that end, 
we understand you are rejecting the proposat re: getting to a Stipulated Judgment on behalf 
of Mr. Hughes against Mr. Diges, as addressed in this email string. We have also indicated 
that Mr. Pogue will not file a motion to withdraw as counsel for a party he does not believe 
he has ever represented for any substantive purpose. But, we have also indicated that if 
you were to see execution proceedings on behalf of the partnership against Mr. Diges for 
that purpose alone there would be no opposition. We don't know where that proposal 
stands. The main thing Mr. Diges won't do is consent to your firm representing the 
partnership for any reason connected with the malpractice case because he is strongly 
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. Re: 2418.3; Hughes;judgment and execution Page 2 of 4 
I understand there are going to be some issues that we simply can't agree on and I respect 
your right to disagree, and will respectfully acknowledge whatever position you wish to take 
on any particular issue notwithstanding our disagreement. Otherwise I hope to work 
cooperatively with each other and I'll do everything I can to do so, and keep intact the good 
relationship we already have. Thanks Eric (and Mark too!). Hope you both have a 
good/safe Holiday weekend. 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
office phone {208) 343 7510 
fax# {208) 342 2927 
--Original Message-
From: Eric Swartz <eric@ionesandswartzlaw.com> 
To: johnjanis <iohnianis@aol.com>; Mark Coonts <mark@ionesa1dswartzlaw.com> 
Sent: Tue, Jul 1, 2014 5:32 pm 
Subject: RE: 2418.3; Hughes; judgment and execution 
John: 
The lawsuit against Mr. Pogue and his firm is not adverse to Mr. Diges. As such, his consent to us representing 
the partnership and Mr. Hughes is not required. If we represented tl1c partnership in the collection of the 
judgment against Mr. Diges, that action would be adverse and his consent is required. 
Mr. Pogue's refosal to represent the Partnership in obtaining its judgment against Mr. Diges is just another 
example of his breach of duty to the Partnership. The Partnership is owed money in a case where Mr. Pogue 
represents it. Mr. Pogue is, again, allowing Mr. Diges' interests to be placed ahead of the interests of his other 
client - the Partnership. 
Your proposal to skip the Partnership Code was made relayed by Mr. Pogue many times and rejected 
repeatedly because it is not the law. The Partnership has debts to pay. If after paying all debts there is money 
left over then, and onJy then, is there something to split Tne more likely outcome is that the Partnership will 
be upside down and need every bit of the judgment against Diges and more to pay taxes that were never paid. 
IfMr. Pogue is not going fulfill his duty to the Partnership in collecting its judgment, please have Mr. Pogue 
withdraw. We will then get an order from the Court allowing us to represent the Partnership in execution with 
or without Mr. Diges' consent. Thank you. 
Regards, 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz PLLC 
1673 West Shoreline Drive, Ste 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ph. (208) 489-8989 
Fax (208) 489-8988 
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www .jonesandswartzlaw.com 
From: iobnianisl@aol.com (mailto:johniani.s@aol.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 5:i3 PM 
To: Mark Coonts 
Cc: Eric Swartz 
Subject: Re: 2418.3; Hughes;judgment and execution 
09. 9a.m. 10-28-2014 
Page 3 of 4 
Mark. we were trying to offer an informal way or form of settlement to put your client in the position you have indicated 
he desired to be. that is in the position of having the legal authority to seek collection against Andrew individually, for 
what is obviously the bottom line of what Andrew will owe Mr. Hughes when all is said and done. We could have reached 
such a settlement without regard to the formalities of the Uniform Partnership Code, and which would have been a binding 
and legally enforceable settlement agreement between your client and Mr. Diges if there could have been a consensus on 
the specific financial terms (i.e. the fair market value of the 2 vehicles). 1fyou want to reject my proposal of what I 
thought was a practical and fair solution bere, that did not otherwise have any adverse legal effect on anyone, that is of 
course your choice and I accept your email as such a rejection, 
But, if the insistence of trying to comply with formal partnership law is an effort to try and get Andrew to consent to your 
firm representing the partnership generally, including for purposes of the malpractice case, I'm sure you understand be 
does not so consent and never will. On the contrary he has repeatedly expressed his disdain for the case against Mr. 
Pogue, and his belief that there is simply no merit to it whatsoever. You at least know that he has rejected your firm's 
proposal of offering him favorable financial terms ifhe would consent to your furn pursuing the malpractice case against 
Mr. Pogue and his law firm. He did not consent to the case being filed in the first place and never gave any form of 
permission under IRPC J. 7 or 1.13(g) for your firm to go on record as attorney for the partnership for claims against Mr. 
Pogue or his law firm. His refusal to give such consent for such purpose has never wavered and he has made it clear 
never will. 
So, the short answer is no I can not obtain Mr.Diges' "consent to the representation" as requested which I understand to be 
for the purpose of your firm representing the parmership generally. 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
office phone (208) 343 7510 
fax # (208) 342 2927 
---Original Message--
From: Mark Coonts <mark(@,jonesandswartzlaw.com> 
To: 'johnianis@aol.com' <iolmian.is@aol.com> 
Cc: Eric Swartz <ericl@.jonesandswartzlaw.com> 
Sent: Fri, Jun 27, 2014 4:21 pm 
Subject: 2418.3; Hughes;judgment and execution 
John: 
In light of our situation and according to the Uniform Partnership Code, all of the money (full judgment amount) 
needs to go through the partnership, creditors paid, and then llie net can be left for the partners. Hughes will be seeking to 
have Dig es' 50% disgorged. Diges is only entitled to half of the profits, and profits can only be calculated after the 
creditors have been paid. 
We cannot accept your proposal to consent to a judgment for half of the total against Diges in our client's favor. 
However, we would be happy to move forward on execution for the full judgment, but before we can represent the 
partnership in an action adverse to Diges, Diges needs to give his consent: 
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organiz.ation's 
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consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given an appropriate 
official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
i.13(g).) 
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; 
(I.R.P.C. 1.7.) 
Thus, ifDiges consents to the representation, we'd be happy to move on execution against him in order to complete 
winding up the partnership. Please feel free to let Eric or I know if you have any questions. Have a great weekend. 
Thank you. 
Regards, 
Mark Coonts 
Attorney 
Jones & Swartz PLLC 
1673 West Shoreline Drive, Ste 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ph. (208) 489-8989 
Fax (208) 489-8988 
jonesandswartzlaw .com 
NOTICE: DO NOT read., copy or disseminate this communication unless you are the intended addressee. This 
communication may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information intended only for the addressee. All 
parties, entities or individuals privy to or in any way using or disclosing any protected health information in conjunction 
with this e-mail shall comply with all federal and state laws and regulations, including HIP AA regulations, with regard to 
the confidentiality, handling, and use of such protected health information_ If you are not the intended recipient, you are 
hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, o:- the taking of any action in reliance upon the contents of this 
information is snictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please call us (collect) immediately at 
(208) 489-8989 and ask to speak to the sender. 
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Hi Mr. Coonts 1ms is John Janis. As rm 5<.lre you know, my law ftmi and I represent Mr. Pogue and his law f,rm In the case your fom has filed against tnem an behaff of l'h. Hughes 
and H·O Transport. I filed our Acswer wilh lie Court and your firm last WMk. Y= emsii to Mr. Poguo (belcN,) has b<lon dite<:ted lo me IOI' a response. 
1 understand O\:at your communication wttr1 Mf. Pogue is .as pan of thf: ongo~ issues tn the underly.rig !awsU,t (Sla.nf:l' County crvil C6$8 # 20i 1-955) arid it would Hemiogty be just part 
of the proce,.s of counsel' representing one parry communicating with counsel representing another party aboLt such ongoing iuues However. your rf'IQUiry re~tes to the subjed matte,-
of Mr. Pogue purportedly reprG.Senting the partn~h~ H~O Transport 'l\ some KJM ct. rniiterla: or substantive cac.acity. t also~nd the baStS of t"'.is is Mc Pogue,'$ name on tnE 
piaadings as counsalfOfthe ~. But, ttKtre an, numerousplac:es Ji the reca-d of the underlying !swsuil where tt was cieM that H-D Tr.:tn$~ iss an entrtywas net a ma1eria( 
party IO those proceedings, but only a ncmlnolly named party and thel Mr. Pogue and his law firm did not in fact represent !he pamcr..hip er.trty on any kind of a m•ter,al or subm,,tiw 
basis These include the fol1owing: 
• Your client Mr .. Hughes leSlilied under oath at the undertying trial Ulat on Novemw 21, 2011 he beeamo a,,am thal Mr. Poguo was - lo his wor<ls - ".!!2l n,pr,,sentl"fl H-0 TtaMpOI! 
the partMrship and was lndMdual!y ,.,pr,11,enling Mr. Diges.• 
• J<J.111* hewing of Apr!: 3. 2012., on your clienf s pnor attorney's Motion to W!hdraw, Ille !rial judge after granting the motion le wlthdrsw specjf,eally addressed t>ie ;,oinl of whetiw 
H-D Tninspotlwas really any kind of a "materiar- par,y tt the CO!.S. Your cr~1 was ;,n,sern of course. Mr. Pogue rospon<led dearty that no H-0 transport was rea'ly not a ~lenal party 
to the case that instead the !-,it was really t>eKveao tho 2 individual part,es and l~oir respectivv interes!S in :he paMer.ship Al !hat po,n,, a eo<.rse, your ciJ&nt', coutsel had also 
filed runerous pleads,gs which identified him as counsof ol record for !he H-D Transport paMer.ship entity, just lik& M,. Pogua had done. A.ad h& loo agreed, with Mt. Hughes standing 
right next to him, that tt,a pame<Ship entity wu not a serious or ma!erie' P811y to lhe ease end agreed with Mr. Pogve's point tt>al the lawsuit wat ru!ly abou1 "" interests d the ; 
n;:ividw!.l part.es. The t.rtal Juctg& himself then specifrcafly expressed hi$ •view' that • again ,n his wnrds - "H~O is 'Mly a nominal party in this case.· 
.. In the COt.rt's ultimate ruling in the uMcrlying casQ fo~ir,g the trial tho Court Med in Finding d !=act #i 8 tha! "Or', conflicting evidence. this Ce<.:rt finds lNilt Otg,es hlttd counsel to 
tepresent htm. not tht: pfrtncr;,;hip. Orge$ hired counsel to end his nJl&tionsh.lp with Hu;_has to maxmlle h.is personal lnterosL'" 
Notwithstanding the above, the question of Mr Poguo'r. mle as supposed counsa! tor lhe p::irtf'l8tst1tp enl1ty is Plaeed squarely as a cantra! 1SSU8 i1 lhe lawst..nt filed by yotr lawfrm 
ag.ainst Mr. Pogue and hi1 brw f.mi. Our answer atf1rrr.attvely der!H?S that Mt Pogue reP<esented the leQB! interest of the H-0 Tran.sport e:itity for any materiai or substantive ~ose. My 
po:nt is that there rs. no dOUbt the question regerdi!'tQ :i"ie aetuet secpe ot Mr. Pogve's ro~ es eol.l'ISef for the H-0 pertnorsh•p ~ ~ centra, disputed 1.ssoo in thO lawsuit brovght by yots 
furn against him. Your email communicatir:g dU'ecl!y with him likwtise rotates to tr.at dantieal is.sufl!. IRCP .e..2 p-ohibHs. attorneys frorn a::mmun1calng dtt'ectty with a patty the aUo."'ne}' 
knows to be "represent&d by counsel COl'\Ceming u,e matter to which the communication relates.•· 
'We woutd accordingly appreciate ycu and your firm dtroe!tr.g an CXlfflmt,;nlcations retating to Mr. Pogt.:e's ,PUfl)Crled reJYGsentation cl the H-0 Transport partne,rship as ~ entity to my 
office for re-si:,onse, 
Also, to the extenl it ts not dear' at.ready pie~ fel me make cJesr that it b OU" po!'Sition that Mr. Pogue hes ~Y not. doe~ not f"IOW', -a'l'ld will nof in the fvtu«!. be n,pre,,enting the. H-0 
Transport pannership Mtily in artJ kind of a marerial o, substantive capacity. MG, no he w,H not be laking any step• on bohaH of that "'1lily to ""eo.rte on th<, Judgmer.t enwed aga,,st 
Mr. Oiges or p..nue cofjection proeaedogs refau.ng lo 1t\at $an1e iucgmen1 \No!e - M~. Oioes also owe:s Mr. Pogue end his IS'W' ftrm most of the attorney fee, biil5 for Mr. P09!Ji3's 
representatlon in tr,e undel1ying lawsuit so lhey would of course reserve the righl to seek colleclion of those 40K plus in fees}. 
Joor\J.Janil 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & l<LUKSOAL 
537 W.11 Bannock 
Bot..,, ldeho 83701 
o!foe• pllOOe (208) 343 7510 
fax# (208) M2 2927 
-OrigWiOl Messa98"--
From..: Mien.act Pogue <m~iav.,SOt'lfaski.com> 
To: jot,rpnls <j<,hqanis@aol.c:om> 
Sent ihJ. May 1, 201410:37 am 
Subject FW; 2418.Z; Hugr,<>s; P•rt.-,,,rship a,llecilons 
From: Ma.1' Coonu fm!ti!tci:mcrk(U'JQ:'.Xi}pn<lex-.:r:111w com} 
Sen.t: Wed~y. Apri! 30, 20\4 11.14 PM 
Ta:Micl!&c!Pogue 
Cc: Enc Sw:uu 
Subjttt: :i.ct&.2: Hugha; Ptrtnce.'"'Ship eolleaiom 
Mr. Pogue, 
I wanted to inquire about the progre$S of payments from Mt. Diges to I.he Pnrtnership, l also wanted lo~ ab:)Ul whether er not you pian.ied ori fi!ing any documents 10 execute Of'\ 
the judgment ag~ Mr. O~e-s At one point, y.)\l mentiOf)(tC t.'it!t Mr. Oige:s wanted to make payments to the Partner&hip, 'out we nover reee:ved any details of that proposal. Thank 
YO<J. 
Regard>. 
Mark Coonb 
A!tomey 
Jone• & Swatt:< Pl.LC 
1673 west Shoreivle Drive, Ste 200 
Boin, ID 83702 
Ph(200)489-89B9 
Fax (208) 489-!f.!66 
jonesandswiiUtZJaw,com 
N011CE: 00 NOT l'H<I. capi,or disMfflnl10 1111s CO!llmunication lJl'IIKt you an, ttw intended adclnl.....,. This ccmmunie:ilieti may eontain confi<IEtnli.al aro.':,, 1aga1/y pnvileQed 
wiformaUon irnenc:ted c,n>y for the addressee. AU partie,. effli00$ « i"1dt\'duals priv-1 lo or tn any way w.ing 0< di,CJOS!ng any prctected hearth if'FormaOori in c;onjt.:nction with th!~ e-maif 
shat comply wi1h aJlfedetar and state 1aws and rvgulations, inducting" Hf PM regulations. w1L'1 regard to the conftd8r'tia0ty, t-andhng, and !..1$e Of SUCh prolec:ted health lf'Jtomiatioo If you 
are not tne intended recipier"!t, you are hereby notlfied that any disdosure. copying, cf:st.rirn.rJon. or tho taJ<hg of arr; at1lor; ir. re.Jiance ~ the contents r:I u-,,.s ir:tormation ifi ,:netty 
proha:>ited. lf you have received thts communicabOn n1 emx, please call us (coil&Ct) rnmedtatery at (208) 489-8989 and ask to speak lo the sender. 
about:blank 5/1/2014 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liablity company; and LA WON & 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a/ LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: CV-2013-683 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
On November 3, 2014 the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing. Counsel, Scott R Learned, appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, H-D Transport, an Idaho 
partnership, and Vint Lee Hughes. Counsel, John Janis, appeared on behalf of Defendants 
Michael D. Pogue, an individual; Lawson & Laski, PLLC and Lawson & Laski, PLLC d/b/a/ 
Lawson, Laski, Clark, & Pogue, PLLC. 
The Court after having considered the Briefs, Affidavits and argument of the parties and 
counsel, took the matter under advisement for a written decision. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
313 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Complaint alleges two counts of Professional Negligence/Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Counts I & III) and two counts of Unreasonable Restraint of Trade, I. C. § 48-101, et seq. 
(Counts II & IV). The plaintiff as to counts I & II is H-D Transport, a partnership (Partnership) 
and the plaintiff as to counts III & IV is Vint Lee Hughes. 
This action concerns the conduct and actions of an attorney with respect to their 
engagement by a partner of the Partnership to provide legal services and the ultimate dissolution 
of the Partnership.1 The partners of the Partnership consisted of Andrew Diges (Diges) and Vint 
Lee Hughes (Hughes). 
The Partnership was formed sometime m August, 2011, although a Statement of 
Partnership Authority was not filed with the Secretary of State until September 2, 2011. There is 
no dispute that the Partnership was formed to engage in the hauling business of hauling hydraulic 
fracking fluid and/or water in connection with the business of fracking. Hughes contributed 
fmancial capital and Diges contributed his experience. Sometime prior to October 21, 2011 
serious disagreements arose between the partners as to the operation and finances of the 
Partnership and a high level of distrust developed between the partners. The Partnership had 
commenced its business and operations without the benefit of a formal written partnership 
agreement to govern the affairs of the Partnership. 
It is undisputed that it was on October 21, 2011 that Diges engaged the services of an 
attorney, Michael D. Pogue (Pogue), who at the time was a partner with the firm of Lawson, 
1 The Partnership and its partners were the subject ofa Dissolution Action, Blaine County Case No. CV-2011-955. 
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Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC. There appears to be no dispute that Diges hired Pogue initially to 
draft a partnership agreement. Diges informed Hughes that he had hired an attorney to prepare a 
partnership agreement. Diges used partnership funds to hire Pogue, though Hughes was unaware 
of the source of funds at the time Diges retained Pogue. 
On November 21, 2011 a telephone conference was conducted between Pogue, Hughes 
and Diane Barker, the Partnership bookkeeper. The substance of this conversation is not part of 
the record. However, on this same day Diane Barker sent an email to Pogue and attached 
financial information concerning the Partnership. In her email she states that it is her" ... hope 
this provides a clear picture to all parties so that they may work on a partnership agreement ... " 
and that there are "important tax implications that will come into play with a memorialized 
partnership agreement." Diane Barker is also suggesting to Pogue that the Partnership should 
seek the advice of a "tax professional" in connection with the preparation a oartnersJlJtP 
agreement. 
Hughes testified under oath that on November 21, 2011 it was disclosed to him by an 
individual who he had worked with that Pogue was not representing H-D Transport and that 
Pogue " ... was individually representing Mr. Diges". The record does not disclose if this 
information or awareness was before or after the telephone conference call on the same date. 
On November 28, 2011 Pogue sent a letter to Hughes which indicates that he is 
representing Diges, which letter summarizes the problems with the Partnership from Diges' 
perspective and suggesting two options for the dissolution and wind-up of the Partnership. The 
letter seeks a response to one of the two options by December 2, 2011. There was no agreement 
as to the dissolution of the Partnership. 
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On December 2, 2011 Pogue filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Accounting 
(Dissolution Action)2. The complaint named the Partnership and Diges as plaintiffs and Hughes 
as the defendant. On January 3, 2012 Hughes retained Ben Worst as his attorney who filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim. The Counterclaim named as Counterclaimants the Partnership and 
Hughes. The verified counterclaim in part alleged that as of October 28, 2011 Diges had used the 
Partnership accounts ''to pay Diges' own personal expenses". The counterciaim further alleges 
that during the month of November, 2011 that Diges on numerous occasions was withdrawing 
money for the partnership accounts without the consent of Hughes. The counterclaim sought 
dissolution and wind-up of the Partnership. 
The Dissolution Action went to trial on August 28 & 29, 2013. After the conclusion of 
the trial the district judge entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 30, 
2013. A Final Judgment was entered March 10, 2014. The district judge found that Diges hired 
Pogue to represent his interest and not the Partnership's and as such the district judge ordered 
Diges to repay the Partnership the $1500.00 that he previously paid Pogue. 
II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate only when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & Ai Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 
2 Blaine County Case No.CV-2011-955 
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808 851 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 (Ct. 
App. 1994). "[T]he motion must be denied if evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be 
drawn there from, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions" unless the trial 
court is to be the ultimate fact finder, in which case the court itself may resolve the conflicting 
inferences. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990); Riverside 
Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518-20, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). However, a mere scintilla of 
evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; 
there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the 
party opposing summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 
1005 (1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
However, "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations 
the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue 
trial." Curlee, 148 Idaho at 394-95, 224 P.3d at 461-62 (quoting Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 
Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994)). 
Further, our courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary judgment 
are those raised by the pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440,443, 111 P.3d 125 (2005) 
(quoting Beco Const. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859,865,865 P.2d 950 (1993)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Professional Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
A legal malpractice action is based on tort and contract theories. Stephen v. Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd, 150 Idaho 521, 526, 248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011). "The attorney-client 
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relationship is generally based on contract principles, while the negligence standard is based on 
tort principles." Id 
To prove a professional negligence claim plaintiff must show: 
(I) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part 
of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the failure to perform the duty 
must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client. 
J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P.3d 858, 864 
(2008). 
The parties, among other things, disagree as to whether an attorney-client relationship 
existed between the Partnership, Hughes, and Defendants and whether-assuming such a 
relationship-Plaintiffs' damages arose during the time of representation. The Defendants argue 
that Pogue never agreed to represent Hughes or the Partnership, nor did he engage in conduct 
that would imply an attorney-client relationship between the defendants and Hughes or the 
Partnership. The Plaintiffs argue that Hughes reasonably believed that Pogue was the attorney for 
himself and the Partnership based on the Diges's statement that he had hired an attorney to draft 
a partnership agreement; the telephone conference on November 21, 2011 with the Partnership 
bookkeeper and Pogue; and the fact that Pogue filed the Complaint in the underlying action 
naming the Partnership as a plaintiff. 
1. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Whether an attorney-client relationship exists is a question of fact. Warner v. Stewart, 
129 Idaho 588, 593, 930 P.2d 1030, 1035 (1997); O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262, 796 
P.2d 134, 139 (Ct.App.1990); see also Idaho R. Prof. Cond. (IRPC), Preamble at 1 17. The 
attorney-client relationship is regarded by most courts as contractual in nature. 48 AM. JUR. 
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Proof of Facts 2d 525 (Originally published 1987). However, as in traditional contract law, the 
contractual relationship may be express or implied-in-fact. Warner, 129 Idaho at 594, 930 P.2d at 
1036. Whether such an attorney-client contract can be implied from the conduct of the parties 
depends upon ''whether the intent to make the contract may be fairly inferred from the facts." Id., 
930 P.2d at 1036. Payment of attorney fees is one fact that provides strong evidence that an 
attorney-client relationship exists. Id, 930 P.2d at 1036. In Warner v. Stewart, supra. the court 
discussed the appropriate tests for establishing the existence of an attorney-client relationship as 
follows: 
This Court has not addressed the appropriate test for determining whether an attorney-
client relationship exists. Some courts have held that the controlling factor is the client's 
subjective belief which is reasonable under the circumstances. Other courts have 
construed the attorney-client relationship in more strict contractual terms, finding that no 
attorney-client relationship exists absent clear assent by both the putative client and 
attorney. 
Id 129 Idaho at 593-594, 930 P.2d at 1035-1036 (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court settled on an appropriate test in Berry v. McFarland, in which 
it opined that,"[a]s a general rule, no attorney-client relationship exists absent assent by both the 
putative client and attorney." 153 Idaho 5, 9, 278 P.3d 407, 411 (2012). However, "[t]here are 
also circumstances in which the existence of an attorney-client relationship can exist based upon 
the attorney's failure to clarify whom the attorney is representing." Id at 9, 278 P.3d at 411 ("If 
the attorney agrees to provide assistance, or engages in conduct that could reasonably be 
construed as so agreeing, then there is an attorney-client relationship."). These are situations 
where, ''under the circumstances, one of the parties could reasonably believe that the attorney is 
representing that person's interests." Id. Thus, "where an attorney has represented a closely held 
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business entity and then provides legal services for a transaction involving that entity and 
owners where their interests are adverse, the attorney must clearly inform all involved who is the 
attorney's client and inform the others to seek independent legal advice." Id at 10, 278 P.3d at 
412 (citing Blickenstajfv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577-78, 97 P.3d 439, 444-45 (2004)). Once an 
attorney client relationship is created, the scope of the subsequent representation and its 
termination depends upon what services the attorney agreed to provide. Id at 9,278 P.3d at 411. 
Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), "[a] partnership is an entity distinct 
from its partners and thus a partnership could be a client for purposes of forming an attorney-
client relationship. I.C. § 53-3-20I(a). However, just because an attorney may have been retained 
to represent a partnership does not, "by itself, create an attorney-client relationship with the 
individual partners." Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.App. 4th 1717, 1731 (1993); 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.App. 4th 463 (1995); IRPC 1.13. The material facts at issue 
not appear to be in dispute. Diges and Hughes formed the Partnership prior to any involvement 
of the Defendants. The Partnership and its partners began conducting business and partnership 
activities without the benefit of a written partnership agreement. Diges hired Pogue on October 
21, 2011 and paid him with Partnership money to draft a partnership agreement because of 
difficulties that arose between the partners prior to that date. Each partner complained about how 
the other used partnership money prior to Pogue's engagement. There existed a general distrust 
among the partners prior to Pogue's engagement by Diges. In the underlying trial, Diges 
admitted that he hired Pogue to "draft a partnership agreement for [him] and Hughes. (Tr. pg. 
124, L. 8-11). 
The only evidence as concerns this summary judgment motion of an "express agreement" 
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forming an attorney-client relationship is the testimony of Diges in the underlying case and the 
affidavit of Pogue that Diges hired Pogue and Pogue agreed to represent Diges in the preparation 
of a partnership agreement. There is no evidence of an express agreement with the Partnership or 
Hughes. However it remains to be seen as to whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a triable 
issue of fact of an attorney-client relationship with either Hughes or the Partnership based on an 
"implied-in-fact contract theory". 
The Court in Berry v. McFarland, supra, recognized that, "[i]f the attorney agrees to 
provide assistance, or engages in conduct that could reasonably be construed as so agreeing, then 
there is an attorney-client relationship." Under this circumstance could Hughes reasonably 
believe that Pogue represented his interests as concerns himself or the Partnership? In assessing 
the reasonableness of one's belief a totality of the circumstances analysis is appropriate with both 
a subjective and objective component: (1) Subjectively, did Hughes have a good faith 
Diges hired Pogue and Pogue agreed to represent not only Diges' interests but also the interests 
of Hughes and the Partnership?; (2) Objectively, was the belief of Hughes reasonable in light of 
the facts and record presented? 
The Oregon Supreme Court in In Re Weidner, 801 P.2d 828 (1990), cited to in Warner v. 
Stewart, held that the attorney-client relationship may be found to have existed based on the 
putative client's objectively reasonable belief that the relationship had been established, provided 
that the putative client's subjective belief was accompanied by evidence "the lawyer understood 
or should have understood that the relationship existed, or acted as though the lawyer was 
providing professional assistance or advice on behalf of the putative client." Id Similarly, the 
Utah Supreme Court in Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119, 1127 (2002) held that the putative client 
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must subjectively believe the attorney represents him and that the subjective belief "must be 
reasonable under the circumstances." The Washington Supreme Court found that while the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship turns largely on the client's subjective belief, such a 
belief does not control the issue unless it is reasonably formed based on the attending 
circumstances, including the attorney's words or actions. Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71 (1992). 
In Williams v. McCoy, 931 So.2d 1217 (2006) the Louisiana Court of Appeals addressed 
the issue of the existence of an attorney-client relationship where one member of an LLC 
retained counsel to assist in the formation of the LLC and the question was presented as to 
whether there was an attorney-client relationship with the other two members of the LLC. The 
court affirmed summary judgment for the attorney on the basis that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish such a relationship with the other members employing the test that the subjective 
belief that an attorney-client relationship exists "must be reasonable under the circumstances." 
The Plaintiff is correct when he argues that an attorney for a closely held business has a 
duty to advise the individual members of that business entity as to who he represents when the 
interests of the business and the individuals members become adverse. Berry v. McFarland, 153 
Idaho at 9-10, 278 P.3d at 411-412. Also see, Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 974 P.2d 70 
(1999). However, the plaintiff's argument is conditioned on the finding that the attorney had an 
attorney-client relationship with the entity. 
There is no evidence, and neither party argues, that Pogue or his law firm had any 
relationship with the parties prior to October 21, 2011. Prior to October 21, 2011 there existed a 
great deal of animosity and distrust between Diges and Hughes concerning the operation of the 
Partnership and the use of Partnership monies. On October 21, 2011 Diges hired Pogue to draft a 
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partnership agreement. There is no evidence that Diges consulted with Hughes or that they 
agreed beforehand to hire Pogue or his law firm. After hiring Pogue, Diges did inform Hughes 
the he had hired Pogue to draft a partnership agreement. It is undisputed that Diges used 
Partnership funds to pay Pogue; however at the time in question it is also undisputed that Hughes 
was unaware that Diges used Partnership monies to pay Pogue or his law firm. 3 There is no 
evidence that there was any interaction or the providing of any advice or consultation between 
Pogue and Hughes after October 21, 2011 and prior to November 21, 2011. On November 21, 
2011 a telephone conference occurred between Pogue, Hughes and the Partnership bookkeeper, 
Baker, which may appear to be related to the financial information of the Partnership or the 
partners based on Barker's email to Pogue. There is no evidence otherwise as to the substance of 
the telephone conference. However, Hughes has admitted that on this same day, i.e. November 
21, 2011, he became aware from a third party that Pogue was not representing his interests. 
"Summary Judgment is proper when 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Id "If 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, 'only a question of law remains' ... " Id (quoting 
Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005)). 
a) Hughes/ailed to establish an attorney-client relationship. 
There is no evidence or claim of any express agreement between Hughes and Pogue 
wherein Hughes hired and/or Pogue agreed to represent the personal interests of Hughes. 
3 This issue as to whether the payment was a partnership expense or a personal expense was litigated in the 
underlying dissolution action and it was determined to be a personal expense on the part ofDiges. 
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Therefore, Hughes has the burden to establish that Pogue engaged "in conduct that could 
reasonably be construed" to indicate the parties agreed to establish an attorney client 
relationship. Berry v. McFarland, supra. There is no dispute that Diges originally hired Pogue to 
draft a partnership agreement in October, 2011 and then later in November, 2011 the focus of 
Pogue's engagement changed from the drafting of the partnership agreement to the dissolution of 
the partnership. The only evidence of the attorney-client relationship that Hughes can point to is 
the statement by Diges that he [Diges] had hired an attorney to draft a partnership agreement for 
Diges, Hughes and the Partnership. This again is a statement by Diges and not Pogue and the 
statement by Diges does not establish the required mutual assent between a client and an 
attorney. 
As for any "implied-in-fact" contract, there is no evidence of any conduct on the part of 
Pogue after October 21, 2011 and prior to November 21, 2011 that would imply an .,.tt,.,....,,,"' 
client relationship between Pogue and Hughes. Hughes admitted that on November 21, 2011 he 
became aware that Pogue only represented the interests of Diges and while it may be true that 
Pogue participated in a telephone conference with Hughes and the Partnership bookkeeper on 
November 21, 2011 there is no evidence as to what transpired in this call that would lead Hughes 
to reasonably believe that Pogue represented his personal interests. 
The evidence suggests and there does not appear to be any dispute that the relationship 
between Diges and Hughes was very strained and that there was a great deal of distrust between 
the two of them. It is not reasonable to believe that Hughes would rely upon Diges to hire an 
attorney to represent his personal interests or that Hughes would rely on an attorney hired by 
someone who was clearly his adversary. Tnis court must therefore conclude that it is not 
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subjectively or objectively reasonable for Hughes to believe that Pogue was his attorney or 
representing his interest under the circumstances and as such there is insufficient evidence to 
establish a triable issue of fact as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship between 
Pogue and Hughes. 
b) H-D Transport failed to establish an attorney-client relationship. 
Hughes has not presented evidence of an express agreement of an attorney-client 
relationship between Pogue and the Partnership, except for the statement of Diges that he had 
hired an attorney to prepare a partnership agreement for Hughes, Diges and the Partnership. 
There is also evidence that Diges paid Pogue $1500.00 from the Partnership account. However, 
as the Defendants have noted, the issue of this payment was some of the subject matter in the 
underlying dissolution action. In the underlying dissolution action there was an issue litigated as 
to whether the $1500.00 paid was a personal expense of Diges or a Partnership expense. In the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ,r,r 17-18, the district court found that the expenditure 
by Diges was personal and not a partnership expense; it ordered Diges to reimburse the 
Partnership the sum of $1500.00. 
The case law has previously stated that the payment for services is a strong indicator or 
factor in the establishment of an attorney client relationship. However, given the district court's 
findings, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the issue of who retained Pogue and in 
what capacity. The court in Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182, 731 P.2d 171, 
177 ( 1986) (internal citations omitted) addressed collateral estoppel: 
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Collateral estoppel4[, also known as issue preclusion,] is a rule of the general doctrine of 
res judicata. Under the general doctrine, "the [former] judgment establishes legal barriers 
against relitigating the matters involved in the action." Under the specific rule of 
collateral estoppel, in actions involving different claims than those involved in a former judgment, in some circumstances the former judgment can "operate[ ] as an estoppel as to 
those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding 
or verdict [is] rendered." Because this rule of collateral estoppel involves the effect of a 
prior judgment on a subsequent action as a matter of substantive law, the admissibility of 
the prior judgment itself in the subsequent action is not in question. 
Five factors are required for collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of an issue decided in 
an earlier proceeding: 
( 1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue 
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Waller v. State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 238, 192 P .3d 1058, 1062 (2008). 
Hughes was a party to the dissolution action. The issue of the $1500.00 payment by Diges to 
Pogue was litigated in the dissolution action and is an issue in this action as concerns the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship. 5 The district court decided in the dissolution action 
that the expenditure of partnership funds by Diges was a personal expense of Diges and not a 
partnership expense. There was also a final judgment entered that included the $1500.00 sum 
4 
"The general doctrine of res judicata is not to be confused with the specific rule of res judicata, [ also known as] 
claim preclusion, which is 'the effect of the former judgment where the latter action proceeds on all or part of the 
very claim which was the subject of the former.' J. Fleming and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 11.3, p. 532 (2d ed. 1977) (hereinafter Fleming and Hazard, supra). Anderson v. City of Pocatello, l 12 Idaho 176, 182 n.3, 731 P.2d 171, 177 (1986). 
5 The doctrine of collateral estoppel only applies to the issue of the characterization of the payment of the legal fees 
and not as to the existence of the attorney-client relationship, which was not fully litigated in the underlying action. 
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that Diges was required to pay back to the Partnership. There is no showing that as to this 
particular issue that Hughes did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
characterization of the $1500.00 payment. Considering that the district court found this 
expenditure to be personal to Diges and further considering that Hughes was not aware of this 
expenditure of partnership monies until after the dissolution action had been filed, it is not 
reasonable to believe that Hughes had a reasonable belief based on this factor that Pogue was 
representing the Partnership. Further, the mere fact that Pogue named the Partnership as a 
plaintiff in the dissolution action does not suggest that Pogue was the attorney for the Partnership 
on or before November 21, 2011 when Hughes learned that Pogue was only representing Diges. 
In the dissolution action all parties agreed that the Partnership was a nominal party and further, 
Hughes had his own attorney, Ben Worst, who named the Partnership as a Counterclaimant in 
the dissolution action. On or before November 21, 2011 it was not reasonable for 
believe that Pogue was the Partnership attorney. 
B. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' unreasonable restraint of trade claims fail because (1) no 
conspiracy can exist between principal and agent and (2) Defendants are involved in the practice 
of Law, not in the practice of fracking and had no purpose to drive H-D out of business." Mem. 
in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., 18. Plaintiffs counter that the basis of their unreasonable 
restraint claim is supported by a "combination" of conduct between Defendants and Diges. Mem. 
in Opp'n. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., 28-29. The argument of the plaintiff is not supported with 
any legal authority. 
The purpose behind the Idaho Competition Act is "to maintain and promote economic 
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competition in Idaho commerce, to provide the benefits of that competition to consumers and 
businesses in the state, and to establish efficient and economical procedures to accomplish these 
purposes and policies." LC. § 48-102(2). At issue here is Idaho Code § 48-104 of the Idaho 
Competition Act which states: "A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two (2) or more 
persons in unreasonable restraint of Idaho commerce is unlawful." 
Woodland Furniture, LLC v. Larsen discusses the application ofldaho Code§ 48-104: 
[Idaho Code § 48-104] requires a claimant to show a purpose to drive another out of business, reflecting the notion that unfair competition laws were enacted to protect 
competition, not competitors. Idaho Code § 48-104 strikes the balance between free 
competition and fair competition by offering relief only where a company can show a 
competitor's intent to drive the company out of business, rather than simply an intent to 
compete. 
142 Idaho 140, 146, 124 P.3d 1016, 1022 (2005)). 
I. Contract, combination, or conspiracy 
Idaho Code § 48-104 is read disjunctively: "contract, combination, or conspiracy." 
( emphasis added). It is undisputed that Diges and Defendants had an attorney-client relationship; 
an attorney-client relationship is one of agency and cannot be civil conspiracy so long as the 
agent is within the scope of his representation. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 844, 243 
P.3d 642, 660 (2010). Plaintiffs statement that there is a "combination" of conduct fails for 
choosing form over substance-Plaintiffs have produced nothing ( and presumably Defendants 
found nothing in discovery) to indicate that there existed some relationship other than an 
attorney-client relationship between Defendants and Diges. 
"A principal is responsible for its agent's tortious acts, so long as the agent has acted 
within the course and scope of authority delegated by the principal." Millenkamp v. Davisco 
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Foods Int'!, Inc., 562 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 
P.2d 900, 902 (1985)). By implication, an agent is liable for his own tortious conduct if it is 
outside the scope of authority delegated by the principal. 
In Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 84, 14 P.3d 1074, 1078 (Ct App. 
2000) the court reviewed the standards for evaluating whether an employee's act is Vlithin the 
scope of his or her employment: 
[I]f the employee's purpose is purely personal, it does not matter that the employee is 
using the employer's tools or driving the employer's vehicle or some other activity that merely 
resembles his or her employment. The employee must be engaged in some type of work that is 
assigned to him or her in the general sense of doing something to serve the employer. 
[I]t is apparent that serving the "master" is required in order for the conduct to be Vlithin 
the scope of employment. 
Idaho Rules of Professional conduct 1.2( d) further limits the scope of representation in 
the attorney-client relationship stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not...assist a client, conduct that 
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... "6 
Here, Defendants were in an attorney-client/principal-agent relationship Vlith Diges and 
acted at his direction to first prepare a partnership agreement and then dissolve the Partnership 
and then to assist him in setting up an LLC. The complaint alleges additional conduct thereafter, 
including: directing, allowing, or assisting Diges with (1) forcing a dissolution of H-D, (2) taking 
and using H-D Transport's cash and/or Accounts Receivable assets, (3) taking and using H-D 
Transport's hauling contract, (4) taking and using H-D Transport's equipment, (5) putting H-D 
Transport out of business. Thus, because no criminal or fraudulent conduct has been alleged the 
6 Preamble to IRPC, Cmt. 20 sta~s that the IRPC is "not designed to be a basis for civil liability'' but that "since the 
[IRPC] establish[ es] standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of 
the applicable standard of conduct." Neither agency nor civil conspiracy are basis for civil liability, rather they a.re 
conduits with which liability flows from an underlying cause of action. 
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Defendants were presumably within the scope of representation ( and thus indemnified by Diges ). 
2. Intent to drive H-D Transport out of business 
The court in both Woodland Furniture and Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. discusses 
"intent" in the context of I.C. § 48-104. In Woodland Furniture, the court found that a former 
employer did not have an unreasonable restraint of trade claim because it could show no more 
than a scintilla of evidence that a former employee intended to drive it out of business: "{1) 
When [former-employee's] employment with Woodland was terminate~ he told [former-
employer] he was going to put [it] out of business; {2) [former-employee's new business] had 
used [former-employer's] catalog numbers to quote furniture descriptions and prices on purchase 
orders [with customers of former employer]; and (3) [former-employee's new business] copied 
[former-employer's] catalog using scanned images [that former-employee] knew were of 
[former-employer's] furniture." 142 Idaho at 146, 124 P.3d at 1022. 
In Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc., the court similarly found no genuine issue of material 
fact, holding: "Wesco could not maintain a cause of action under the Idaho Competition Act .... 
because, while the actions of Ernest in seeking to hire the majority of the Wesco employees to 
staff stores in the same three cities may not have been 'commendable,' Wesco's only evidence 
that the intent was to drive Wesco out of business was Howe's testimony that Ernest commented 
on taking P & E's business away from them." 149 Idaho 881,897,243 P.3d 1069, 1085 (2010). 
Unlike both Woodland Furniture and Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc in which the alleged 
wrongdoers had no right to put the complaining party out of business, Diges had the right under 
the RUPA to direct his attorney to wind up the H-D Partnership. I.C. §§ 53-3-801, 53-3-601. 
This simply is not the type of unreasonable restraint contemplated by I.C. § 48-104 since the 
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very purpose of a dissolution action is to ultimately wind up a partnership. Therefore, while 
Defendants alleged assistance in setting up an LLC and directing, allowing, or assisting Diges 
with forcing a dissolution of H-D, taking and using H-D Transport's cash and/or Accounts 
Receivable assets, taking and using H-D Transport's hauling contract, taking and using H-D 
Transport's equipment, and ultimately putting H-D Transport out of business may not have 
transpired in the most "commendable" way, there is no evidence that Defendants ever had an 
intent to do anything other than follow Diges's directives. 
3. Litigation Privilege 
The Defendants cite Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) for the 
proposition that Plaintiffs cannot sue Defendants for any conduct that took place during the 
course and scope of their representation of Diges after filing the underlying lawsuit. In Taylor 
the court contemplates the expansion of the litigation privilege from protecting attorneys from 
suits based on defamatory statements made in the course of representing clients to include other 
tortious behavior during the same. See Id. at 836-43, 243 P.3d at 652-59. The privilege is 
permitted in limited circumstances based on an attorney's duty to zealously advocate for the 
client, and protects the attorney from adverse parties-non clients of the attorney-from 
thereafter holding the attorney personally liable for performing that central function of the 
profession. Id at 839, 243 P.3d at 655. In the case of Taylor, Reed brought an underlying suit 
against (among others) AIAS (which was represented by HTEH) and Taylor (who was 
represented by McNichols of CBM); sometime later Reed brought a second suit against HTEH 
and McNichols (CBM) in their capacity as counsel for defendants in the underlying action. Id. at 
830-31, 243 P.3d at 646-47. The court thereafter granted the respondents' motion to dismiss 
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based on the litigation privilege as the defendants/attorneys had been within the scope of 
representing their clients in the underlying case. Id. at 839, 243 P.3d at 655. Thus in this State the 
litigation privilege not only protects an attorney from statements made in the course of litigation 
but also protects the attorney's conduct on behalf ofhls client during the course of the litigation. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated in Malmin v. Engler, the litigation privilege "is 
based on a public policy of securing to attorneys and officers of the cou..'1: the utmost freedom in 
their efforts to secure justice for their clients." 124 Idaho 733, 735, 864 P.2d 179. 181 (CtApp. 
1993) (quoiting RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS § 586). While the litigation privilege does 
not preclude a civil claim for malpractice when an attorney-client relationship reattaches based 
on the independent fiduciary duty of loyalty owed a former client in matters substantially related 
to the initial matter of engagement, there is no similarly independent basis for liability in an 
unreasonable restraint of trade claim. Therefore summary judgment and dismissal is granted as to 
Plaintiffs' two unreasonable restraint of trade claims. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning above, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED as to all Counts alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Plaintiff's Complaint is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J L\-- day of ·1',):!(~014 
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following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Joy M. Vega 
Mark P. Coon ts 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned La'v\yer, PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
[)q U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Email 
LXf U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Emai 
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John J. Janis [ISB No. 3599] 
Kira Dale Pfisterer [ISB No. 6571] 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Telephone: (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
E-mail: jjanis@hepworthlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
* * * * * 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; ) 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; ) 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional ) 
limited liability company; and LAWSON & ) 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, ) 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------) 
* * * * * 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
DEFENDANTS' VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & 
Kluksdal, hereby submit this Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, pursuant to Rule 
54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, following the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO AW ARD OF COSTS AND FEES 
Defendants are the prevailing party in this lawsuit and, as such, are entitled to an award of 
the costs and fees incurred for the purpose of defending this lawsuit 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("LR.C.P."), a prevailing party is entitled to 
recover its costs. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A). A prevailing party is also entitled to an award of its 
reasonable attorneys' fees when provided for by statute or contract. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). In this 
case, and as discussed more fully below, the applicable statutes providing for the award of attorneys' 
fees are Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123. 
Defendants submit there is no question that they are the "prevailing party" as defined by 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants were awarded judgment as a matter of law on all 
Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to their costs and fees. 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), the Defendants submit the following as their costs as a 
matter of right: 
Court Filing Fees - 54(d)(l)(C)(l) 
Filing Fee 
TOTAL 
A TTOilc"'lEYS' FEES 
$66.00 
$66.00 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3), 121, and 123, Defendants 
are also entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. As discussed more fully below, the amount of 
attorneys' fees sought is reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Attorneys Fees are Appropriate under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), Because 
Plaintiffs' Claims Are Fundamentally Related to a Commercial Transaction. 
Defendants are entitled to their attorneys' fees as the prevailing party under Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3). Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorneys' fees to a 
prevailing party "in any commercial transaction," defined as "all transactions except for personal or 
household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that attorneys' fees are recoverable in attorney 
malpractice cases so long as the plaintiffs claims are fundamentally related to a commercial 
transaction. See, Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 26-27, 293 P.3d 
645, 650-51 (2013); Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322,326,256 P.3d 730 (201 I). As stated by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in the Reynolds decision issued just last year: 
We have held that 'the prevailing party may be entitled to attorneys' 
fees under§ 12-120(3) in an action for legal malpractice so long as a 
commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party and the 
party from whom that party seeks fees.' A commercial transaction 
includes 'all transactions except transactions for personal or 
household purposes.' Further, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies where 
a 'commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover,' and 'thus, as 
long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the 
prevailing party may be entitled to attorneys' fees for claims that are 
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in 
tort.' 
Reynolds, I 54 Idaho at 650-51 ( citations omitted). The Court found an attorneys fee award 
appropriate in Reynolds because the attorney malpractice claim was fundamentally related to an 
underlying commercial transaction: 
Therefore, this transaction had 'the symmetry of commercial purpose 
necessary to trigger I.C. § 12-120(3). The malpractice claim was 
'fundamentally related' to this commercial transaction. 
Consequently, as the prevailing party in an action arising from a 
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commercial transaction, [the defendant law firm] is entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 65 l ( citations omitted). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' claims here are fundamentally related to a commercial transaction. 
Plaintiffs claimed Defendants were hired to represent the Plaintiffs for the purpose of drafting a 
partnership agreement. Plaintiffs claimed that an attorney client relationshiµ existed between them 
and Defendants with regard to the operations of the partnership business. Plaintiffs claimed that 
Defendants should have protected their financial interests in a commercial enterprise during the 
pendency of the underlying lawsuit and, instead, assisted and conspired with their client to use 
partnership assets and compete with the partnership business. 
In the underlying case, the district court decided that the dissolution action was not a 
commercial transaction for purposes of I.C. § 12-120(3). The Court reasoned that the underlying 
lawsuit was an effort to enforce a statutory scheme of dissolution, rather than a commercial 
transaction. 
However, the lawsuit in this case is not a partnership dissolution proceeding itself, and never 
has been. Plaintiffs alleged a commercial injury - damage to the partnership and its assets, as well 
as the individual Plaintiff, resulting from Defendants allegedly not only failing to protect the 
Plaintiffs' financial interests, but affirmatively conspiring with their clients to compete with the 
partnership business. Otherwise stated, the Plaintiffs here have been claiming the professional 
Defendants in the underlying matter were hired to provide services and either failed to do so, or did 
so in a manner that adversely effected the Plaintiffs' interest in a commercial enterprise. 
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Accordingly, a "commercial transaction" is clearly "fundamentally related" and integral to 
claims at the center of this lawsuit. Thus, Defendants, as the prevailing party, are entitled to their 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot argue to the contrary. In the Verified Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, they, too, requested attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120. See Verified Complaint 
and Demand for jury Trial, p. 11. 
B. Attorneys Fees are Also Appropriate under Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 123, and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Because Plaintiffs' Claims Are Frivolous. 
Idaho statutory law and the Rules of Civil Procedure also allow for the recovery of fees for 
the pursuit of cases that are frivolous, or without reasonable foundation in fact or law. See, e.g. IC. 
§ 12-121, I. C § 12-123, JRCP 54(e)(l), IRCP 11 (a)(l). More specifically, attorneys' fees may be 
awarded when the court "finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, umeasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(l). While an award of 
attorneys' fees under these provisions of Idaho law are not the norm, they are deserved here. 
There were four causes of action raised by the Plaintiffs in this case, none of which had any 
legal or factual merit, or reasonable foundation in fact or law. The two causes of action relating to 
the Unfair Restraint of Trade statute had no application to the facts of this case, or the relationship 
between any of the parties, and that should have been clear from the get-go. To begin with, the 
statute requires a conspiracy, and it is extremely well established law everywhere, including Idaho, 
that an attorney and a client cannot be held to such a conspiracy. That has always been the law and 
there has never been any doubt about it. Here, the Court in the underlying case had already ruled as 
a matter of law that all conduct performed by Mr. Pogue had been a result of Mr. Diges hiring him 
for his own personal legal interests. As such, it has always been clear that all conduct by Mr. Pogue 
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that could even arguably be at issue in this case was conduct committed during the scope and course 
of his representation of Mr. Diges. That was clearly and undeniably an attorney client relationship 
to which no civil conspiracy claim can attach. The bottom line is the Plaintiff never had any facts 
that even arguably supported claims under this statute. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the litigation privilege for attorneys, and 
made it clear that an attorney cannot be sued by his client's present or former adversary for any 
communications or conduct committed during the scope of his representation of his client That 
privilege clearly and undeniably applied to all of the facts of this case. The one and only argument 
the Plaintiffs ever raised in response to this (that the privilege only applied to communications, not 
conduct} was one they ultimately acknowledged themselves was an incorrect statement of law and 
represented an argument they had to withdraw. 
The same basic points could be made regarding the claims for attorney malpractice. The 
bottom line is the Plaintiffs were trying to concoct an attorney client relationship when clearly none 
had existed. In fact, this much was clear not only by the Court's rulings in the underlying case, but 
by the individual Plaintiffs own testimony under oath in the underlying case where he openly 
acknowledged knowing very early on, long before any arguable damage occurred, that Mr. Pogue 
was only representing the interests of Mr. Diges. The bottom line summary of this case is the 
Plaintiffs never had any appropriate legal basis to file a lawsuit against their former adversary's 
lawyer for what that lawyer did in representing the interests of his client in the underlying case. This 
entire case boiled down to the Plaintiff trying to concoct a legal duty between the parties to this case 
when none ever existed, and every legal theory offered for this purpose boiled down to trying to fit 
a proverbial square peg in a round hole. 
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In sum. the Defendants respectfully submit that attorneys' fees should be awarded in this 
case, if not for some reason under LC. § 12-120(3), then because the claims in this case were 
frivolous and had no reasonable basis in fact or in law. 
C. Defendants Seek Attorneys' Fees of $36,510.00. 
The actual amount of attorneys' fees generated to date by my law firm in representing the 
Defendants in this action, as of the most recent billing cycle month, is $36,510.00. Attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A" is a more detailed record of the actual time spent with description of the legal services 
provided on this matter, the amount of hourly time, and the corresponding charge (with redactions 
to preserve privileged or otherwise protected information). 
The attorneys' fees identified in Exhibit "A" reflect amounts actually billed by my law firm 
to the Defendants' insurer and paid by the insurer. I believe all of the professional services reflected 
in Exhibit "A" were reasonably and necessarily incurred in dealing with this case. 
D. The Amount of Attorneys' Fees Sought is Reasonable. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) is the rule governing the "amount of attorneys' fees" 
to be awarded in any case. It provides a list of eleven factors the trial courts "shall consider" in 
determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to a prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
A trial court must "consider all eleven factors plus any other factor it deems appropriate." 
Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 181 P.3d 473 (2008). However, the trial court "need not 
specifically address all of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long as the record 
clearly indicates that the court considered them all." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 
Idaho 743,747, 152 P.3d 614,618 (2001)(quotingBoelv. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 
43 P.23d 768, 775 (2002)). In short, the Court does not have to make a record of specific finding 
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regarding each the eleven factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3). Nonetheless, it must make a record at 
least summarily indicating the court gave consideration to all of the factors under the rule. 
With regard to the eleven factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3), it would seem likely that in any 
given case a number of the factors listed would have some direct applicability, while others will have 
only some applicability, and yet others will have no applicability at all. Nevertheless, and in any 
event, the Defendants would offer the following on each of the listed factors in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3): 
I. The time and labor required. The attorneys' fees requested are exactly commensurate 
with the "time and labor required" in the defense of this case. This case was determined on summary 
judgment, and the majority of time spent on the case was devoted to researching and writing the 
summary judgment briefing. Additional time was spent basically litigating the case (e.g. discovery) 
and otherwise working the case up and preparing for trial that would have otherwise taken place just 
a bit more than a month from now. 
2. The novelty and difficultv of the questions. There were many legal issues ,.,.,.,,.,.,,,,,t,,,r1 
by the case. These legal issues included when, whether, and how an attorney client relationship is 
formed; duties owed by an attorney to client/partnership; derivative claims; the scope and application 
of the litigation privilege; and the scope and application of unfair competition claims. These issues 
required significant amounts of legal research and briefing. 
"' 
.). The skill requisite to perform the legal service properlv and the experience and ability 
of the attornev in the particular field oflaw. Defendants employed two attorneys to perform the legal 
research necessary to defend the lawsuit. Each legal professional performed their functions properly 
and consistent with their experience and ability. 
DEFENDANTS' VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 8 
345 
4. The prevailing charges for like work. Defense counsel submits the hourly charges 
the defense of this case are commensurate with the normal and usual rates charged by the law 
firm representing attorney or law firm defendants for a number of years. These are also charges that 
are commensurate with customary and usual rates charged by lawyers practicing in Boise, Idaho, 
with commensurate levels of experience. 
5. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. The law firm representing the Defendants was 
hired on a fixed hour fee arrangement based upon the applicable hourly rates. 
6. The time limitations imposed bv the client or the circumstances of the case. The 
Defendants do not believe this is a factor worthy of much consideration here. There were no time 
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case generally, other than the 
scheduling order and the corresponding need to prepare for trial at the same time as preparing for 
the summary judgment motion. 
7. The amount involved and the results obtained. The amount involved in this case, at 
least according to the Plaintiffs, was substantial, since they were claiming damages for multiple 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, plus they intended to seek leave to include claims for punitive 
damages to boot. Just before the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a lengthy and accusatory 
demand letter demanding close to a million dollars to be paid within fifteen days or withdrawn. (See 
first and last pages of that letter dated October 18, 2013 attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.) The 
'·results obtained" were thus obviously favorable to the defense, since all of Plaintiffs' claims have 
now been dismissed as a matter of law. 
8. The undesirability of the case. The Defendants do not believe this is a factor that has 
much applicability here. 
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9. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. The Defendants 
that this is likewise a factor that has little if any applicability here. 
10. Awards in similar cases. The Defendants are not certain what consideration could 
be given to this factor. Defense counsel is not aware of any attorneys' fee awards that have been 
given in what could be fairly classified as a "similar" case. Defense counsel is aware of attorneys' 
fees being awarded in cases where the fee awards are commensurate with the amounts that were 
actually billed and paid by the client in defense of the case, and particularly in one instance for 
amounts of fees awarded in excess of the amounts sought here, in an attorney malpractice case 
involving close to the same level of litigation activity here (written discovery, no depositions and a 
dispositive motion). That is what is in substance being requested here and submitted as fair and 
appropriate. 
11. Reasonable cost of automated legal research. Defendants do not seek reimbursement 
for their use of automated legal research tools, though they did, in fact, 
bit. 
upon Westlaw a 
12. Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in a particular case. The 
Defendants are not aware of any "other" factor that would provide any significant contribution to the 
attorneys fees considerations here, other than those addressed above. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the total of the costs and fees incurred in defense of this lawsuit are $36,510.00. 
Defendants respectfully request that the Court award them the costs and attorneys' fees incurred in 
this matter. 
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VERIFICATION 
The undersigned John J. Janis hereby verifies and confirms, to the best my personal 
knowledge and belief, that the above statements are true and correct, and the above listed and 
described costs are correct, were actually incurred by our law firm on behalf of the Defendants in this 
litigation, and that said costs are in compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and its various sub-parts. 
In addition, the undersigned John J. Janis hereby verifies and confirms, to the best of my 
personal knowledge and belief, that the above calculated attorneys' fees are correct, and accurately 
reflect time spent by attorneys on behalf of Defendants in this litigation. As further verification and 
confirmation of these fees, attached as Exhibit "B" is a copy of a fee ledger generated by our firm. 
This is a record kept by our law firm in the regular and ordinary course of our law firm's business. 
r 
Dated this~ 'f day of November, 2014. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
anis 
eys for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED and SWOR.1\T to before me this 2-f (i day of November, 2014. 
fbvuh UtA1n1l,f> 
Notary Public for Idaho f-< 
Residing at · \ r !:> 
My Commission expires_,_/-=D.._..,__,_,_.,_ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 537 W. Bannock 
Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the Defendants 
in this matter, certifies that on this Jytfday ofNovember, 2014, he caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Joy M. Vega 
Mark P. Coon ts 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned Lawyer, PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(X1 U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Email 
[)dU.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimil 
[ ] il 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric B. Swartz 
eric@jonesandswartzlaw .corn 
October 18, 2013 
VIA E-MAIL (without exhibits) 
and US MAIL 
James R. Laski 
Michael D. Pogue 
LAWSON & LASKI PLLC 
~ro~~ 
! LAWSON L.\SKI CLARK & POGUE I 
--·· 
LAWSON, LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
OFFER OF COMPROMISE 
JONESf;..!J 
SWARTZPLLC 
jrl@lawsonlaski.com 
mdp@lawsonlaski.com 
PROTECTED BY RULE 408 OF THE (OAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Gentlemen: 
Vint Hughes has hired my firm to represent him and H-D Transport, an Idaho Partnership in which 
he is a 500/o owner ("Partnership"), to pursue their claims against you, Lawson & Laski PLLC, and 
Lawson, Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, arising out of your and your firm's: assistance of Andrew 
Diges in his theft of H-D Transport's money; breach of fiduciary duty owed to Mr. Hughes and 
H-D Transport; negligent representation of H-D Tra.nsi;,ort; and unreasonable restraint of trade. 
The purpose of this letter is to put you, Lawson, Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and 
as the assumed business name of Lawson & Laski PLLC, and Lawson & Laski PLLC, on notice of 
Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport's claims and our representation of Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport 
incident to such matters. I am also writing to make a demand for payment by you, Lawson, Laski, 
Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and as the assumed business name of Lawson & Laski 
PLLC, to Mr. Hughes in the amount of $570,510.00 and to H-D Transport in the amount of 
$428,893.20. These amounts are intended to compensate Mr. Hughes and H-D Transport for the 
following damages caused by you and your firm: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND GIVING RISE TO CLAIMS 
On or about October 21, 2011, Mr. Diges hired you and your firm on behalf of himself, H-D 
Transport and Mr. Hughes, using H-D Transport money. As Mr. Diges testified at trial in the 
Diges, H-D Transport·v. Hughes matter, you and your firm were hired to draft a partnership · 
agreement for Mr. Diges and Mr. Hughes: 
1 673 w. Shoreline De 
Suite 200 
-Boise, JD 83702 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Phone: (208) 489-8989 
Faic: (208) 489-8988 
joncsandswartzlaw.com 
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James R.. Laski 
Michael D. Pogue 
LAWSON & LASKI PLLC 
LAWSON, LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
October 18, 2013 
Page 16 
My clients will agree to a full release of any and all claims that they have against you, Lawson, 
Laski, Clark and Pogue, PLLC, individually and as the assumed business name of Lawson & 
Laski PLLC, in exchange for their receipt of your and your firm's payment to Mr. Hughes in the 
amount of $570,510.00 and to H-D Transport in the amount of $428,893.20. This offer will 
remain open for fifteen days from the date of this letter. I look forward to hearing from you and 
your firm on how you and your firm wish to proceed. Thank you. 
EBS:e! 
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52028.009 06/03/2014 
2A 
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2 A 
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2 A 
2 A 
2 A 
2 A 
2 A 
2A 
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2A 
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Detail Fee Transaction File list 
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chttl. 
Page: 1 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
Hours 
to BIii 
0.50 
0.40 
3.00 
3.00 
2.50 
1.00 
3.00 
3.50 
2.00 
3.00 
2.50 
3.00 
2.50 
1.50 
2.50 
3.50 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.50 
Amount 
150.00 Confer with John Janis re case strategy and execution on judgment. 
120.00 Confer with John Janis. 
ARCH 
ARCH 
900.00 Telephone call with Jim Mickelson; follow..up e-mails; ARCH 
telephone call with Jim Laski; telephone call with Mike 
Pogue; review memo of events prapared by Mr. Pogue; 
review verified complaint. 
900.00 Review Judge's decisions anc(judgment in underlying ARCH 
case; review demand letter and response: prepare for 
and attend late meeting with Mike Pogue. 
750.00 Review trial transcript and Mlecled pleadings in ARCH 
underlying case; telephone call with Mike Pogue. 
300.00 Continue reviewing file; research partnership law and ARCH 
restraint of trade statutes; exehange e-mails with Mike 
Pogue. 
900.00 Continue reviewing file; confer with Charlie Hepworth and ARCH 
Kira Pfisterer re legal issues and research; telephone call 
with plaintiff's counsel; confer with Kira Pfisterer. 
1,050.00 Continue revieWing plead'mgs file; telephone call and ARCH 
exchange e-mails With Mike Pogue: work on answers and 
defenses; confer With Kira Pfisterer. 
600.00 Telephone call$ and exehange e-mails With Mike Pogue; ARCH 
continue reviewing pleadings file; review additional 
materials from Mike Pogue; wOl'k on answer. 
900.00 Review deposition of Andrew Diges; listen to audio ARCH 
recordings of pretrial hearings in underlying case; work 
on answer and defenses. 
750.00 Continue work on answer and defenses; telephone calls ARCH 
and exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue re answer and 
discovery; draft discovery requesis; fisten to fourth audio 
of heartngs: review portions of trial transcript. 
900.00 Telephone calls with Mike Pogue; revise and finalize ARCH 
answer and demand for jury trial; continue drafting 
discovery requests; telephone call with Andrew Oiges. 
750.00 Finalize discovery requests; telephone calls and ARCH 
exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue to review and approve 
the filings. 
450.00 Exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue: review and analyze ARCH 
e-mail from plaintiff's counsel to Mike Pogue; telephone 
calls with Mike Pogue re same. 
750.00 Draft reply e-mail to plaintiff's counsel re e-mail requests ARCH 
to Mr. Pogue; telephone call and exehange e-mails with 
Mike Pogue re revisions to response: review ethical rules 
re contacting adverse parties directly. 
1,050.00 Telephone calls and exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue; ARCH 
review all documents l8flectlng history of settlement 
proposals in underlying case: telephone calts with 
Andrew Oiges. 
600.00 Exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue; review e-mails from ARCH 
plaintiffs' counsel to Mr. Pogue; review ethical rules re 
contacting party; exchange e-mails with defense counsel 
re dtscovery deadline. 
300.00 Telephone call and exehange e-mails with Mr. Pogue; ARCH 
confer with office attorneys re execution on underlying 
judgment issues. 
600.00 Draft proposed response to plaintiffs' counsel re ARCH 
execution and partnen.hip Issues In underlying case; 
revise Mike Pogue's proposed response; exchange 
e-mails with Mr. Pogue and plaintiffs' counsel. 
600.00 Confer with Charlie Hepworth and Klra Pfisterer; review ARCH 
e-malf from adverse counsel re enforcing underlying 
judgment; telephone call and exehange e-mails with Mike 
Pogue re coordinating response; revise and finarize letter 
to counsel. 
450.00 Confer with Charlie Hepworth and Kira Pfisterer; ARCH 
telephone call with Mike Pogue; exchange &-mail$ with 
plaintiffs' counsel; telephone call with Mark Coonts. 
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52028.009 06/10/2014 2A 300.00 0.50 150.00 Telephone call and exd'lange e-mails with plaintiffs' ARCH 
counsel re discovery and status of underlying case; 
exd'lange e-mails with Mr. Pogue re same. 52026.009 06/1112014 2A 300.00 1.00 300.00 Telephone call and exchange e-mails wi'..h Mr. Pogue; ARCH 
telephone call and exchange e-mails with plalntlffl.' 
counsel. 
52026.009 06/16/2014 2A 300.00 0.80 240.00 AevieW plaintiffs' discovery responses; send e-mails to ARCH 
Mr. Pogue and Mc Mickelson re same. 52026.009 06/17/2014 2A 300.00 0.50 150.00 Telephone call with Mike Pogue re discovery responses ARCH 
and status; confer with Kira Pfisterer re motion strategy. 52028.009 07/01/2014 2 A 300.00 1.00 300.00 Exchange e-mails with plaintiffs' counsel; telephone call ARCH 
and exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue. 52026.009 07/02/2014 2 A 300.00 1.30 390.00 Exchange e-mails with plaintiff's counsel; telephone call ARCH 
and exchange ~ifs with Mike Pogue, exd'langing 
proposed l'eSJ)Ol'l$8$ to plaintiff. 52028.009 07/10/2014 2A 300.00 0.30 90.00 Exchange e-mails with Mr. Pogue re scheduling order ARCH 
and potential experts. 
52028.009 09/03/2014 2 A 1 300.00 0.30 90.00 Confer with Kira Pfisterer re summary judgment issues. ARCH 52028.009 09/08/2014 2A 1 300.00 2.00 600.00 Review preliminary draft of motion for summary judgment ARCH 
brief; confer with Kira Pfisterer; review hearing transcripts 
and discovery responses. 
52028.009 09/10/2014 2 A 300.00 2.00 600.00 Continue work on motion for summasy judgment ARCH 
exd'lange e-mails with plaintiff's counsel and Mr. Pogue 
re debts and check issues; confer with Kira Piisterer re 
edits to brief and affidavits. 
52028.009 09/19/2014 2 A 300.00 1.00 300.00 Exchange e-mails with plaintiff's counsel and Mr. Pogue ARCH 
re payment of debt issues; finalize brief and affidavit in 
support of motion for summary judgment 52028.009 10/03/2014 2A 300.00 1.00 300.00 Confer with Kira Pfisterer re e-mails with plaintiff's ARCH 
counsel; exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue; review 
Court's scheduling order. 520211.009 10/06/2014 2 A 300.00 0.30 90.00 Exchange e-mails with Mr. Mickelson re status. ARCH 52028.009 10/14/2014 2A 300.00 1.00 300 .00 Exchange e-mail$ with Mr. Clartt; draft letter to expert Mr. ARCH 
Clark with selected materials. 
520213.009 1Ql22/2014 2 p 300.00 1.50 450.00 Review opposition brief: confer with Kira Pfisterer; send 60 
e-mails to expert Mr. Clark with plaintiff's opposition. 52028.009 10/2312014 2 p 300.00 1.00 300.00 Exchange e-mails with Mike Pogue; confer with Kira 61 
Pfisterer; review and edit first draft of reply brief on 
summary judgment; exchange e-mails with defense 
expert re supplemental materials. 
52028.009 11/03/2014 2 p 300.00 6.00 1,800.00 Prepare for oral argument, confer with Kira Pfisterer; 
travel to Jerome County Courthouse; attend hearing on 
defendants' motion for $Ul'Ml&I)' judgment; return travel 
to Boise; confer with Kira Pftsleler; confer with defense 
counsel. 
52028.009 11/04/2014 2 p 300.00 2.00 600.00 Telephone call with Menyn Clark; exchange follow-up 69 
e-mails: confer with Kita Pfisterer re expert disc!osu!M. 52028.009 11/05/2014 2 p 300.00 0.50 150.00 Wort,; on expert disclosures; telephone call with Merlyn 70 
Clark; confer with Kira Pfisterer. 
52028..009 11/07/2014 2 p 300.00 0.70 210.00 Partially review motion to include punitive damages and 71 
supporting documents; confer with Kira Pfisterer. 52028.009 11/10/2014 2 p 300.00 1.00 300.00 E-mail motion for punitive damages claim to clients; 82 
exchange e-mails and telephone call with Mike Pogue. 52028.009 11/12/2014 2 p 300.00 0.50 150.00 Confer with Kira Pfisterer re opposing motion for punitive 83 
damages claim. 
52028.009 11/1412014 2 p 300.00 2.50 750.00 Review Court memorandum decision, order of dismissal 84 
and judgment; telephone cal! with Kira Pf'!StenM'; 
exchange e-mails with client re same. 
52028.009 11118/2014 2 p 300-00 0.40 120.00 Review expert's bin; send e-mail to Jim Mickelson. 85 52028.009 11l20!2014 2 p 300.00 2.50 750.00 Work on motion for costs and attorneys fees; revieW case 86 
law on fees In malpractice actions; confer with Kira 
Pfisteier. 
52028.009 11/2112014 2 p 300.00 3.00 900.00 Work on motion for cost and fees; exchange e-mails with 87 
Mike Pogue; review tee transactions for privilege issues 
and possible exhibit; confer with Kira Pfisterer; revieW 
Court decision from underlying case II!! dflnial of fees. 
utomey 3 JOHN W. KLUKSDAL 
52028,009 05/01/2014 3 A 1 275.00 0.40 110.00 Confer with John Janis re communications With client; ARCH 
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analyze response. 
1.ttOmey 4 KfRA DALE PFISTERER 
52028.009 04/1612014 4A 200.00 0.40 80.00 Confer with John Janis re case status; review RUPA ARCH 
(Revised Uniform Partnership Act) provisions re 
dissolution and winding up of partnen.hip. 
52028.009 04/17/2014 4 A 200.00 0.20 40.00 Confer with John Janis. ARCH 52028.009 04/18/2014 4 A 200.00 0.80 160.00 Review complaint and statute; confer with John Jani$ re ARCH 
same. 
52028.()09 04/21/2014 4A 1 200.00 0.20 40.00 Confer with John Janis re affirmative defenses. ARCH 
52028.009 05/2912014 4 A 200.00 0.50 100.00 Confer with John Janis re who represents partnership, ARCH 
withdrawal as counsel of record. 
52028.009 05130/2014 4A 200.00 0.30 60.00 Confer with John Janis re partnership representation ARCH 
issue. 
52028.009 06/25/2014 4A 200.00 2.50 500.00 Review complaint; begin drafting motion for summaiy ARCH judgment 
52028.009 06/26,'2014 4 A 200.00 3.00 600.00 Work on motion for summary judgment brief. ARCH 
5202!t009 06/27/2014 4 A 200.00 2.50 500.00 Work on motion for summary judgment; review files ARCH 
produced in discovery and underlying pleadings. 
52028.009 06/3012014 4 A 1 200.00 3.20 640.00 Review District Court findings, client memo, and ARCH 
discovery responses from plaintiffs; draft memo; 
research. 
52028.009 07/02/2014 4 A 1 200.00 4.00 800.00 Work on motion for summary judgment; ieview Distrlcl. ARCH 
Court filings; review e-mail; correspond with opposing 
counsel. 
52028.009 09/03/2014 4 A 1 200.00 3.00 600.00 Review and revise summary judgment briefing; review ARCH 
trial transcript and underlying proceedings. 
52028.009 09/04/2014 4 A 200.00 1.50 300.00 Review trial, pretrial briefing and transcripts; review and ARCH 
revise brief. 
52028.009 09/05/2014 4 A 200.00 2.50 500.00 Review transcnpts and filings from prior proceedings; ARCH 
update motion for summary judgment 
52028;009 09/08/2014 4 A 200.00 3.50 700.00 Prepare and revise motion for summary judgment; ARCH 
research antitrust claims. 
52028.009 09/09/2014 4 A 200.00 5.00 1,000.00 Finalize motion for summary judgment and draft affidavit. ARCH 
5202lt009 09/1012014 4 A 200.00 3.50 700.00 Finalize affidavit; review and revise motion for summary ARCH judgment. 
52028.009 09/1112014 4 A 200.00 2.00 400.00 Review trial transcript; update memo re same; ARCH 
double-check affidavit and cites. 
52028.009 09/12/2014 4 A 200.00 0.30 60. 00 Discuss motion for judicial notice versus affidavit with trial ARCH 
transcrip!/partial trial transcript. 
52028.009 09/17/2014 4 A 1 200.00 0.80 160.00 Review client e-mail; edit brief re same. ARCH 
52028.009 09/19/2014 4 A 1 200.00 2.50 500.00 Finalize summary judgment briefing for filing. ARCH 
52028.009 10/02/2014 4 A 1 200.00 0.80 160.00 Telephone calls with opposing counsel and Mike Pogue; ARCH 
confer with John Janis re same; send e-mail to opposing 
counsel; contact Judge's chambers. 
52028.009 10/08/2014 4 A , 200.00 0.20 40.00 Send e-mail to client re hearing schedule. ARCH 
52028.009 10122/2014 4 p 1 200.00 1.50 300.00 Telephone call to Mike Pogue; case law research re 62 
opposition brief. 
52028.009 10/23/2014 4 p 1 200.00 0.50 100.00 Review opposition, RUPA. outline response; exchange 63 
e-mail$ With Mike Pogue. 
52021U)09 10124/2014 4 p , 200.00 2-00 400.00 Draft outline: research reply brief. 64 
52028.009 10/25/2014 4 p 1 200.00 5.00 1,000.00 Draft reply brief; research re same; incorporate 65 
comments from Mike Pogue; draft affidavits in support. 
(Saturday) 
52028.0Q9 10/26/2014 4 p 200.00 5.00 1.000.00 Draft reply brief; research dissolution action and nominal 66 
party. (Sunday) 
52028.009 10/27/2014 4 p 1 200.00 7.00 1,400.00 Draft and edit reply in support of summary judgment. 67 
52028.009 11/03/2014 4 p 1 200.00 1.00 200.00 Work on expert disclosures due this week; determine 72 
depositions needed. 
52028.009 11/04/2014 4 p 200.00 020 40.00 Review expert witness deadlines; wort< on extension for 73 
time to depose Vint Hughes. 
52028.009 11/05/2014 4 p 1 200.00 0.20 40.00 Review expert witness disclosures. 74 
52028..009 11/06/2014 4 p 1 200.00 3.50 700.00 Telephone call with Mertyn Clarie; work on expert witness 75 
disclosure. 
5202fUl09 11/07/2014 4 p i 200.00 0.50 100.00 Review motion for punitive damages. 76 
52028.009 11/10/2014 4 p 1 200.00 1.00 200.00 Draft opposition brief. n 
52028.009 11/12/2014 4 p 1 200.00 2.50 500.00 Draft opposition to motion for punitive damages; outline 78 
affidavits. 
52028.009 11/13/2014 4 p 200.00 1.50 300.00 Draft opposition to motion for punitive damages and 79 
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affidavit. 5202fL009 11/1412014 4 p 200.00 1-50 300.00 Research and draft opposition to motion ror punitive 80 damages. 52028.009 11/20/2014 4 p 1 200.00 0.50 100.00 Review and revise attorneys' fee motion. 81 
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DEC 11 2014 
Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
.Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
Regan Charlton, ISB #9235 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
P.O. Box 7808 
~ ~. C"'11< District Court Blaine Coun . tmaho 
Boise, JD 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise. JD 83702 
Tt'lephone: (208) 615-5327 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN TllE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TF OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TJ le COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT f .EE HUGHES, 
Plaintiff<;, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual~ 
I .A WSON & LASKI, PT ,I ,C. a professional 
limite<l Jiability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI. Pl ,LC. d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK, & POGUE. PLLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 01• 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR AN AW ARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' PEES AND COSTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' Motion for an Award or Attorneys' Fees should be disallowed because 
Defendants arc not entitled to attorney foel:i under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3 ), 12-12 t and 12-123. 
or any other section. Attorney fees may only be awarded under LC.§ 12-120(3) when there is an 
und!!rlying commercial transaction between the parties which constitutes the hasis of the daim 
for attorney fees. l lcn.\ there was no commercial trar1saction making a fee award appropriate. 
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is no underlying conduct between the parties which amounts to any transaction, much less 
a commercial transaction. This case concerns two counts that sound in tort and two counts that 
arc based upon a statute that awards foes lo, only, a prevailing injured plaintiff. 
Attorney fees are only proper under I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-123 when a plaintiffs claims 
are brought frivolously, unreasonably. or without foundation. Although Defendants prevailed in 
this suit. Plnintiffs' claims were not brought frivolously. unreasonably, or without foundation and 
tlms there is no justification for an award of attorneys· foes. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A, Defendants Are Not Entitled To Attorneys' Fees Under J.C.§ 12-120(3) Because No Commercial Transaction Has Occurred Between The Parties 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorney fees under 1.C. § 12-120(3) because 
"plaintiff's claims are fundamentally rdalcd to a commercial transaction.'' 1 Idaho explicitly 
requires thal a commercial transaction occur before an award of fees is appropriate. Soignia r. 
fletcher, 151 l<laho 322 (20 I i ); Great Plain.~· J::.quipmenl, Inc. v. Northwest Pipe/in<.: , 136 
Idaho 466,471 (2001 ); Bin;:ham v. Montane Resour,:e Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426 (]999). 
J lere. there is no underlying commercial transaction between Plaintiffs and Defendants 
Defendants argued and the Court ruled in their favor that there was no express agreement 
between Hughes2 or H-D Transport and Pogue;3 there was no implied in fact contract between 
Hughes and l'oguc;4 and no attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiffs and Pogue.5 
In determining whether attorney fees are appropriate under LC. § I 2-120(3 ), the court 
conducts a two-step analysis: "(I) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the 
1 Defendants' Memorandum. p. 3. 
1 Court's Memorandum, p. 11. 
Court's Memt1randum. p. 13. 
4 Court's Memorandum, p. 12. 
~ Court's Memorandum, pp. 13-15. 
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and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought." 
Garner v. Powy, 151 Idaho 462, 469 (2011) (quoting Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 471 }. A 
commercial transaction includes transactions except those for personal or household purposes. 
LC. § 12-120(3 ). Courts arc nol required to award attorney fees every time a commercial 
transaction is connected with a case, but a commercial transaction must have occurred between 
the parties before a fee award is appropriate. Id; Bingham. 133 Idaho at 426. The commercial 
transaction must be the basis of the complaint, not simply a situation that can be characterized as 
a commercial transaction. Binihum, 133 ldal10 at 426. Thus, courts consider whether the 
commercial transaction constituted "the gravamen of the lawsuit," and was the basis on which a 
party is attempting to recover. id. at 427~ Freihurg<.!r v. J-U-B Eng 'r:., Inc., J 41 Idaho 415, 423-
424 (2005 ). Defendants cite to Reynold,; v. Trout Jones Gledhill Furman. PA., 154 ldaho 21 
(2013) and Soignicr v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322 (2011), for the proposition that attorney fees are 
appropriate when u plaintiffs claims ure fundamentally related to a commercial transaction, 
Neither of these cases support Defendants' interpretation of the law that attorney fees are proper 
when a party's claims merely relate to a commercial transaction. Reynolds holds that a 
commercial transaction must have occurred between the parties. Reynold,·, 154 Idaho at 650. In 
Soignier, the court hd<l that attorney foes were not appropriate because no commercial 
trunsaction occurred between the parties. Soignier, 151 Idaho at 326. Thus, the case law clearly 
requires thal a commercial transaction must have occurred between the parties, not just that a 
plaintilrs claims must relate to a commercial transaction for a foe award to be appropriate. 
In this case, there is no underlying transaction of any fbrm between the parties, and thus 
the necessary requirement that a commerdal transaction occur between the parties for an 
attorney foe award tu he proper is not satisfied. Defendants' claim for fees should be denied. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT or PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO IJISALLOW 
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B. Plaintiffs' Professional Negligence And Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Do Not 
Constitute A Commercial Transaction. 
Delendants correctly assert that attorney's fees may be recoverable for claims that arc 
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction in attorney malpractice cases when a 
commercial transaction occurred between the parties and the "commercial transaction is at the 
center of the lawsuit.'· Reynold\·, 154 Idaho 651; D.A.R., Inc. v. 5i'h4Jer, 134 Idaho 141, 147 
(2000). For attorney foes to be recoverable in a legal malpractice action, the commercial 
transaction must comprise the gravamen of the malpractice suit and be the basis for that suit. 
Bishop v. Owens. 152 Idaho 617. 620 (2012): McCormick lnr'l US,4, inc. v. Snor,1, 152 Idaho 
920, 926-927 (2012). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 
620; s,•e also HarriKfeld v. JJancoc:k, 140 Idaho 134. I 36 (2004 ). Plaintiffs' claims of 
profossional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty (Counts I and III) sound in tort and not in 
contract and are not fundamentally rdated to a commercial transaction. ln Count I or 
Complaint, Plaintiff H-D Transport allt:ges that the Defendants owed a duty to H-D Transport to, 
in/er alia. act wilhout a confiicL of interest; prepare the partnership agreement lhey were hired to 
prepare; refrain from undertaking interests that were adverse lo H-D Transport; and properly 
carry out a dissolution as required by Idaho's Uniform Partnership Act. 6 In Count lil of their 
Complaint, Plaintiff Hughes alleges that the Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Hughes to, 
inter alia. act without a conflict of interest; prepare the partnership agreement that they were 
hired to prepare; and rdrain from undertaking interests that were adverse to Mr. Hughes.7 These 
claims are based upon the standard of care expected of an attorney. The foundation of Plaintiffs' 
counts here is Defendants' negligence in the attorney-client relationship, which sounds in tort, 
not in contract. Thus, without the establishment of an attorney-client relationship, there is no 
6 Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. 11 35. 
7 Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint, ii 48. 
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commercial transaction that constitutes the gravamen of the lawsuit for attorney foes to be 
appropriate under I .C. § l 2--120(3 ). 
In a factually analogous scenario, the idaho Supreme Court found that attorney foes were 
not appropriate under l.C. § J 2-120(3) in a malpractice action when the conduct related to an 
attorney's negligence in negotiating the end of a marriage. ("It is difficult to fathom a more 
intensely personal transaction than hiring an attorney to negotiate the end of a marriage. This 
was not a commercial transaction.") McCormick, 152 Idaho at 927. While the conduct here is 
arguably not as personal as a divorce, adhering to the ethical duties allomeys are held to in a 
partnership is more aligm:d with the facts in McCormick than in a contract-based transaction. 
Defendants cite to Reynold'! as an analogous case where a malpractice claim was 
"fondamcntally related" to a commercial transaction. While the Reynolds court found that the 
malpractice claim then~ had .. the symmetry of commercial purpose necessary to trigger LC. § 12-
120(3 ). "8 the situation there is not analogous lo the circumstances here, There, the attorney was 
hired lo facilitate the purchase of real property between two commercial parties. Id The 
underlying dispute that gave rise to the malpractice case involved a real estate agreement 
between two commercial parties. Id 
Here. the aJlegations arc that Defendants breached their duties lo the Plaintiffs, not that 
they breached a contract with the Plaintiffs or committed malpractice when drafting a contract 
for the Plaintiffs. The claims of profossional negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty arc more 
aligned with tort causes of action as described in Bishop and McCormick, above. The claims do 
not relate to an underlying commercial transaction, like the purchase of property between two 
commercial entities, as was the case in Reynolds. Additionally, the statutory violations that 
Plaintiffs alleged an: not considered a commercial transaction for purposes of LC.§ 12-I20(J), 
~ Reynolds. 154 Idaho at 27. (!UOting Carrillo v. Buis1: Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 74 l (20 l 2). 
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as discussed below. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims do not med the requisite threshold for attorney fees 
to be appropriate tinder I. C. § I 2* l 20( 3). 
Further, cven if this Court found that a commercial transaction was somehow related to 
Plaintiffs' claims, the commercial transaction must be the "'thrust" of the lawsuit, and the basis 
for the complaint. Rin1-;ham. at I 04 l, 426. The heart of Plaintiffs' allegations arc Defendants' 
conduct faUing below the standard of care expected of an attorney and violating an Idaho statute. 
The fact remains that there is no commercial transaction at the center of the lawsuit to make a fee 
award appropriate. S'ee D.A.R .. Inc. v. Sheffer. 134 Idaho 141, 147 (2000). 
C Plaintiffs, Ch1ims Of Unreasonable Restraint Of Trade Pursuant To I.C. § 48-101, et .req., Do Not Constitute A Commercial Transaction. 
Idaho courts have repeatedly held that attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) arc not proper 
when the claim is based on a statute, even when the underlying action depends on a contract. 
,\'hay v. Cesfrr, 132 Idaho 585 (1999); Gumprecht v. Doyle. 128 Idaho 242 (1995): Kelly v. 
S'ilwrwood Es/ates, I 2i Idaho 624, 63 I ( ! 995 ). This is because an action to enforce a statutory 
penally is not a commercial transaction. Gumprecht, 128 Idaho at 242; Kelly, l 27 Idaho at 63 l. 
Plaintiff brought Count::; fl and IV based upon an unreasonable restraint of trade under 
I.C. ~ 48-101, et seq. 9 And. under ldaho Code § 48-1 I 3, only the prevailing injured plaintiff is 
entitled to fees. Additionally, similar to Kelly and Gumprecht, Counts Il and IV are based upon a 
statule and thus arc not a commercial transaction. Attorneys foes under Idaho Code§ l2-120{3) 
arc not appropriate under fdaho law and the circumstances of the present case. 
D. Defendants Arc Not Entitled To Attorneys' Fees Under J.C. Sections 12-121 and 12-123 Because Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Brought Frivolously, Unreasonably, Or Without Foundation 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims arc frivolous and thus attorneys' fees arc 
') C'oum II. Jl~TJ Transport v. All Oefendants; Count IV, !lug.hes v. All Defendants. 
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appropriate. Despite losing summary judgment, Plaintiffs' claims were not brought in violation 
of any Idaho Code section. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "an award of attorney foes 
under LC. § l 2-121 is not a matter of right, and is appropriate oniy when the Court [has thcj 
·abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously. unreasonably, or 
without foundation."' (l.R.C.P. 54(e)(I) (emphasis added); Numpa & Meridian Irr l)f.,1. v. 
Washin~ton Fed Se1v.. 135 Idaho 518, 524-25(2001) ( quoting Owner-Operator Ind Drivers 
Assoc. v. Idaho Puhlic U1il. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 40!, 408 (1994)). When deciding whether the 
case was brought frivolously, "the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account." 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524. If there is any "legitimate, triable issue of fact. 
attorney fees may not bi: awarded under I.C. § l 2-12 I even though the losing party has asserted 
factual or legal claims that arc frivolous .... " Id. al 525; see also Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 
1023 ( 199 l). Idaho Code § 12-123( l)(b) defines frivolous conduct as conduct that satisfies 
either of the following: 
(i) It obviously serves merely to hara'>s or maliciously injure 
another party to the civil action: 
(ii) 11 is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and 
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification. or reversal of existing law. 
Plaintiffs' claims. although dismissed by the Court, were not fr,volous. Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs "never had any facts that even arguably supported their claims under [the statute]."'° 
To the contrnry, Plaintiffs provided evidence and testimony in support of their claims and raised 
a "colorable argument" in support of their position. See Auto. Cluh. I 24 Idaho at 879-80 
(holding the suit was not frivolous when a colorable argument wa.s put forth). Where a party's 
claim, though unsuccessful. is oftered in good faith with no intent to delay or hinder justice. the 
district court docs not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees. Kelly, 127 Idaho at 630-3 J; 
----·----·-·--
IO Defendants' Memorandum. p. fi. 
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Cunningham v. Bundy, 100 Idaho 456, 459 (l 979). A claim is not frivolous or lacking merit 
simply because it ultimately fails. J::dwarcb· v. Donart. l 16 Idaho 687, 688 ( l 989). 
Plaintiffs produced multiple documents in support of their claims and Mr. Hughes 
verified his Complaint and testified under oath as to his rem.onable belief about his and the 
partnernhip's relationship with the Defendants, how Defendants breach their duties to the 
Plaintiff.;;, and how Defendants' conduct (not requested by Mr. Diges) constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of trade under LC. * 48-101. While the Court weighed the parties' 
arguments and evidence. the relevant case law and statutory authority, and ruled in favor of the 
Defendants, there were many issues that were not ruled upon and some that were ruled upon 
were based upon the weighing of conflicting testimony and evidence. Mr. Hughes has claimed 
in this action and on summary judgment that part of Defendants' breach of duties was failing to 
perform <luties as counsel for H-D Transport in preserving assets, winding up lhc partnership, 
and collecting on the judgment rendered in H-D lransporlS' favor. This was not 
the Comt's ruling. The Court, instead, concluded that H-D Transport was a nominal party and 
that Mr. Hughes (not H-D Transport) had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
characterization of a limited amount of money paid to Defendants. H-D Transport did not have 
an opportunity to litigate the charncteriwtion of a limited amount of money paid to Defendants. 
It also did not have the opportunity, nor did Mr. Hughes, to litigate the characterization of cash 
after the first $1,500 that Mr. Diges paid to the Defendants. And, who bound 11-D Transport as a 
nominal party? What is a nominal party? That concept does not appear in Idaho law. 11-D 
Transport was never dismissed from the underlying lawsuit. Who was representing it? 
Defendants were the only counsel of record for H-D Transport after Mr. Worst was allowed to 
withdraw. All of these open questions arc reasonable and have foundation in law and fact. 
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Further. while the Court's Memorandum analyzes the relevant case law at issue and 
ultimately sides with Defendants' interpretation of some of the same, differing reasonable 
interpretations of law is not. hy itself, unreasonable conduct and therefbre grounds for a foe 
award. Allio Club, 124 Idaho at 879-80. Thus. despite the fact that Plaintiffs' claims were 
dismissed by the Court. there is no evidence that the claims were frivolous and therefore no 
attorney fee award is appropriate under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 or 12-123. 
F.. In The Event The Court Awards Attorneys' Fees To Defendants, The Amount 
Defendants' Request Is Not Reasonable 
A court need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and may disallow 
fees that were unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred. Action Collection Services, Inc. v. 
Bif:hmn, 146 Idaho 286. 290 (2008). The time and Jahor actually expended by an attorney is to 
be considered and evaluated under a standard of reasonableness. Action Collection. 146 Idaho at 
290 (citing Dai.~y Mfk Co., Inc v. Painthall Sports. Inc .. 134 Idaho 259, 263 (Ct. App. 2000). 
/\n attorney cannot spt:nd his or her time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by the 
party who loses. Achon Collection. 146 Idaho at 290. A court may disallow fees that were 
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred or that were the product of attorney "churning." Id 
(quoting Daisy, 134 Idaho at 263). 
Plaintiffs leave the issue of reasonableness of fees to the Court's discretion, hut 
encourage the Court to consider: Defendants' request for $36,5 l O in foes without identifying 
which entries on its Lime hill for $39,580 the sought amount applies; Defendants' statement that 
two lawyers worked on the case, but have submitted a bill listing fees for four lawyers; 
Defendants' 2I-page Summary Judgment was worked on over and over again from June 25, 
2014 until filed on September 19, 2014; and Defendants appear to be seeking fees incurred while 
providing an insurance company representative, J. Michelson. updates on the case. 
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HI. CONCLUSION 
the foregoing reasons. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court disallow 
Defendants' Motion for Attorneys· Fees because Defendants have failed to establish that an 
award of attorney foes is appropriate pursuant to LC.§§ 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, or any 
other section. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 2014. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
By 
~-----
Joy M. VEGA 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
Tl IE STATE OF TDAllO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE I IUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, Pl .LC. a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI. PLLC. d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI. CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC / 
Defendants. ._J 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, hy and through undersigned counsel, and hereby respectfully 
request that the Court disallow Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)( l) and .54(c)(6J. 
This Motion is made and supported by the pleadings of record herein. together with the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Dclendants' Motion for an Award of 
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Attorneys· Fees and Costs. filed contemporaneously herewith. No attorney foes should be 
awarded to Defendants because there was no underlying commercial transaction for foes lo he 
appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-l 20(3 ). and Plaintiff,;;' claims were not hrought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation for tees to be awarded under Idaho Code § § 12-121 and I 2-
123. There is no othcr basis. and Defendants have not alleged one, to justify an award of 
attorney fees against Plaintiffs. 
DA TED this 11th day of Dccemher. 2014. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
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P.O. Box 7808 
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Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988 DEC 2 4 2014 
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
regan@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
JoLynn Dra.2)8, Clerk DJstrlct 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 615-5327 
Facsimile: (215) 650-5327 
Email: scottlearned@msn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants/Res ondents. 
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TO: The above-named Respondents, MICHAEL D. POGUE; LAWSON & LASKI, 
PLLC; and LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & 
POGUE, PLLC, and their attorneys of record, JOHN J. JANIS and KIRA DALE 
PFISTERER, of the fmn HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL, 537 W. Bannock 
Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, ID 83701-2582, and THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership, and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the November 14, 2014 MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Order"), dismissing all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
against the Defendants/Respondents in the above-entitled action, Judgment on which was entered 
on November 14, 2014, the Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable Order under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule l l(a)(l). 
3. Appellants request a review of the following issues: 
(a) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to apply the 
appropriate legal standard in determining \\rhether an attorney-client relationship existed between 
Appellants and Respondents? 
(b) In granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, did the District 
Court err in finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to Appellants' claims 
(Counts I and III) that they reasonably believed that Respondents were their lawyers? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
370 
5. A reporter's transcript of the November 3, 2014 hearing on Defendants' Motion 
Summary Judgment has been requested. 
6. Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record: 
(a) Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(b) Defendants' Answer to Complaint 
( c) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(d) Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(e) Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
(f) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
(g) Declaration of Vint Lee Hughes, Individually and on Behalf ofH-D 
Transport, in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(h) Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
(i) Plaintiffs Request to Take Judicial Notice 
G) Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
(k) Affidavit of Michael D. Pogue in Support of Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(l) Affidavit of John J. Janis in Support of Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(m) November 14, 2014 Memorandum Decision Re: Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dismissing all counts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Judgment on which was entered on November 14, 2014, the Honorable John 
K. Butler, District Judge, presiding 
7. I certify: 
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(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Denise Schloder 
Jerome County District Court 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
(208) 644-2616 
(b) That the reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the 
reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014. 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
REGAN CHARLTON 
SCOTT R. LEARi"IBD 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffe/Appellants 
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FILED A.M,~oa,r-_-1.., 
JAN 2 6 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D1STR1CT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, ll\ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
i-J.1) I'R/\>JSPORT. an Idaho partnership: 
2nd V !NT LEE HUGHES. 
Plaintiffs. 
~v11CHAEL D POGUE, an individual: 
* * * * "' 
LJ\ \:VSOJ\ & LASKL PLLC a professional 
limited lial-tility company: and L/\ \VSON & 
LASKI. PLLC, d/b/a LA \VSO>T, LASKI, 
CLARK. & POGUE. PLLC 
Defendams. 
Case Ne. CV 2013-683 
OPPOSITION TO PLAlNTIFf'S 
\IOTION TO DISALLOVV 
DEFENUA!\'TS' MOTIO~ FOR AN 
A WARD OF A n·oRNEYS' FEES 
AND COSTS 
The Court should deny Plaintiffs \.lotion to Disallow Defendants' Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys· Fees and Costs and gram the Defendant's \folion fo,- :\n Aw.1rd of Attorneys· Fees and 
Costs. There is no requirement lh,1, the Court find 3 commercial contract existed in order to rnvard 
OPPOSfT!ON TO PLA!NT!FF'S \,IoTION ~o DISALLOWS DEFENDANTS' MOTIOJ\: FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS • l 
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!~es under [daho Code Section; 2-120(3}: the Plaimiffs' claims were frivolous: and the amount of 
fee~ sought is reasonable and commensurate vvith the \vork involved m defending the Ciaims. 
L BACKGROUND 
On November 24. 20 l 4, Defendants filed a Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees and 
Costs. Defendants requests costs as a matter of right as the prevailing party and fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3). 12-121. and 12-123. 
On December 11, 2014. Plai:1tiffs responded to the Defendants· request by filing a Motion 
to Disallow Defendants' \;lodor: for ar Award of Attorneys· Fees and C osls. It does not appear that 
Plaintiffs ob_iect to the Defendanls' motion for costs. Instead. Ptaintifts cbjcct to: {I) the statutory 
bases for Defendants request for lees and (2) the amount of the fees requested. As discussed more 
full:, below, Plaintiffs· argumc111s are nl)t persuasive, and the Cour·, shoulc grant the Defendants' 
tv1otion for an Award or Atlorneys· Fec:s and Costs in its entirety. 
11. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' b1ief raises three primary arguments: (1) the Court must find a commercial 
contract existed to support a claim for fees under Idaho Code Section l 2-120(3); (2) Pla111tiffs 
claims were not frivolous as requi i·cd to support a claim for fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-12 
and 12-l23: and (3) the amount of attorneys fees requested is Lmrc:isonable. These arguments are 
inconsislent with Idaho law anc the allegations and claims t!1e Plc1.intifts made in this case. 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims were Premised upon a Commercial Transaction within the :Meaning 
of Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
Plaintiffs appear to argue thm the Court must first find lhm there was a commercial contract 
before it may award fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3 ). This position is inconsistent with 
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Idaho law. To determine whether Defendants may avail themselves fdaho Code Section 1 
120(3). the Court rnusL look only to the Complaint and. based on the allegations and claims set forth 
therein. determine \\hether a comm(!rciai transaction ism the hear~ of the dispu:e. 
Plaintiffs argue chat .. there is no underlying commercial transaction between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants·· because the Court ruled: (1) there was no exp:·ess agreement t>etween Plaintiffs and 
Defendants: (2) there was no implied-in-fact contract: and {3) no attorney-client relationship existed 
bctwe~n the Plaintiffs and Defendants. See Memou,·•1eiwn in Suppor: c,f I'iaim((fs' Motion to 
Dfsoll0v1 Defendants· Aloi ionfiJ1· w1 Award c,(Ar1orneys · Fees and Costs, p. 2. However, ldaho case 
hnv makes clear that it is the Plaintiffs· claims that dictate ,vhethcr ldaho Code Section 12-120(3) 
applies~ there is no requirement Lhat the Court find a contract exists between the parties. 
To determine whether Section 12-120(3} applies, the Court looks to the claims and 
alkg.ations in inc complaint. .. ln detenni:iicg \Vhethcr attorneys lees should be awarded under LC 
§ I l20(3 ). the Court has conduct:d a l\No-step analysis: ·c) there must be a commercial 
transaction that is integral to the claim. 2nd (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon 
,·vhich rccovcrv is sought., .. Gc:rner "· Povey, 151 Idaho 462. 469. 259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Greo1 l'/ains ElJUip., Inc. v. Xort!rn es/ Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466. 
47 l, 36 P.3d 218,223 (200 I) ''The commercial 1.ransaction must be an actual basis of the complaint 
... [TJhe lawsuit and the cause~ of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply 
a sitm1tio11 that can be charncteriLed as a commercial transaction.'· Great Plains. 136 Idaho at 471. 
36 P 3d at 223 (emphasis added) ... The relevant inquiry is whether the commercial transaction 
constituted ''the gravamen of the lawsuit" and was the basis upon which a party is attempting to 
recover. Id at 472. 36 P.3d at 2:24. 
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The idaho Supreme has made it clear: ldaho Code Sectior: 12-120(3) ··does not 
require that there he a contrnd bct"·ccn the parties before the statute is applied: the statute 
only requires that there be a commcrci::.ti transaction:' City o(McCail i' Buxton, ;46 Idaho 656,201 
P.3d 629 (2009) (emphasis added) {quoting Grear Plains, 136 Idaho at 466. 36 P.3d at 224). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has also clearly held that "[t]he allegation of a contract of the type covered in 
~ 12-120(3) was sufficient to award fees. even though the claim \.HlS combined with other theories 
that would not have triggered th:::: statute:· Brooks v. Gigray Ranches. 128 Idaho 72, 79,910 P.2d 
744. 751 (1996). 
The instant case is premised upon commercial transactions rnvolving Plaintiff H-D Tran sport 
and Highly Dependable Transport L LC. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants agreed to represent t\VO 
individual partners and a partnership and. instead. represented oniy one the partne::s, hc:ping him 
create a separate competing business w the Plaintiffs' detriment. Complaint and Demc.mdj'i)r Jury 
Trial 1~ 9, 13-16, 21-22, 25-:26. Based on this allege<:'. cond:.ict Plaintiffs made 
professional negligence/ breach of fiduciary duty and unreasonable restraint of trade. 
These claims are fundamentally commercial in nantre: there is no allegation that the 
transactions were for personal oi- household purposes. [m;tead. the allegation was that the 
Defendants' conduct \'>·as design-:d to hurt rhe H-D Transpor1 business and constituted an unfair 
restrain! of trade. Accordingly. Plaintiffs themselves included a claim fot atto:::-neys fees pursuant 
to Sccrion 12-120{3) in their Complaint 
iVIoreover, the case law is clear: the existence or non-existence of a contract is besides the 
point Idaho Code Section l '.2.-120(3) applies \Vhcre, as here, the allegations and claims are premised 
upon a commercial Lransaction. 
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B. Altcrnath1el)', the Court J\'ia:; Award Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 
12-123 Because Plaintiffs' Claims lverc Frivolous. 
Plaintiffs claims were broughl frivolously, unreasonably, and lacked foundation. The claims 
are inconsistent with botb Idaho law and Plaintiff Hughes· ovvn testimony in the underlying lawsuiL 
The Plaintiffs brought the claim. because the underlying judgment remains unpaid, and they are 
unhappy \vith that resull. 
The fundamemal t;·uth is that Plaintiff Vint Lee Hughes 1iled a lnwsciit against his adversary's 
aHorneys. This is contrnry to lda\o lmv. no ma1tcr what leg,.! theories Plaintiffs concocted in an 
attempt to achieve this improps:r purpose. 
tv1oreover, the legal theories upon which Plaintiffs relied were co:npletely at odds with the 
tacts. Plaintiff Hughes filed a legul malpractice claim against an attorney and a law firm that he 
never hired. Yet throughout Lhe underlying. litigation, Plaintiff Hughes was clearly not relying upon 
the De!endants and was keenly avvarc tha, they were representing his adversary 
[)]aintiffs also tried to foshic,n an unfair restrain1 o:'trade ci,1im there \vas not even 
colorable argument that statute c1ppl1cd to the facts in letter or spirit. Furthermore, the requisite 
conspiracy to support such a claim ,vas squarely contradtcred by a fundamental principle of both 
ci.gcncy and conspiracy law: principles cannot conspire with their agents. 
Defendants tlms submit this alternative basis for foes in th:s case. Because t.'1e claims lacked 
any reasonable foundation in fact or lnw, attorneys foes may be awarded pursuant to Idah Code 
Seel ion 12, 12Land J 2:-.123. 
C. The Attorneys Fees Request is Reasonable. 
Plaintiffs' objection to the amount of fees in short on detail. There is no allegation that the 
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Defendants were "extravagam·· v,,itb their lime. That counsei began drafting the summary judgment 
al th:;; end of June and returned 10 i1 in September is not a sufficiern basis for disallo"ving the fees. 
r\1orc:over, providing the ciic111. in this case the insuran..::e adjuster_ with updates on case status is ar: 
essential pan of a lawyer" s prolcssional responsibilities. h would be bad policy to deduct from the 
attorneys foe award that time spent communicating with the client. 
CO:'ICLUSION 
ln sum, Plaimiffs have not demonstrated that the Coun should reduce or disallow the 
D...::lcndants· fees request. Plainti:rs brough: a complaint premised upon commercial t::-ansactions 
involving H-D Transport and Highly Dependable Transport LLC. If Plaintiffs had succeeded on their 
claims, they would have sought foes. Instead. the Defendants prevailed and the Plaintiffs must pay 
nccording to the plain language or the statute 
Dated 1b1s ~ ~l.i> oi'hnuary, :201:5. 
HEP\VORTK JJ\NIS & KLUKSDAL 
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CERTJFICA TE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, n residem attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. Bannock 
Street. Suile 200, P.O. Box 2582. Boise Idaho 837Dl, and oni: of the attomevs foT the Defendants 
in this matter, certifies that on this d {.;¥day of January, 20 i 5. he caused t~ be served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
follow·ing: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Joy M. Vega 
Mark P. Coonts 
Jones & Sv,1anz, PLLC 
l 673 \\/. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Scott R. Learned 
Learned La\.vyer, PLLC 
94 2. \\'. tv1yrtie Street 
Boise. ldaho 83702 
p(] C.S. Mai! 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
l ] Overnight i\fail 
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[ ] Email 
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[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight l\l;ail 
D<l Facsimile 
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
Regan Charlton, ISB #9235 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive. Suite 200 l83702] 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise. ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988 
Email: eric@joncsandswartzlaw.com joy@j oncsandswartzlaw .com 
regan(~~}jonesandswartz.law .com 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 615-5327 
facsimile: (215) 650-5327 
Email: scottleamed(i3)msn.com 
Joh•nn 
Co:.:11 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN TTIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIU:: FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIUJ COUNTY OF BI ,AINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE. an individual; 
LAWSON & IASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limiled liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, d/h/a 
LAWSON. LASKI. CLARK. & POGUE. PLLC. 
Defendants. 
------... ----··-··----
Case No. CV 2U 13-683 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS• OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO DISALLOW 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
AN AW ARD OP ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO Dl:FENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS I 
381 
FROM TO 12087885527P2418003 30/2015 14 0410 #9591 P 003/006 
J, INTRODUCTION 
Despite Defendants' claims in their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Defendants' Opposition"), 
Defendants have not established that they arc entitled to attorney foes under Idaho Code §§ 12-
120(3 ), 12- t 2 J, 12-123, or any other .section. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Regardless of the Content of Plaintiff:-;' Claims, Defendants Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees under J.C. § 12-120(3) Because No Commercial Transaction Has Occurred Between the Parties. 
Defendants cite to the same case law that Plaintiffs cite in their Motion to Disallow but 
argue that Plaintiffs' claims were premised upon a commercial transaction for purposes of LC. 
§ 12-120(3) and therefore fees are appropriate. While Plaintiffs agree that an express 
commercial contract is not required for a foe award to be appropriate, Plaintiffs maintain the 
position that 1daho law requires that a commercial transa<:tion occur before fees may be awarded 
under I.C. § 12-120(3). Defendants cite to Garner v. Povey, 15I fdaho 462, 469 (201 I). and 
(irfat Plains Equip. Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466 (200 I), for the holding that 
"( l) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the commercial 
transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought'' for attorney fees to be appropriate. 
(Defendants' Opposition, p. 3.) The language is clear that the relevant question is not what the 
plaintiff is or is not claiming. the question is whether there is a commercial transaction that is 
integral to plaintiff's claim and whether that commercial transaction is the basis upon which the 
recovery is sought. As Defendants later state. the statute requires that there he a commercial 
transaction. City (~{'McCall v. Buxtun, 146 Idaho 656 (2009). 
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Herc, there was no commercial transaction (whether via contract or otherwise) between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants. While it is not integral to the relevant inquiry, Plaintiffs' claims were 
that Ocfondants breached duties they owed to Plaintiffs, not that there was a breach of a contract 
or conuncrcial transaction. There was no underlying transaction of any kind between the parties 
and thus there is no commercial transaction that can he integral to Plaintiffs' claims as required 
by law. 
R. Defendants Arc Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees Under I.C. Sections 12-121 and 12-123 Because Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Brought Frivolously. 
Defendants alternatively argue that they are entitled to fees hecausc Plaintiffs' claims 
were frivolous. (Defendants' Opposition, p. 5.) Defondants characterize Plaintiffs· lawsuit as a 
malpractice claim against a law firm and an attorney that Mr. Hughes never hired. (Defendants' 
Opposition, p. 5.) This characterization is not accurate. As Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
explains m detail. Plaintiffs produced evidence in support of their claims and Mr. I lughcs 
testified as to his rcasonahle belief about his and the partnership· s relationship with the 
Defendants. how Defendants breach lheir duties to the Plaintiffs, an<l how Defendants' conduct 
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under LC. § 48-lOL The Court wcighc<l the 
parties' arguments and evidence and relevant authority, and ultimately ruled in favor of the 
I)efcndants. However, there were some issues that were not ruled upon, some issues were 
decided based upon the weighing of conflicting testimony and evidence, and the Court ultimatdy 
had to make close calls about differing, reasonable interpretations of law. 
As Plaintiffs previously pointed out, where a party's claim. though unsuccessful. is 
offered in good faith with no intent to delay or hinder justice, the district court docs not abuse its 
discretion in denying attorney fees. Kelly v. Silverwood Es/ates, 127 Idaho 624, 630-31 (1995); 
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CunninKham v. Bundy, I 00 Idaho 456, 459 (l 979). A claim is not frivolous or lacking merit 
simply because it ultimately foils. l:,'dwards v. Don,lrt, l 16 Idaho 687, 688 (1989). Plaintiffs' 
claims were not brought in bad faith and should not be subject to an award of attorneys' fees 
under this provision. 
C. In the Event the Court Awards Attorneys• Fees to Defendants, the Amount 
Defendants Request Is Not Reasonable. 
Defendants claim that their fee demand is reasonable; however. they fail to adequately 
demonstrate how the requested entries were necessary and judicious. Plaintiffs defer to the 
Court's discretion on the issue of reasonableness but urge the Court to consider that requisite 
detaib and justification arc lacking in Dcfcndanls· demand, as pointed out in Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Disallow. 
HI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow, 
Plaintiffs rcspcctfolly request that this Court disallow Dt!fendants' Motion for Attorneys· Fees 
hecause Defendants have failed to estahlish that an award of attorney fees is appropriate pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3 ), 12-12 l and 12-123, or any other section. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015. 
JONES & SWARTZ PLI.C 
By~~-- -
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
Joy M. VEGA 
REGAN CHARI.TON 
Scon R. LEARNED 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
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CERTlFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HERERY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
John J. Janis 
Kira Dale Pfisterer 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Rannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
The Honorable John K. Butler 
District Judge 
Jerome County District Court 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
I J U.S. Mail 
IXJ Fax: 342-2927 
I I Hand Delivery 
L I Email: johnjanis@a()Lcom 
kdp@hcpworlhlaw.com 
[ ]U.S.Mail 
[X] Fax: (208) 644-2609 
I l Overnight Delivery 
I I Hand Delivery [ J Email: 
~ ·---··--ERIC B. SWARTZ 
Joy M. VE(iA 
REGAN CHARLTON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 20] 5, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
John J. Janis 
Kira Dale Pfisterer 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
The Honorable John K. Butler 
District Judge 
Jerome County District Court 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
I I U.S. Mail 
I.X J Fax: 342-2927 
[ l Hand Delivery 
l I Email: johnjanis@aol.com 
kdp@hcpworthlaw.com 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax: (208) 644-2609 
l l Overnight Delivery 
I I Hand Deli very 
[ ] Email: 
~ ·-·----
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
Joy M. VEGA 
REGAN CHARLTON 
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Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
Regan Charlton, ISB #9235 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
P.O. Box 7808 
FILED~~.~t 
FEB 1 9 20i5 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Scott R. Learned, ISB #6390 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 615-5327 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs H-D Transport and Vint Lee Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; and 
VINT LEE HUGHES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASK.I, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and 
LAWSON & LASK.I, PLLC, d/b/a 
LAWSON, LASK.I, CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2013-683 
ORDER ON DEFENDA.~S' 
MOTION FOR AN AW ARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants' MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES came on for hearing before 
this Court by telephone conference on February 2, 2015. Counsel Eric B. Swartz appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiffs, H-D Transport, an Idaho partnership, and Vint Lee Hughes. Counsel John J. 
Janis appeared on behalf of Defendants Michael D. Pogue, an individual; Lawson & Laski, 
PLLC and Lawson & Laski, PLLC d/b/a Lawson, Laski, Clark, & Pogue, PLLC. 
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After reviewing the submissions and arguments of the parties, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and for the reasons stated by the Court on the record, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for fees is DENIED. Defendants' 
motion for costs is hereby GRANTED in the amount of $66.00, awarded as normal costs of right 
to the prevailing party. 
DATED this }~ day of February, 2015. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _!.i_ day of February, 2015, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Eric B. Swartz 
JoyM. Vega 
Regan Charlton 
JONES & SW ARTZ PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Scott R. Learned 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
John J. Janis 
Kira Dale Pfisterer 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
[X] U.S. Mail 
( '] Fax: 489-8988 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
regan@jonesandswartzlaw.com 
[YI U.S. Mail 
[ } Fax: (215) 650-5327 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: scottlearned@msn.com 
1zl_ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax: 342-2927 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email: johnjanis@aol.com 
kdp@hepworthlaw.com 
JOLYNN DRAGE, CLERK 
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John J. Janis [ISB No. 3599] 
Kira Dale Pfisterer [ISB No. 6571] 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
53 7 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Telephone: (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FILED~~~-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, an Idaho partnership; 
and VINT LEE HUGHES, 
* * * * * 
) 
) Case No. CV 2013-683 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, an individual; 
LAWSON & LASKI, PLLC, a professional 
limited liability company; and LAWSON & 
LASKI, PLLC, d/b/a LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
---------------
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, H-D TRANSPORT AND VINT 
LEE HUGHES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: ERIC B. SWARTZ, JONES & SW ARTZ, 
PLLC, 1673 W. SHORELINE DR., SUITE 200, BOISE, IDAHO 83702 AND SCOTT R. 
LEARNED, LEARNED LAWYER, PLLC, 942 W. MYRTLE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO 
83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - l 
!] OAIGftJAL 
NOTICE IS GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 18 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, that: 
l. The above-named Defendants/Respondents, cross-appeal against the above-named 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Defendants' Motion for an 
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, dated February 19, 2015. 
2. The Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Order 
described above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule l l(a), I.AR. 
3. The following is a preliminary statement of the issue which Respondents intend to 
assert on appeal: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys' Fees. 
4. Cross-Appellants request a Reporter's Transcript be prepared in both hard copy and 
electronic format of the following: 
a. Hearing on Defendant's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 
held on February 2, 2015. The reporter is Denise Schloder. Ms. Schloder 
indicated the fee for the transcript is $3 5. 7 5 and a check was mailed to her in 
that amount. 
5. Cross-Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28(b )(1) of the Idaho Appellate Rules 
and in addition to those requested by the Appellants in their Notice of Appeal: 
a. Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, entered 
November 26, 2014; 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 2 
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b. Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, entered 
November 26, 2014; 
c. Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Defendants' Motion for an A ward of Attorney 
Fees and Costs, entered December 11, 2014; 
d. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Defendants' 
Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, entered December 11, 
2014; 
e. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Defendants' Motion for an 
Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, entered January 26, 2015; 
f. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, entered 
January 30, 2015; 
g. Order on Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 
entered February 19, 2015. 
6. Cross-Appellants request no additional documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits. 
7. The undersigned hereby certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Cross-Appeal and a check in the amount of 
$35.75 has been served on the Reporter from whom the transcript has been 
requested at the address set out below: 
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Denise Schloder 
c/o Judge John K. Butler 
Jerome County Courthouse 
233 W. Main Street 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
b. The estimated fee for the additions requested for the Clerk's record here of 
$ I 00.00 has been paid; 
c. The filing fee of $129.00 to the Blaine County Clerk of the Court for this 
Cross-Appeal has been paid. 
d. That service has been made upon all parties and counsel required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R. 
fl-
DA TED this 9 day of March, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this .zr::-ctay of March, 2015, he caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Eric B. Swartz 
Jones & Swartz, PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Dr., Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Scott R. Learned 
LEARNED LA WYER PLLC 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
H-D TRANSPORT, and VINT LEE HUGHES, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs /Appellants/Cross Respondents, ) 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, LAWSON & 
LASKI, PLLC, dba LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross Appellants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Blaine ) 
Supreme Court No. 42921 
CLERKS CERTIFICATE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all, if any, exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WH;f/OF, I have here470 set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this day of {tpt?d, , 2015. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
TRANSPORT, and VINT LEE HUGHES, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs /Appellants/Cross Respondents, ) 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. POGUE, LAWSON & 
LASKI, PLLC, dba LAWSON, LASKI, 
CLARK, & POGUE, PLLC, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross Appellants. ) 
---------------- ) 
Supreme Court No. 42921 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and 
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
PO Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
/Cross Respondents 
JOHN J. JANIS 
PO Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
/Cross Appellants 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF~: ~ereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this I'-/ day of tIE/?j_ / , 2015. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
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